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INTRODUCTION
Dr. John Mendelsohn did not have a very good year in 2001. As
president of the prestigious University of Texas M.D. Anderson
Cancer Center, Mendelsohn enjoyed a reputation as one of the best
cancer doctors in the country. He also worked as a high profile
ambassador for the institution. Under his tenure, M.D. Anderson
raised its public visibility, attracted record donations from private
philanthropists, and doubled both its budget and federal research
funding.
1
But, in 2001 two seemingly unrelated business disasters hit in
succession-Enron and ImClone. Dr. Mendelsohn figured promi-
nently in the news again, but this was not the typical favorable
coverage. In the ImClone fiasco, Mendelsohn's involvement made
more sense. Dr. Mendelsohn served on the corporate board of
ImClone, a New York biotechnology company, owned ImClone stock,
and helped develop its leading experimental cancer drug, Erbitux.2
In early 2001, ImClone's fortunes seemed to be riding high on the
prospects of Erbitux receiving full approval by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) relatively early in the drug's testing cycle. In
late December of that year, however, the FDA declined to give the
drug early approval, questioning some of the clinical trial data and
concluding that more testing needed to be done before it could be
cleared as safe and effective for clinical care. ImClone's stock price
plummeted when this bad news hit the financial markets.3 The
downward turn of events then generated an insider trading scandal
of epic proportions. Securities regulators accused Samuel Waksal,
ImClone's CEO, of tipping family members to sell their ImClone
stock in advance of the FDA announcement.4 The ImClone scandal
1. Leigh Hopper, Cancer Crusader Weathers Scandals: ImClone and Enron Don't Derail
President of M.D. Anderson, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 30, 2003, at A33.
2. Justin Gillis, A Hospital's Conflict of Interest: Patients Weren't Told of Stake in Cancer
Drug, WASH. POST, June 30, 2002, at Al.
3. Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV.
1, 28 (2003).
4. Id. at 28-29. Waksal ended up pleading guilty to securities fraud, conspiracy,
obstruction of justice, perjury, and bank fraud. Press Release, United States Attorney,
Southern District of New York, Samuel Waksal Sentenced in Federal Court to 7 Years 3
Months in Prison, Fined $3 Million (June 10, 2003). He also was fined $3 million and ordered
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also engulfed lifestyle entrepreneur Martha Stewart. Ms. Stewart
was convicted on federal criminal charges of obstruction of justice
and related counts arising from a governmental investigation as to
whether she sold her ImClone stock based on an illegal inside tip.5
With the Waksal and Stewart charges dominating the news,
another troubling aspect of the ImClone saga received considerably
less attention. Clinical investigators tested Erbitux on approxi-
mately 195 research subjects at M.D. Anderson. All this occurred
while Dr. Mendelsohn simultaneously served as M.D. Anderson's
president and yet remained financially and operationally involved
with ImClone, including still serving on the ImClone corporate
board.6 The research subjects were not told that the medical center's
president had a very large financial stake in the company develop-
ing the experimental drug.7 In fact, Mendelsohn made approxi-
mately $6 million on the sale of twenty percent of his ImClone
shares in November 2001. Although Mendelsohn did not directly
conduct the Erbitux trials at M.D. Anderson-other faculty
members did the actual research--critics still questioned the
potentially serious conflict of interest for M.D. Anderson's top
executive and for the medical center generally?
to pay restitution of more than $1.2 million. See id. Interestingly, later clinical studies in
Europe suggested that Erbitux is indeed an effective drug for colon cancer patients. See Todd
Ackerman, New Study Validates Cancer Drug Erbitux, HOUS. CHRON., June 2, 2003, at Al.
Thus, the FDA recently approved the release of Erbitux onto the commercial market. See
Andrew Poflach, ImClone Cancer Drug Behind Martha Stewart Trial Is Approved by F.D.A.,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at C2.
5. Waksal and Stewart coincidentally shared the same broker. See Superseding
Indictment at 2, 5, United States v. Stewart, S1 03 Cr. 717 (MGC) (S.D.N.Y.). Allegedly, the
broker, through his assistant, told Stewart about impending bad news for the company and
advised her to sell her ImClone stock. Id. at 7. Ms. Stewart faced federal charges of, among
other things, obstruction of justice and perjury in connection with the government's
investigation as to why she sold her ImClone shares, as well as securities fraud for allegedly
misleading investors in her own company about her actions in the ImClone trading scandal.
See id. at 1-24. The securities fraud count was thrown out during the trial, but the jury
convicted Stewart on all other charges. See Constance L. Hays & Leslie Eaton, Stewart Found
Guilty of Lying in Sale of Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at Al.
6. Todd Ackerman, Doctor Regrets Failure to Tell of Stake in Drug, HOUS. CHRON., July
4, 2002, at Al.
7. Gillis, supra note 2.
8. Todd Ackerman, Report Tackles Conflicts Within Medical Research: M.D. Anderson
Faced Related Flap, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 26, 2002, at A27.
9. See Gillis, supra note 2; M.D. Anderson in ImClone Media Hype, PHARMA
MARKETLETTER, July 15, 2002; Mary Papenfuss, The Patient or the Portfolio?, Salon.com, Dec.
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Among the concerns arising from the Erbitux episode, the
relatively passive role of M.D. Anderson's institutional review board
(IRB) stands out. Why did the M.D. Anderson IRB allow all of this
to happen in the first place? IRBs, the federally required research
review committees at major academic medical centers, are responsi-
ble for reviewing, approving, and monitoring research protocols
involving human subjects.' ° Did the oversight body fail to take
appropriate actions? Should it have investigated the potential
conflicts of interest and moved the Erbitux clinical trials to another
medical center? Should the IRB have at least insisted that research
subjects be told about the financial ties during the informed consent
process?"
ImClone actually presented the second major headache for Dr.
Mendelsohn in 2001. He also had the misfortune of being associated
with the downfall of Enron, one of the major business disasters in
American history. Enron, an energy trading giant and the seventh
largest company in the United States shortly before its collapse,
began to unravel in mid-2001. Enron management insiders
allegedly had caused the company to enter into a number of off
balance sheet transactions with affiliated entities under
arrangements benefiting several of the insiders while hiding the
corporation's true financial debt. When Enron issued restated
financial statements revealing more accurate debt estimates,
swift and severe market disfavor resulted, eventually culminat-
ing with the company declaring bankruptcy in December 2001.12
9, 2002, at http://archive.Salon.com/mwt/feature/2002/12/09/clinictrials/index.html.
10. See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-50.56 (2003) (Food and Drug Administration
regulations); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.409 (2003) (Department of Health and Human Services
regulations); infra notes 65-95 and accompanying text.
11. Dr. Mendelsohn later apologized for not ensuring that the cancer trial subjects were
told about his ties to ImClone. Hopper, supra note 1. Meanwhile, M.D. Anderson has changed
its policy to require disclosure of such information to research subjects. Todd Ackerman, Feds
Had Advised Hospitals to Reveal any Financial Interests in Drug Trials, HOUS. CHRON., July
2, 2002, at Al; Hopper, supra note 1.
12. For a thorough examination of Enron's downfall, see generally ENRON: CORPORATE
FIAScOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). The
Enron debacle has been described as "a synergistic combination of human errors and hubris:
a 'Titanic' miscalculation ...." Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, in
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra, at 927, 930 (footnote omitted).
For other overviews of Enron's collapse, see Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The
Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855,856-59 (2003);
6232004]
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Dr. Mendelsohn's connection to Enron surprised many. Although a
research doctor, he served on Enron's board of directors as well as
on the board's audit committee. He apparently had performed his
role as ambassador for M.D. Anderson Cancer Center quite well,
forging relationships with the business and social elite in Houston,
which later earned him an invitation onto the Enron board.13
Among the many questions emanating from the Enron debacle:
where was the Enron corporate board? Boards of directors are
supposed to monitor management for the benefit of shareholders.
Why did the Enron board allegedly approve the questionable off
balance sheet transactions and waive conflict of interest policies for
senior executives? Did the Enron directors really even know and
truly understand the grave financial risks senior management
caused the corporation to take? Why did the board not suspect
alleged self-dealing and false financial reporting by management
insiders when numerous signals indicated something might be
wrong? 4
The connection between the conduct of the Enron corporate board
and the conduct of the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center IRB might, at
first blush, seem to be a fluke. One entity, a corporate board elected
by shareholders, appears to have very little to do with the other, an
internal research oversight committee, other than the fortuitous
involvement of Dr. Mendelsohn. The major proposition of this
Article, however, is that there is indeed a very strong connection.
The alleged problems with the Enron corporate board resonate with
and have major implications for understanding the alleged monitor-
ing deficiencies of the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center IRB. This
Article contends that policy makers and health law scholars
interested in better understanding and improving research over-
Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233,
1233-34 (2003).
13. Mendelsohn became acquainted with Ken Lay, Enron's former CEO, through his
efforts to target major philanthropic supporters for the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center. See
Hopper, supra note 1. Lay later asked Mendelsohn if the physician would like to serve on the
Enron board. See id.; Jo Thomas & Reed Abelson, How a Top Medical Researcher Became
Entangled with Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at C1.
14. See S. REP. No. 107-70 (2002), available at http'//www.senate.gov/-gov affairs
070902enronboardreport.pdf; Elson & Gyves, supra note 12, at 858-62; Troy A. Paredes,
Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in
ENRON: CORPORATE FiASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 12, at 495, 503-15.
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sight performed by the nation's IRBs should pay more attention to
the role of boards of directors in corporate governance.
Like London and Paris in A Tale of Two Cities, this is "the best of
times" and "the worst of times" for IRBs and corporate boards." As
a result of several high profile research subject deaths at major
institutions, such as Johns Hopkins University" and the University
of Pennsylvania," IRBs have come under increasing fire. Leading
academic medical centers have had their research programs
temporarily suspended because of IRBs' alleged failures to protect
research subjects.'" A recent series of critical government reports
15. As Charles Dickens wrote: "It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was
the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness ...." CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES
7 (First Vintage Classics 1990) (1859).
16. In 2001, Ellen Roche, a healthy subject, volunteered to participate in a Johns Hopkins
University trial that was designed to study the effects of nebulized hexamethonium on the
physiology of asthma. She died after participating. An internal investigation concluded the
death was most likely the result of an adverse reaction to the experimental drug. Among the
problems identified were that: (1) the IRB approved the use ofboilerplate consent forms which
failed to identify the drug's pulmonary toxicity and failed to mention that it was not currently
FDA approved for human use nor had it ever been approved as an inhalant; (2) the IRB did
not conduct substantive or meaningful ongoing review of trials once approved; (3) the IRB
members did not sufficiently understand what the federal research regulations required; and
(4) protocols were not presented individually and were not discussed in detail when a majority
of IRB members were present. See generally Bette-Jane Crigger, What Does It Mean to
"Review" a Protocol?: Johns Hopkins & OHRP, 23 IRB: ETHICS AND HUM. RES. 13, 13-15
(2001).
17. In 1999, Jesse Gelsinger died after participation in a gene therapy study at the
University of Pennsylvania. See Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research: IRB Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach,
28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 379, 379 (2000). Investigations after his death found several problems
with the oversight of the trial, including that: (1) he was allowed to enroll in the trial despite
the fact that his clinical condition did not meet the narrow eligibility criteria for the study;
(2) researchers had not told the federal agencies or the IRB about severe side effects
experienced by previous research subjects; (3) the consent form approved by the IRB did not
disclose previous subjects' complications or the death of animal subjects that had received the
therapy; (4) documentation was lacking that all subjects received appropriate information
about the risks and benefits of the therapy; and (5) Gelsinger allegedly was not told about the
investigator's and University's complicated financial ties with the company sponsoring the
research and that the investigator had patents on some aspects of the procedure. In fact, the
principal investigator had a 30% equity interest and the University a 3.2% equity interest in
the company sponsoring the trial. See generally Mark Barnes & Patrik S. Florencio, Financial
Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research: The Problem of Institutional Conflicts, 30
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 394 (2002); Goldner, supra, at 379-80; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The
Biotech Death of Jesse Gelsinger, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 28, 1999, at 136.
18. See, e.g., Philip J. Hilts, Safety Concerns Halt Oklahoma Research, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 2000, at F12 (discussing suspension of human experiments at the University of
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:619
concludes that IRBs review too many protocols in too rapid a
timeframe while lacking sufficient resources and expertise.19 Critics
charge that the IRB system of review simply is tilted too much in
favor of researcher and institutional interests at the expense of
human subject protection.2 ° In short, this has been called a time of
"crisis" in which IRBs are "under strain" and awaiting serious
reform."
Meanwhile, with recent high profile business disasters at large,
publicly traded corporations such as Enron and WorldCom,22 these
are also very unsettling, difficult times in corporate boardrooms.
Oklahoma); Gina Kolata, Johns Hopkins Death Brings Halt to U.S. Financed Human Studies,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20,2001, at Al (discussing suspension of human research at Johns Hopkins
University); J. Obermayer & S. Kauffiman, Duke Awaits Research Ruling, NEWS & OBSERVER,
May 14, 1999, at B1; Duff Wilson & David Heath, Class-Action Suit Filed Against 'The Hutch,'
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 27, 2001, at Al (discussing a suit filed against the Fred Hutchison
Cancer Research Center at the University of Washington).
19. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: HHS DIRECTION
NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2001); NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY
COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS (2001);
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARDS: A TIME FOR REFORM (1998) [hereinafter IRBS: A TIME]; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: STATUS OF
RECOMMENDATIONS (2000) [hereinafter PROTECTING SUBJECTS]; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RECRUITING HUMAN SUBJECTS: PRESSURES IN INDUSTRY-
SPONSORED CLINICAL RESEARCH (2000) [hereinafter RECRUITING SUBJECTS]; see also Robert
Steinbrook, Improving Protection for Research Subjects, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1425, 1425-26
(2002).
20. See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, The Role of Institutional Review Boards in Protecting
Human Subjects: Are We Really Ready to Fix a Broken System?, 26 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1,
39-41 (2002); John Biemer, Research Overload?, HouS. CHRON., Aug. 29, 2001, at 17A; Kerry
Burke, Note, Loose-Fitting Genes: The Inadequacies in Federal Regulation of Institutional
Review Boards, 3 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 10, 1 41 (Apr. 10, 1997), at http://www.bu.edu/law/
scitech/volume3/ 3JSTL10.pdf.
21. See COMM. ON ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS, INST. OF MED., RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PROTECTING
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 5 (Daniel D. Federman et al. eds., 2003); Robert J. Levine,
Institutional Review Boards: A Crisis in Confidence, 134 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 161, 161
(2001) ("There is a sense of crisis in the country about the effectiveness of the nationwide
system that protects the rights and welfare of human research subjects.").
22. For the Enron troubles, see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. As for
WorldCom, in June 2002, the company announced that it had overstated its earnings by $3.8
billion in previous years by treating various expense items inaccurately as capital
investments. See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 21. The bad news led to a steep decline in the
trading price of WorldCom stock, and the company eventually filed for bankruptcy in July
2002. Id. The company and its CEO, Bernard Ebbers, face numerous fraud charges filed by
the SEC. Id. at 21-22.
626
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The conduct of corporate boards features prominently in the current
business scandals. 23 As with the current period of IRB crisis, this is
perceived to be a critical time for corporate boards, "a watershed
moment in U.S. corporate governance."24
Although IRBs and corporate boards both seem to be navigating
troubled waters, not all is bleak. For one, because of the renewed
attention, reformers have come forward with ideas to improve the
monitoring effectiveness of both corporate boards and IRBs. On the
corporate governance side, significant legal and regulatory changes
are already underway. For example, the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and revisions to the New York Stock Exchange and National
Association of Securities Dealers listing requirements are pushing
corporations to adopt different approaches to board composition and
conduct. 25 Market pressures and other factors have also contributed
to a renewed interest in more vigorous board performance.2 6 On the
IRB side, both the influential Institute of Medicine and the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission recently issued reports calling for
significant changes to the IRB system of human subjects research
oversight.2 In addition, the Department of Health and Human
Services has issued relatively new regulatory guidance directed at
23. E. Norman Veasey, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, noted that
independent reports of the Enron and WorldCom collapses "point to colossal corporate
governance failures of the boards of directors in carrying out their duties to direct the
management of the business and affairs of the firms." E. Norman Veasey, Corporate
Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron Worldcom Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
839, 840 (2003).
24. E!son & Gyves, supra note 12, at 856.
25. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text; see also Elson & Gyves, supra note 12,
at 856, 874-79 (discussing the New York Stock Exchange listing standards and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act as a response to the Enron failure).
26. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 562-63 (2003) (discussing several factors at play in the
trend, taking hold in the 1990s, toward more active and effective director oversight, including
the demands of institutional investors for more responsive boards); Veasey, supra note 23, at
840-41 (discussing the demands of institutional investors for more accountability and
independence of directors, and lawyer reforms in this area).
27. See COMM. ON ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS, INST. OF MED., supra note 21, at 44; COMM. ON ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR
PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS, INST. OF MED., PRESERVING PUBLIC TRUST:
ACCREDITATION AND HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANT PROTECTION PROGRAMS 6-21 (2001);
NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 19, at xi-xxi.
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helping IRBs do a better job of evaluating investigator and institu-
tional financial conflicts of interest.28
What seems odd is that the many groups seeking to understand
and improve the performance of IRBs and corporate boards have
paid little attention to one another, perhaps oblivious to the
similarities in governance and oversight undertaken by both types
of boards. It is important to bridge this gap, especially for health
law policy makers and scholars. This Article contributes to the
ongoing debates over IRB reform by contending that a deeper,
richer, more nuanced understanding of the IRB as an oversight and
governance body is gained by considering how IRBs exhibit
institutional strengths and limitations very similar to those of
corporate boards.29
Development of such comparative institutional analysis is
particularly important for health law and policy scholarship in the
area of human subjects research. Government estimates indicate
that 3,000 to 5,000 IRBs now operate across the country.3 ° Indeed,
the IRB serves as the "centerpiece" in the current regulatory system
of protecting research subjects.31 Yet, scholars and policy makers
experience understandable confusion and frustration in attempting
to develop a coherent taxonomy for IRBs. Although IRBs historically
looked and functioned very much like peer review committees,32
they have morphed into larger oversight bodies, comprised of both
scientific peers and non-scientists, and have a complicated structure
and perform numerous functions no longer limited to a traditional
peer review body. The IRB defies easy categorization. It has at times
been compared to the jury system,33 to a quasi-regulatory agency, 34
28. See Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving Human Subjects:
Guidance for Human Subject Protection, 69 Fed. Reg. 26,393, 26,395-97 (May 12, 2004).
29. Conversely, scholars and reformers interested in corporate governance might benefit
from paying greater attention to IRBs, but this latter inquiry-how an IRB perspective might
impact corporate governance issues-is beyond the intended scope of this Article.
30. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEPr OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARDS: THEIR ROLE IN REVIEWING APPROVED RESEARCH 3 (1998) [hereinafter IRBS:
THEIR ROLE].
31. Levine, supra note 21, at 161.
32. For a discussion of the initial peer review committees, see infra Part I.A.
33. See Carl H. Coleman, Rationalizing Risk Assessment in Human Subject Research, 46
ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4, 13-27 (2004) (arguing that IRBs and juries follow similar decision-making
processes).
34. See LARS NOAH & BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY:
628 [Vol. 46:619
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and even to a "deputy sheriff' of the government.3" Yet none of these
descriptions fully captures its essential nature. The IRB remains a
very strange entity, with diverse and not always consistent
expectations about its performance. It is little surprise, then, that
it has been described as an institutional "giraffe," because "so odd
is it when compared to other creatures in the jungle."36
Perhaps looking to the more developed track record of corporate
boards can help. In short, this Article claims that the IRB "giraffe"
can be better understood by considering how, functionally, it
performs much like a mini-corporate board, overseeing significant
components of the research enterprise within an institution, just as
a corporate board oversees the general business of the firm. To start,
and by way of qualification, it is acknowledged that obvious
differences exist between the corporate board, a governance entity
for the overall firm subject to shareholder elections and influenced
by market forces, and the IRB, a body created by federal regulation
and charged to protect research subjects. The more narrow position
advanced here is that, despite the different environments in which
they work and their distinct overall missions, examination of how
IRBs and corporate boards actually operate reveals that they have
much in common both structurally and functionally. The parallels
are at least significant enough to merit greater attention to
corporate governance debates by persons seriously interested in IRB
reform. The comparison advanced in this Article also remains
CASES AND MATERIALS 155 (2002) (questioning whether it is appropriate for the FDA to
delegate "quasi-regulatory" functions to IRBs when most IRBs are not, technically,
government entities). Lars Noah emphasizes that IRBs do not exercise full regulatory powers
as do bona fide agencies. Yet, IRBs may involve some limited governmental delegation of
authority, at least to the extent that the federal agencies depend on IRBs as front-line
monitors. Noah ultimately characterizes the IRB as an example of an "audited self-
regulation" system. See Lars Noah, Deputizing Institutional Review Boards to Police (Audit?)
Biomedical Research, 25 J. LEGAL MED. (forthcoming 2004); see also John A. Robertson, The
Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484, 539 n.271 (1979) ("Like other
governmental bodies, [IRBs] may have policy-making, executive, administrative, or even
judicial powers: legislative powers when they prescribe rules and policies for implementing
their mandate, executive powers in administering the review process, and judicial powers in
deciding whether an investigator complied with IRB directives.").
35. See Thomas A. Huff, The IRB as Deputy Sheriff. Proposed FDA Regulation of the
Institutional Review Board, 27 CLINICAL RES. 103 (1979).
36. Harold Edgar & David J. Rothman, The Institutional Review Board and Beyond:
Future Challenges to the Ethics of Human Experimentation, 73 MILBANK Q. 489, 489 (1995).
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intentionally limited to boards for public corporations. Boards of
directors for close corporations present distinct issues that make
them less analogous to IRBs.
37
IRBs and corporate boards suffer from remarkably similar
drawbacks regarding their structure, composition, procedures, and
operations. All of these factors combine to make these entities
imperfect monitoring agents to represent the interests of their
purported principals-research subjects and shareholders. For
example, individuals serving on IRBs and corporate boards face
enormous conformity pressures and possible social sanctions for
aggressive oversight. They can become entangled in and compro-
mised by complex, personal relationships with each other and the
very actors they are supposed to monitor. Additionally, IRBs and
corporate boards are comprised of a mix of "inside" and "outside"
interests. Corporate boards ordinarily include "inside" directors who
are directly employed by the firm and "outside" directors, non-
employees who are nominally more independent.38 Similarly, IRBs
include "inside" members, typically researchers and other personnel
who work within the institution, as well as "outside" members,
37. There are many similarities in the relationships between: (1) the research subject and
IRB, and (2) the shareholder and corporate board. Both the research subject and the
shareholder depend upon a relatively well insulated board to monitor vigorously and to take
actions for his or her benefit, even though he or she wields, as a practical matter, very little
influence over the board.
The situation is very different, however, for close corporations. In close corporations, many
shareholders typically serve on the board and are also officers. See David W. Leebron, Limited
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 1565, 1626 (1991). The different
monitoring dynamics and relationships between the board and shareholders in the close
corporation, therefore, make it a less useful comparison for understanding IRBs.
In addition, the limited focus of this Article does not include a discussion of nonprofit
corporate boards. Nonprofit corporate boards have not been studied and analyzed as in-depth
as the boards of publicly traded firms. There are, however, interesting parallels between IRBs
and nonprofit boards. Just as in the research subject-IRB relationship, members of a nonprofit
corporation depend on the board of trustees to act on their behalf, though the members often
wield very little influence over the board. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the
Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 227, 238-39 (describing the lack of
member control over nonprofit boards).
38. Employment by the firm is the traditional way of distinguishing "inside" from
"outside" directors. See Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate
Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 900 (1996). Others
have questioned, however, how "outside" the perspective is of a non-employed director who
represents an entity that does substantial business with the firm, such as a director employed
by the firm's investment banker, outside auditor, or principal supplier. See id. at 900 n.8.
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usually non-scientists drawn from the larger community who have
no affiliation with the institution. 9 This inside/outside mix is
fraught with complications in terms of how it affects a board's or
IRB's overall monitoring effectiveness.
More generally, IRBs and corporate boards share a significant
degree of insularity. They operate largely free from the control-
ling influence of individual research subjects and shareholders.
Additionally, IRB members and corporate directors suffer from
similar informational and time constraints in performing their
duties. While IRB members and corporate directors are expected to
exert monitoring effort, there exist disappointingly few clear
external incentives for them to do so. As so much depends upon the
goodwill and commitment of dedicated individuals serving on the
boards, the effective performance of IRBs and corporate boards
becomes quite difficult to ensure. Goodwill and commitment can be
in short supply and, in any event, cannot compensate for all the
inherent problems with corporate board and IRB review. IRBs and
corporate boards raise the same critical challenge for health law and
corporate law: who is monitoring the monitors?"0 Moreover, why
should these oversight bodies be trusted and even expected to do a
good job?
Applying the corporate governance perspective helps to illuminate
not only the problems in using the IRB as a monitoring body but
also the IRB's unappreciated power and strength as an oversight
and governance institution. In other words, although IRBs may not
be particularly adept monitoring bodies, they should not be
dismissed as useless and moribund. Corporate governance theorists
similarly have struggled to understand why the corporate board,
which seemingly has few legal and other incentives to act as a
vigorous monitoring agent for shareholders, makes sense as a
governance entity. The corporate governance literature, however,
has identified multiple non-monitoring functions, such as acting as
a mediating hierarch among different stakeholders in the firm, that
the corporate board remains uniquely positioned to perform, even
39. See infra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
40. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 873-76 (1991); Philip J. Hilts, In
Tests on People, Who Watches the Watchers?, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1999, at Fl.
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if, at times, it is a weak monitoring agent.41 The corporate board
experience suggests that the IRB remains positioned to perform
important, non-monitoring functions as well-features which need
to be accounted for in any proposed IRB reform.
Part I of this Article reviews the legal and historical background
of IRBs. It briefly explores how IRBs first became part of the federal
regulatory scheme, how they have evolved from peer review
committees to take on a more complicated structure and multiple
missions, and their central role in research oversight today. Part II
explores the many shared features and characteristics of IRBs and
corporate boards. Both entities raise many of the same agency cost
problems, in that IRBs and corporate boards are poor monitoring
representatives for their principals-research subjects and
shareholders-for remarkably similar reasons.
Part III, drawing on corporate governance theory, discusses the
monitoring trade-off problem of corporate boards. Corporate
directors perform many important non-monitoring functions, such
as mediating among the corporation's stakeholders and performing
a service role in providing strategic planning advice to senior
executives. Increasing the monitoring function, however, presents
a dilemma, as it may make corporate boards less able to fulfill their
significant non-monitoring roles adequately. This Part also consid-
ers how IRBs can perform overlooked, critical, non-monitoring
functions too, such as mediating among the different stakeholders
involved in an institution's research enterprise. Reform proponents
should recognize that IRBs, like corporate boards, confront a
monitoring trade-off dilemma as well.
Part IV explores preliminary implications of the corporate
governance perspective by asking what IRB reformers could learn
from corporate boards. It sounds a note of caution regarding two
significant proposals currently attracting much support within the
IRB reform movement: (1) efforts to increase the number of "out-
side" community members serving on IRBs; and (2) calls for IRBs to
take a more direct role in reviewing financial conflicts of interest.
The corporate governance perspective suggests that adjusting the
insider/outsider mix likely will not register much of an impact
41. See infra text accompanying notes 249-58 (discussing the corporate board's role as a
mediating hierarch).
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without also changing the underlying process by which all members
are appointed to IRBs and without deeper modifications to IRB
structures, procedures, and operations. As for financial conflicts of
interest, the corporate governance perspective suggests that IRBs
may be particularly ill suited for this type of review.
Part V concludes with a brief discussion of the importance of
social norms, rather than laws and regulations, in understanding
corporate board behavior. A critical lesson IRB reform proponents
should heed from the experience of corporate boards is that
improving board performance will require paying much greater
attention to the norms surrounding IRB service.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF IRBs AND THEIR ROLE
IN RESEARCH REGULATION
Nearly all research proposals involving human subjects must
obtain approval by an IRB. Yet for all the apparent power they
wield, IRBs are incredibly strange institutions that are not neces-
sarily well designed for their multiple assigned roles. The reasons
for this can partially be found in a review of IRB history. Although
IRBs originated as peer review committees, they have suffered from
mission creep. That is, IRBs have been urged to perform not only
peer review but also monitoring, ethical analysis, legal counseling,
regulatory compliance, and policy formulation. At the same time,
IRBs are also expected to reflect diverse viewpoints, including those
of non-scientists. Thus, IRBs have morphed into hybrid entities that
function very differently from their peer review body ancestors.
A. The Initial Peer Review Committees in the 1950s and 1960s
IRBs formally became part of the federal research regulatory
scheme in 1974 through regulations issued by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare,42 but their origins trace further
back. The development of the Nuremberg Code43 in the aftermath
42. See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914 (May 30, 1974) (subsequently
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
43. See The Nuremberg Code (1949), reprinted in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD:
MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION 490-91 (Robert J. Amdur & Elizabeth A. Bankert eds., 2002).
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of World War II and the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964" introduced
critical new ethical standards for the conduct of human experimen-
tation. These standards emphasized the individual rights of
research subjects, the importance of informed consent, and the
appropriate balancing of risks and benefits in presenting research
opportunities to subjects.45 The ethical guidelines, however, did not
clearly call for separate review and approval of research protocols
by distinct, deliberative bodies such as IRBs. Indeed, the original
versions of these ethical guidelines pushed almost all responsibility
for the conduct of trials onto the principal investigators.46
However, in 1953, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) issued
the first set of federal guidelines calling for some form of peer
review of research studies by an investigator's professional col-
leagues.47 The guidelines applied only to some internal NIH
studies.' Apparently, the peer review idea came about in part
because of concern for "normal," healthy research subjects who were
not referred to a clinical trial by their doctor. Such volunteers,
because they did not have regular treating physicians acting on
their behalf, were thought to be particularly vulnerable and in need
of peer review as an additional safeguard. 49 During this period,
several academic medical centers developed their own informal
committees to review human subjects research within their own
institutions, even though the then-current legal and ethical
guidelines did not require it.
5 °
Despite the voluntary movement for separate reviewing bodies
during the 1950s and 1960s, research abuses still occurred.51 The
44. See World Med. Ass'n, Declaration of Helsinki (1964), reprinted in INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 43, at 499-500.
45. See The Nuremberg Code, supra note 43, at 490-91; World Med. Ass'n, supra note 44.
46. ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 322 (2d ed. 1986).
47. See id.; Marian F. Ratnoff, Who Shall Decide When Doctors Disagree? A Review of the
Legal Development of Informed Consent and the Implications of Proposed Lay Review of
Human Experimentation, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 472, 502 (1975).
48. See LEVINE, supra note 46, at 322; Ratnoff, supra note 47, at 502.
49. See Ratnoff, supra note 47, at 501-02.
50. See LEVINE, supra note 46, at 322-23.
51. Ethical guidelines, such as the Declaration of Helsinki, had failed to register much of
an impact and did not lead to widespread changes. See Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal
Controls on Human Experimentation and the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor
Katz Seriously, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 63, 92 (1993). For example, in an infamous study at the
Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn, investigators injected live cancer cells into
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government, recognizing increasing public concern, expanded the
use of peer review bodies in 1966, when the Surgeon General issued
a policy directive requiring that most Public Health Service (PHS)
funded research with human subjects, whether performed within
NIH or in private institutions, undergo prior review by a committee
of the investigator's peers.52 The review was supposed to focus on
the rights of individual subjects, informed consent, and appropriate-
ness of risks and benefits arising from the study. 3 Later PHS policy
directives clarified and expanded the peer review bodies' mission to
include accounting for ethical concerns and compliance with
relevant law. 4 In addition, the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (DHEW) extended the committee review requirement
to all institutions receiving DHEW research funds.55
Thus, the peer review bodies became saddled with mission creep.
Their initial limited purpose-to act on behalf of healthy subjects
who did not have preexisting relationships with physicians and to
provide technical reviews of research proposals--dramatically
expanded to consideration of ethical and legal issues. Yet, PHS's
vaguely written policies provided few specific mandates for the
reviewing bodies to follow.56 As a result, even as their potential
functions expanded, the reviewing bodies were left without clearly
defined standards to implement, leading to potential accountability
and performance evaluation problems.
As the issues considered by peer review bodies expanded, natural
questions arose as to their capacity. Committees comprised solely of
the investigator and his physician peers would not necessarily have
the training, expertise, or orientation necessary to tackle ethical and
elderly patients without their knowledge or consent. See Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease
Hosp., 251 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964). Henry Beecher's famous 1966 article in
the New England Journal of Medicine catalogued numerous such examples of post-World War
II studies that involved serious breaches of research ethics. See Henry K Beecher, Ethics and
Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1355-59 (1966).
52. See Dale H. Cowan, Human Experimentation: The Review Process in Practice, 25 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 533, 534-35 (1975); Charles R. McCarthy, The Institutional Review Board: Its
Origins, Purpose, Function, and Future, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS: ETHICS, LAW, &
SOCIAL POLICY 301, 307 (David N. Weisstub ed., 1998) (discussing the Surgeon General's
Policy and Procedure Order issued on February 8, 1966); Ratnoff, supra note 47, at 503.
53. See Ratnoff, supra note 47, at 503.
54. See LEVINE, supra note 46, at 323.
55. See Robertson, supra note 34, at 488.
56. See Goldner, supra note 51, at 95.
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legal implications or to account for community viewpoints. Thus,
by 1969, revised PHS guidelines strongly suggested that the
reviewing bodies include non-scientists. 7 During this period,
however, research scientists and physicians made up almost the
entire membership of the committees, and the representation of
other groups was extremely limited.5"
B. The National Research Act, Report of the National Commission,
and Initial Regulations
Public concern about research practices continued to mount
despite the implementation of the PHS peer review policies in the
mid-1960s. The uneasiness with human subject experimentation
was fueled by revelation of the federally funded Tuskegee
syphilis study, in which poor African-American men, suffering from
syphilis, were deliberately left untreated as part of a decades long
investigation into the natural history of the disease.59 The Tuskegee
scandal led to congressional hearings, demands for greater research
oversight, and eventually new legislation and regulations." DHEW
published final rules in May 1974, requiring that all DHEW-funded
research involving human subjects undergo prior review and
approval by a distinct research review committee.6 DHEW stood
firm in its position that at least some persons not affiliated with the
research institutions should serve on the committees.62 Although
57. See LEVINE, supra note 46, at 324. Others have suggested that the move to include
nonscientists on reviewing panels followed from developments in informed consent law. See
Joan P. Porter, WhatAre the Ideal Characteristics of Unaffiliated/Nonscientist IRB Members?,
8 IRB 1, 1 (1986). As the reasonable patient approach developed in case law in some
jurisdictions, clarifying that the disclosure obligation of the physician extended to what the
reasonable patient would want to know, it was similarly thought that IRBs should include at
least one nonscientist who could better represent a reasonable subject's point of view. See id.
58. See LEVINE, supra note 46, at 323-24.
59. See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 1-2, 4-5 (new
& expanded ed. 1993). Some of the research subjects were not even told that they had
contracted syphilis. Id. at 5.
60. See McCarthy, supra note 52, at 312-13; Robertson, supra note 34, at 488-89.
61. See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914, 18,917-20 (May 30, 1974)
(subsequently codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46). This followed DHEW's proposed regulations issued
in 1973. See Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,882 (proposed Oct. 9, 1973)
(subsequently codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
62. DHEW maintained that the addition of such outsiders helped protect "against the
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DHEW envisioned a committee structure that was more diverse
and free of institutional interests than a completely internal peer
review committee, the required presence of these outside members
did not necessarily mean much pragmatically or set a very high
bar.63
In any event, shortly after DHEW finalized its research regula-
tions in 1974, Congress passed the National Research Act.64 The Act
required that institutions receiving DHEW research funds establish
"Institutional Review Board[s] ... in order to protect the rights of the
human subjects .... " In 1975, DHEW reissued its previous research
regulations, relabeling the previous reviewing committees as IRBs,
to meet the requirement of the National Research Act. 6
The Act also authorized the creation of the National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (the Commission) and charged it, among other things,
with further studying the role of IRBs.67 The Commission issued its
IRB Report in 1978.6 It endorsed the view that, in addition to any
protections offered to human subjects by informed consent require-
ments, an IRB review system independent of the investigator was
needed.69 Among its interesting recommendations, the Commission
advised that IRBs should be revamped as more effective monitoring
bodies by: (1) giving them direct funding from DHEW research
grants; (2) having at least one-third non-scientist membership; (3)
rewarding members with institutional "credit" for their IRB service;
development of insular or parochial committee attitudes, ... assist[ed] in maintaining
community contacts, and ... augment[ed] the credibility of the committee's independent role
in protection of the subject." Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. at 18,915.
63. Under the initial set of regulations, the committees needed to include only one
scientist and one person external to the research institution. See id. at 18,918. In addition,
the committees could still meet and deliberate in quorums that did not require the presence
of the nonaffiliated persons. Id. In other words, the committees were heavily tilted in favor
of research and institutional interests.
64. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
65. See National Research Act of 1974 § 212(a). This section was codified, but later
omitted in the revision. Similar provisions now appear in 42 U.S.C. § 289.
66. See Protection of Human Subjects, 40 Fed. Reg. 11,854 (Mar. 13, 1975) (subsequently
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
67. See National Research Act of 1974 §§ 201-202.
68. See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174 (Nov. 30, 1978).
69. See id. at 56,175.
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and (4) encouraging IRBs to obtain information on the progress of
trials not only from the investigator but also through independent
examinations of records, discussions with subjects, and direct
observations of the enrollment and informed consent process.7 °
In response to the Commission's recommendations, DHEW, which
was subsequently renamed the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), revised its research regulations again, issuing final
rules in 1981."' At approximately the same time, the FDA issued a
parallel set of research regulations that were substantially similar
to the HHS rules.72 The FDA regulations apply to clinical trials that
are testing drugs and devices for FDA approval, whereas the HHS
regulations apply to HHS-funded trials.
The final FDA and HHS regulations did not implement certain
key recommendations of the Commission. In fact, the agencies
made a series of pragmatic concessions and trade-offs, in which
they were unable, or unwilling, to structure IRBs with the active
monitoring capacity envisioned by the Commission. For example,
the final regulations did not implement the Commission's recom-
mendation that IRBs consist of at least one-third non-scientists,
and they allowed IRBs to continue with membership that was
largely dominated by scientific viewpoints.73 Nor did the final
regulations require direct grant funding for IRBs, leaving their
70. See id. at 56,176, 56,178.
71. DHEW had issued a new set of proposed regulations in 1979. See Proposed
Regulations Amending Basic HEW Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 44 Fed.
Reg. 47,688 (proposed Aug. 14, 1979) (subsequently codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46). The final
regulations were issued in 1981. See Final Regulations Amending Basic HHS Policy for the
Protection of Human Research Subjects, 46 Fed. Reg. 8,366 (Jan. 26, 1981) (subsequently
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
72. The FDA had published its own proposed standards for IRB review of clinical
investigations in August, 1978, before the Commission issued its report. See Standards for
Institutional Review Boards for Clinical Investigations, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,186 (proposed Aug.
8, 1978). The FDA withdrew its proposal, however, after the Commission's report was issued.
See Standards for Institutional Review Boards for Clinical Investigations; Withdrawal of
Proposal, 44 Fed. Reg. 47,698 (Aug. 14, 1979). The FDA decided to try to harmonize its
regulations with HHS and to respond to the Commission's report. When HHS issued its final
regulations in 1981, the FDA issued a parallel set of final regulations that were substantially
similar in terms of IRB review requirements and how IRBs function. See Protection of Human
Subjects; Informed Consent, 46 Fed. Reg. 8,942, 8,950-53 (Jan. 27, 1981) (subsequently
codified in scattered parts of 21 C.F.R.).
73. See Final Regulations Amending Basic HHS Policy for the Protection of Human
Research Subjects, 46 Fed. Reg. at 8,375-76.
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ability to marshal resources appropriate for their responsibilities
in a precarious state.74 Finally, and critically important, the final
regulations were considerably more vague than the Commission had
recommended concerning IRB procedures for ongoing monitoring of
already approved research studies.75
C. Alternatives and What Might Have Been
The IRB system of review described in the final 1981 FDA and
HHS rules is not the most obvious, logical choice for monitoring
research conduct. Letting local institutions essentially police
themselves seems to invite weak controls and investigator and
institutional bias. Also, researchers serving on IRBs will, by
professional orientation, be inclined to favor the pursuit of knowl-
edge and may evaluate experimental protocols differently than
reasonable subjects would.76 The IRB system, therefore, seems
fundamentally flawed if it is meant to represent the views of
research subjects.
For many of these reasons, other leading proposals of the day
would have bypassed a local IRB system of review in favor of
alternative procedures and monitoring bodies. For example, the
Commission considered recommending regional or national review
bodies that would have evaluated clinical research proposals,
removed from the academic institutions themselves.7" An earlier ad
hoc panel convened by DHEW to investigate the Tuskegee syphilis
scandal had recommended a system under which most research
protocols would undergo evaluation by separate, distinct peer and
lay review committees, subject to appellate-like review by a national
74. See id. at 8,386-91.
75. All HHS required was that investigators submit progress reports to the IRB "at least
annually." See id. at 8,378. It further stated that "[tihe precise procedure adopted by the IRB
for continuing review without unnecessarily hindering research should be left to the discretion
of the IRB." Id.
76. As critics of the early IRB review system pointed out, "[ilf scientists have an
understandably unique commitment to the value of the knowledge to be gained, their
judgments about what lay people will want to know are likely to be systematically skewed."
Robert M. Veatch, The National Commission on IRBs: An Evolutionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 22, 26 (1979).
77. See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174, 56,175 (Nov. 30, 1978).
63920041
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
regulatory body that would oversee research trials."8 Furthermore,
in the legislative debates leading to enactment of the National
Research Act, legislators introduced different bills that would have
emphasized lay review and public attitudes regarding research to a
larger degree than the local IRB system."9
The Commission offered the following explanation for why it
eventually favored a local IRB system of review rather than some of
the leading alternatives:
Compared to the possible alternatives of a regional or national
review process, local committees have the advantage of greater
familiarity with the actual conditions surrounding the conduct
of research. Such committees can work closely with [the]
investigator to assure that the rights and welfare of human
subjects are protected and, at the same time, that the applica-
tion of policies is fair to the investigators. They can contribute to
the education of the research community and the public regard-
ing the ethical conduct of research. The committees can become
resource centers for information concerning ethical standards
and federal requirements and can communicate with federal
officials and with- other local committees about matters of
common concern.
80
Although such considerations may have had some influence in
why the final IRB system was selected, clearly pragmatic politics
played a large part as well. The Commission, DHEW, and the FDA
no doubt recognized that a regional or national system of review
could prove costly and difficult to administer, particularly if clinical
investigators, dissatisfied with such a review system, regularly tried
to obstruct and evade it. A local IRB system of review likely seemed
more palatable to the research community and, therefore, easier to
implement.
Clearly, too, some element of path dependence was at play in the
development of IRBs. Although the Commission and federal
agencies had apparent discretion to consider a number of different
options, they all recommended a structure that was substantially
78. See Ratnoff, supra note 47, at 515-16.
79. See id. at 517 n.280.
80. See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 56,175-76.
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similar to what the previous DHEW regulations already required,
and that followed from the earlier PHS and NIH peer review
bodies."' The perceived path of least resistance may have been to
use the quasi-peer review mechanism that was already in place and
build upon that institutional structure rather than start anew with
radically different oversight bodies.
D. Regulatory Requirements and the Role of IRBs Today
The IRB review system finalized in the 1981 FDA and HHS
regulations has continued to the present without significant change.
Clinical trials involving human subjects, funded in whole or in part
by HHS, usually require IRB review. Industry sponsored clinical
trials developing drugs and devices for FDA approval-involving
testing performed with human subjects-also generally require IRB
review. 2 Many academic medical centers and other research
institutions file a general assurance with HHS and structure it to
require IRB review and compliance with the FDA and HHS
regulations for all human subjects research done on their premises,
even if the research is not federally funded, or the IRB review is not
otherwise required by the regulations.8 3 In addition, many founda-
tions and other private research funding organizations require
compliance with the FDA and HHS regulations, and therefore
81. Indeed, the Commission seems to have followed a deliberately "gradualist" method of
policy development by using much of the status quo framework and avoiding radical changes.
See Veatch, supra note 76, at 23.
82. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1, 56.103 (2003) (FDA regulations); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101, 46.109
(2003) (HHS regulations). The general requirements of the research regulations, including the
IRB review system, were extended to research funded or regulated by other federal agencies,
apart from HHS and FDA, with the adoption of the "Common Rule" by multiple other federal
agencies in 1991. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,003
(June 18, 1991); NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 154. It is the FDA and
HHS regulations, however, that have the broadest application, as they affect most clinical
research activities with human subjects in the United States.
83. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (2003); Jeffrey M. Cohen, OHRP Federal-Wide Assurance, in
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 43, at 313. The
assurance document is a type of contract between the research institution and HHS under
which the institution agrees to abide by the federal regulations governing human subjects
research, as well as to comply with appropriate ethical standards. The assurance formalizes
the institution's undertaking to respect and protect research subjects. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.103
(2003); Jeffrey M. Cohen, OHRP Federal-Wide Assurance, in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD:
MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 43, at 313.
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require IRB review, for any clinical trials that they support. 4
Non-institutional review boards, otherwise known as "independent
review boards," also review some clinical research projects.
However, independent review boards oversee only a small propor-
tion of the overall number of research projects, with IRBs function-
ing as the dominant oversight institution. 5
IRBs' regulatory responsibilities today remain much the same as
when DHEW first codified the initial set of IRB regulations. First,
IRBs consider proposed research projects with human subjects
under an initial review. This initial review generally consists of an
examination of the proposed research design and protocol, informed
consent documents, and any advertising or other recruitment
devices. The IRB may vote to approve the project, to approve it with
required modifications, or to reject it. In order to approve a project
undergoing initial review, the regulations require IRBs to determine
that: (1) risks to subjects are minimized through the use of a sound
research design; (2) risks to subjects are reasonable in light of
anticipated benefits to the subjects and the importance of the
knowledge to be gained; (3) subjects are selected equitably; (4)
informed consent willbe obtained from subjects and documented; (5)
when appropriate because of safety concerns, a plan is in place to
monitor incoming data from subjects on the protocol; (6) there are
adequate protections for protecting subjects' privacy and confidenti-
ality; and (7) appropriate precautions are in place when particularly
vulnerable subjects, such as children, prisoners, or the mentally
disabled, will participate.8 6 In addition, IRBs must follow additional
84. See Richard S. Saver, Critical Care Research and Informed Consent, 75 N.C. L. REV.
205, 215-26 (1996).
85. Independent review boards, often established by private, for-profit companies, operate
outside of academic institutions. They offer their review services to investigators in private
community practice who do not have a relationship with a local IRB or who may prefer to
avoid going through a local IRB. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS i-ii (1998)
[hereinafter IRBS: THE EMERGENCE]. Other than the fact that they are formally independent
of any one institution, the board membership requirements and general oversight
responsibilities of such independent review boards remain much the same as for local IRBs.
See id. at 2-5.
86. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2003); see also Susan Z. Kornetsky, Overview of Initial Protocol
Review, in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 43, at 143-
51. Among the many important IRB tasks for initial review described here, possibly the most
critical, is to ensure that subjects will receive adequate informed consent, that risk/benefit
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procedures, and consider other safeguards, when the research
involves fetuses, pregnant women, neonates, prisoners, children,
and subjects in emergency situations who are unable to provide
advance consent.8 7
IRB responsibilities do not end with the initial review. They also
must conduct continuing review of already approved research
projects at appropriate intervals determined by the IRB, but in no
event less than annually."8 IRBs have authority to suspend or
terminate research projects that fail to adhere to the requirements
for initial approval. IRBs can also shut down research that leads to
unexpected, serious harm to subjects.8 9 IRBs regularly receive
"adverse event reports" regarding serious, unexpected complications
with research subjects9 ° and consider such reports to determine
whether any changes in the ongoing research project are warranted.
Under the current regulations, IRBs must be comprised of at least
five persons with varying backgrounds to ensure adequate review
of not only the scientific aspects of a protocol but also the acceptabil-
ity of the proposed research in terms of institutional policies,
applicable law, ethics, and professional standards of conduct.91 IRBs
are not only required to be professionally diverse but also to include
members of diverse gender, race, and cultural backgrounds to
ensure the committee can take account of community attitudes and
the differing viewpoints of potential research subjects.92 Despite the
general aspirations for diverse membership, the regulations permit
ratios are at acceptable levels, and that the burdens and benefits of the research are
distributed equitably across the population. See McCarthy, supra note 52, at 315-16
(describing the "paramount obligation and purpose of the IRB" as protecting research subjects
through review of informed consent documents, determining that risks are reasonable in light
of the research's benefits, and ensuring the risks/benefits are distributed equitably).
Individual IRB members generally may not participate in deliberations about protocols in
which they serve as the investigator or otherwise have a direct conflict of interest. See 45
C.F.R. § 46.107(e) (2003).
87. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.24,50.50-50.56(2003); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-46.207,46.301-46.306,
46.401-46.409 (2003).
88. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e) (2003).
89. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.113 (2003).
90. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.108(b) (2003); 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b)(5) (2003) (requiring research
institutions to have procedures for prompt reporting of adverse events to the IRB,
institutional, and agency officials); see also Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions:
Harnessing Experimental Data to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 449 (2000).
91. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2003).
92. See id.
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IRBs to be dominated by institutional and researcher representa-
tion. Only one non-scientist is required on a committee.93 Also,
though diversity surely includes views beyond the institution, an
IRB need have only one member who is not affiliated with or
employed by the institution.94 As a result, the typical IRB member
is a clinical researcher who works at the institution.
IRBs function largely as self-governing entities, but they are
ultimately overseen by the Office for Human Research Protections
(OHRP) within HHS, as well as by the FDA, as part of the agencies'
implementation of the federal research regulations. Institutions
file written assurances with OHRP regarding their IRB operations
and procedures. OHRP also conducts a limited number of site
visits to evaluate IRBs and to confirm that they are following
written assurance documents and HHS requirements. The FDA also
conducts occasional on-site audits of IRB operations.95
II. THE SHARED MONITORING LIMITATIONS OF IRBs AND
CORPORATE BOARDS
Given that the IRB today operates as a strange hybrid entity with
many responsibilities, including scientific review, ethics guidance,
regulatory compliance, and representation of community views, 96
it should not be surprising that it has occasionally not met expecta-
tions. IRBs may not be very good at performing all these functions
simultaneously.97 Yet despite much criticism of IRB effectiveness,
few studies have examined how IRBs perform functionally in
relation to comparable institutions. The corporate board serves a
93. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(c) (2003).
94. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(d) (2003); 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(e) (2003).
95. See IRBS: THEIR ROLE, supra note 30, at 12-13; see also Gary L. Chadwick, Preparing
for an FDA Audit, in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note
43, at 359-64; Thomas Puglisi & Michele Russell-Einhorn, Preparing for an OHRP Site Visit,
in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 43, at 365-69.
96. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, Law & Bioethics: From Values to Violence, 32 J. L. MED. &
ETHics 293 (2004).
IRBs are a perfect example of a body conceived to do both law and ethics. They
are required to apply the federal regulations, which are law, but those
regulations are so open-textured and the overriding mission of IRBs is so clearly
to protect human subjects, that IRBs must do ethics too.
Id. at 294.
97. See Goldner, supra note 51, at 104-05; Veatch, supra note 76, at 26.
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useful reference point for critically assessing the advantages and
weaknesses of the IRB as a governance and oversight institution.
Of course, IRBs and corporate boards have obvious, important
differences. Shareholders elect directors for general oversight and
monitoring of the corporation in the firm's many broad areas of
activity. Boards of directors engage in a variety of important
decisions, from hiring and firing key management, setting general
strategy for the corporation, and playing a prominent procedural
role in structuring major transactions and corporate combinations.
Boards of directors also feel the push and discipline of external
market pressures, including the market for corporate control and
the market for directors." IRBs, in contrast, are more narrow
oversight bodies. Their more limited focus concerns protection of
human research subjects. Rather than open-ended governance of the
firm, they perform circumscribed activities and derive their limited
authority from the HHS and FDA regulations. IRBs also operate
with little influence felt from external markets. The corporate
board-IRB parallels need not be exact, however, to have possible
explanatory and predictive power. The experience of corporate
boards still can offer key insights as to the IRB's problem areas as
a monitoring body.
A. Agency Relationships and the Classic Monitoring Function of
Both Boards
To appreciate why both institutions present similar governance
and oversight problems, it is first necessary to examine the
underlying agency relationships. In the standard definition of an
agency relationship, the agent acts on behalf of the principal and
98. Institutional investors and Wall Street analysts constantly monitor the performance
of directors to the extent that they evaluate the performance of the company that the directors
run. See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 394, 402-06 (2004). Plus, the market for corporate control supposedly
disciplines underperforming directors. See id. at 406-07. Companies that are run poorly will
experience depressed share prices, which will attract corporate acquirers who may see an
opportunity to purchase a controlling interest in the company, throw out the current
management (including electing a different board), and ran the company more profitably. Id.
Finally, because there is a market for directors, they compete for a limited number of board
seats. Underperforming directors risk being passed over for renomination to the board in
favor of more talented persons.
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subject to the principal's control.99 Traditional application of agency
theory to the corporate setting states that boards of directors act as
agents for the firm's shareholders. 0 Thus, a norm of "shareholder
primacy" underlies corporate governance, with corporate law urging
directors to govern the firm with the goal of maximizing shareholder
interests.'' Agency theory posits that shareholders need to make
use of boards of directors as agents because of the separation of
ownership and control in the modern corporation. This division
exposes shareholders to risks of managerial opportunism, shirking,
and incompetence. Also, even well-meaning managers may view
risks differently than shareholders and take actions divergent
from shareholders' preferences." 2 All such costs are a form of
agency costs that inherently arise from the fact that managers, and
not shareholders, directly run the corporation day to day. 3 The
board of directors helps minimize such agency costs on behalf of
shareholders. The board can hire and fire senior management, set
compensation incentives, oversee the accounting, auditing, and
financial reporting activities of the corporation, and take other
actions to ensure that management acts for the shareholders. This
is the classic, vitally important "monitoring" function performed by
the corporate board. 4
Many critique the conventional, principal-agent view of the
shareholder-director relationship as not accurately describing how
corporate boards really function, because corporate directors, as
purported agents, enjoy unfettered discretion from the control of
shareholders as principals.' °5 Indeed, directors may, at times, take
actions that further other stakeholders' interests in the corporation,
such as favoring creditors and bondholders over shareholders in
deciding whether to pursue risky investments when the firm is on
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).
100. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 548, 565.
101. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical
Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2002).
102. See id. at 1637-39, 1637 n.28.
103. See id. at 1638.
104. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 203-05 (8th ed. 2000).
105. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating
Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 405-07 (2001); see also infra notes 249-58
and accompanying text.
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the brink of insolvency.106 Some view the board, therefore, as not in
a traditional agent-principal relationship with shareholders but
operating as more of an independent institution.0 7 Nonetheless, the
classic agency view of directors continues to find much support.
Even if one concedes that directors may act for stakeholders other
than shareholders or concedes that the board may consider some-
thing other than maximizing shareholder welfare, directors can still
be viewed as acting for shareholder interests so frequently and to
such a large degree that the norm of "shareholder primacy" and the
view that directors perform at least as quasi-agents for shareholders
continue to find much support. Indeed, the principal-agent model
remains the "dominant paradigm" in corporate law.'
IRBs can similarly be viewed as acting as agents for another set
of principals-human research subjects. The relationship of the IRB
to human research subjects, however, does not fall neatly within the
technical definition of a classic agency relationship. The control
element in the agency relationship is lacking as research subjects
have almost no ability to control the IRB.' The principal also
ordinarily manifests some expression of intent that the agent will
act on the principal's behalf for an agency relationship to arise."' It
is doubtful whether most research subjects can be said to assent to
IRBs acting on their behalf, for ordinary clinical trial participants
may not even understand the research regulatory scheme well
enough to know what IRBs do and how they function."'
106. For Chancellor Allen's opinion stating that when the corporation approaches
insolvency, the directors are not mere agents of the shareholders but owe a duty to the larger
corporate enterprise, see, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). Certain
corporate constituency statutes also permit the board to consider the interests of parties other
than shareholders. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1716(a) (West 1995) (permitting
directors, in discharging their duties, to consider the effects of corporate action on the firm's
employees, suppliers, customers, and the communities where the firm does business).
107. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 550-51 (arguing that the board can be viewed
as a "sui generis body-a sort of Platonic guardian" that serves as the nexus for the various
contracts that make up the firm).
108. See Meese, supra note 101, at 1701-02.
109. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
110. An agency relationship is created when the principal manifests assent that the agent
shall act on his behalf. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2001).
111. Even if a consent form mentions the local IRB to the research subject-alerting the
subject to bring questions or concerns about the research to the IRB-it is questionable
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Thus, IRBs are quasi-"agents",for research subjects in a more
loose sense of the term, to the extent that their raison d'etre is to act
for the benefit of research subjects."' Indeed, the conventional
explanation given for why the IRB review system exists is that IRBs
protect research subjects.113 Akin to the classic monitoring function
of the corporate board, the IRB monitors for its principals. Informed
consent alone is regarded as insufficient protection, because
research subjects, in vulnerable states and facing significant
informational disadvantages, can be convinced to consent to unsafe,
poorly designed, or unethical research. The IRB's examination of
proposed protocols thus becomes a very important second level of
review."' IRBs also can monitor by sanctioning noncomplying
researchers, including, among :other actions, withholding IRB
approval for ongoing or future clinical trials. The IRB also can set
record-keeping requirements and audit clinical trials to keep track
of researchers' activities. As with corporate boards and the per-
ceived norm of shareholder primacy, one sees a norm of research
subject primacy in IRB operations. 5
whether the IRB's existence has any significant impact on a subject's decision to participate
in a clinical trial in the first place.
112. One reviewer of an earlier draft of this Article suggested that because IRBs and
research subjects do not squarely fall within the classic definition of an agency relationship,
it might be more accurate to refer to IRBs as "reputational intermediaries" of research
subjects rather than as their agents. Whether viewing IRBs as quasi-agents or reputational
intermediaries, the fundamental analogy to corporate boards still offers useful insights. Both
boards perform classic monitoring functions for third parties, yet both boards display similar
weaknesses as monitoring bodies. Both boards are also insular, enjoy a great deal of
discretion, and lack clear incentives to perform as vigorous monitors for the third parties they
supposedly represented. Thus, whether the underlying relationships involve classic agency
or not, the fundamental monitoring challenges and limitations exhibited by corporate boards
can offer key insights to understanding how IRBs operate.
113. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.102(g) (2003) (ITlihe primary purpose of (IRB] review is to assure
the protection of the rights and welfare of the human subjects."); McCarthy, supra note 52,
at 315-16 ("IT]here has never been any question that the paramount obligation and purpose
of the IRB is to protect the rights and welfare of human research subjects.").
114. See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914 (May 30, 1974) (emphasizing
the important roles research review committees play in addition to creating the requirements
for securing subjects' informed consent); IRBs: THEIR ROLE, supra note 30, at 4.
115. IRB members typically report that they perceive their primary role as acting on behalf
of research subjects. See, e.g., Sohini Sengupta & Bernard Lo, The Roles and Experiences of
Nonaffiliated and Non-Scientist Members of Institutiondl Review Boards, 78 AcAD. MED. 212,
215 (2003) (noting that the majority of non-affiliated, non-scientist members of IRBs report
that they feel their role is to represent the "'community' of human subjects").
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B. Imperfect Agents and Weak Monitoring Bodies
Despite the norms of shareholder and research subject primacy
and the classic monitoring function ascribed to IRBs and corporate
boards, these bodies often may not do a very good job of representing
their respective principals' interests. This should not come as a
surprise. In most agency relationships, a principal cannot ensure
that the agent will always take actions optimal from the principal's
standpoint without incurring significant additional monitoring and
bonding costs." 6 Yet IRBs and corporate boards seem particularly
ill-suited to perform as effective monitoring agents for remarkably
similar reasons.
1. Election and Removal
First, corporate directors and IRB members operate largely free
from the controlling influence of their principals. As a practical
matter, shareholders and research subjects have little opportunity
to decide which persons serve on these boards and have limited
ability to remove them. An individual research subject has no legal
right to gain appointment to an IRB or to elect the members of an
IRB.'17 Institutional officials determine the IRB's composition.
Ordinarily, the medical center's senior management, with the help
of clinical department chairs, decides which persons should be
appointed. Once an IRB is up and running, it is not uncommon for
the IRB chair and current IRB members themselves to have
significant input as to which new members to invite to join the
board. Removal of IRB members also lies beyond the reach of the
individual research subject; removal authority remains with the
116. See, e.g., Theresa M. Welbourne & Luis R. Gomez Mejia, Gainsharing: A Critical
Review and a Future Research Agenda, 21 J. MGMT. 559, 577-82 (1995) (discussing the
monitoring, bonding, and residual loss costs inherent in agency relationships).
117. The only possible legal hook for research subject representation on IRBs is the
regulation stating that if an IRB regularly reviews research that involves vulnerable subjects,
such as prisoners, pregnant women, or the mentally disabled, that "consideration shall be
given to inclusion of one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about and experienced
in working with these subjects." 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2003). This is phrased as a
recommendation, however, rather than a regulatory requirement, and even then the
representative is still chosen by the institution and may be someone only familiar with these
groups, rather than an actual research subject.
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institution."' Even with the recent research scandals at major
medical centers, there are almost no reported instances of the forced
removal of particular IRB members at the troubled institutions.1 9
In short, the IRB experience so far has been that the typical IRB
member faces little risk of being removed once appointed.
In theory, shareholders have greater opportunity regarding
selection and removal of their representatives than research
subjects. Shareholders, after all, elect the board of directors
annually, and the voting right to elect directors is regarded by
courts as one of the most fundamental rights of share ownership. 2 °
Shareholder voting theoretically serves as one of the limited means
for shareholders to discipline the board for poor oversight of the
corporation by voting out the current slate of directors.' 2 '
In practice, however, the shareholder franchise provides a very
weak system for shareholders to influence their choice of directors
or to influence director conduct. Corporate management has largely
captured and controlled shareholder voting contests in publicly
traded corporations. Nominations to a board of directors are
typically made by a committee of the current board, with the CEO
often playing a critical and decisive behind-the-scenes role in
deciding which persons are nominated.'22 Shareholders disap-
pointed with management's nominees to the board must mount a
costly and time-consuming proxy battle to try to get other persons
elected to the board. Not surprisingly, shareholders tend to be
rationally apathetic and disinclined to vote in director elections. 2 3
118. The final IRB regulations are silent on many key details regarding appointment and
removal of IRB members, but the earlier Commission Report recommended that IRB members
be appointed for terms of at least one year. Also, removal of members was not to be permitted,
according to the Commission's view, except for good cause. The Commission envisioned an
IRB that had relatively stable membership from year to year in order for it to perform with
consistency and for members to benefit from increased experience in reviewing research
proposals. See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174, 56,178 (Nov. 30, 1978).
119. See infra note 233.
120. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (describing
shareholder voting as "the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial
power rests").
121. The other commonly identified alternative for shareholders dissatisfied with corporate
performance in publicly traded corporations is to sell their stock.
122. See Lin, supra note 38, at 913-14.
123. See Douglas R. Cole, E-Proxies for Sale? Corporate Vote-Buying in the Internet Age, 76
WASH. L. REV. 793, 808-09 (2001).
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They may view their limited holdings as not decisive to a vote in
which a large number of shares will be cast, they may be content to
free-ride on the work and effort of other shareholders who will
gather the costly information necessary to decide how to cast a vote,
and they face coordination and collective action problems in
gathering information and voting in sync so as to wield true voting
power. 124
Institutional investors, who hold investments over the long-term
and in larger proportions to justify greater monitoring through use
of the shareholder franchise, could be expected to make director
elections more contested and representative of shareholder de-
mands. 25 Evidence of institutional investors having a major
impact on director elections remains limited, however, and "the
nonreviewability by shareholders of board decisions seems to be an
inherent and enduring characteristic of the corporate form." 2 '
Recent corporate governance reforms attempt to make nominations
for board election less subject to the influence of the CEO, such as
through the use of nominating committees comprised exclusively of
independent directors"' or by implementing the SEC's proposal to
require certain companies to include shareholder nominees for
director slots in the company's proxy materials.'28 It is simply too
early, however, to determine the impact of such reforms.
2. Board Size, Composition, and Insider/Outsider Mix
IRBs and corporate boards function as deliberative bodies; most
major decisions cannot be made unilaterally by individual persons
but require the presence and participation of a quorum of the board.
Consideration of overall board size, and which constituencies
predominately are represented on the board, is therefore key to
124. See id. at 805-08.
125. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship
Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1464-
65 (1994).
126. Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 571-72.
127. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Changes, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,158, 64,163 (Nov. 12, 2003).
128. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-48626, IC-
26206 (Oct. 17, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm.
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understanding how board decisions are reached and the extent to
which shareholder and research subject interests are taken into
account. Both institutional bodies are roughly similar in size. While
many corporation statutes permit boards. of directors to consist
solely of one person, with little in the way of formal required
qualifications,12 9 most corporate boards are larger, with estimates
of average board size for non-close corporations ranging from seven
to nine directors on the lower end to an average of thirteen direc-
tors.13° As for IRBs, the federal regulations require at least five
members with varying backgrounds, 3 ' but larger, leading research
institutions tend to have IRBs consisting of between fifteen and
twenty members. 32
Both corporate boards and IRBs have been criticized for following
the agenda of inside interests at the expense of shareholders and
research subjects. For corporate boards, a recurring concern is
whether the directors as a group can remain sufficiently independ-
ent from the corporation's internal senior officers, particularly when
the board includes inside directors who are employees of the firm
and who are drawn from the management ranks.' Inside directors
may be averse to challenging the CEO."3 In addition, insiders may
share the same biases of current management in viewing the
corporation's performance and, thus, even if not acting out of self-
interest, remain overconfident about certain plans of action.'35
Outside directors are thought to be in a much better position to
129. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2002).
130. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 42 & n.172 (2002) (noting that the National Association of
Corporate Directors survey indicated that forty-four percent of boards reviewed had between
seven and nine members); Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate
Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors -as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 492 (1999) (suggesting the average board size is thirteen members).
Similarly, the average Fortune 500 company board consists of thirteen directors. See Edward
B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1009, 1013 n.7 (1997).
131. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2003).
132. See IRBs: A TIME, supra note 19, at 8.
133. For an explanation of the distinction between inside directors and outside directors,
see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 38, at 901.
135. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 803
(2001).
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question current management, raise dissonant viewpoints, and
willingly perform an active monitoring role on behalf of sharehold-
ers. Even among outside directors, however, a desire to maintain
ongoing business relationships with the firm can raise questions
about their ability to take independent action and challenge
management."13
For many years, inside directors dominated corporate board-
rooms, with outside directors relegated to a passive, behind-the-
scenes role. Recently, however, corporate law changes and other
forces have combined to lead to nominally greater outsider represen-
tation in the boardroom.137 First, institutional investors have used
their market clout to advocate for more outside directors.
138
Second, the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted partially in
response to the Enron debacle and criticisms over the role of the
Enron board, increases the need for and prominence of outside
directors. Among other changes, the new law requires that every
public company have an audit committee comprised of solely
independent outside directors. It also bolsters the audit committee's
power by authorizing the committee to hire and fire the company's
outside auditor and to retain its own counsel and advisors in
conducting investigations of the company.'39
Third, and also in response to the recent corporate scandals, the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of
Securities Dealers Stock Market (NASDAQ) have revised the
136. For example, several of the outside directors for Enron were criticized for performing
consulting services and participating in ongoing business relationships with Enron. Even Dr.
Mendelsohn's capacity for independence as an outside Enron director was called into question
because his own institution, M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, received sizable charitable
donations from Enron and its senior officers. See Elson & Gyves, supra note 12, at 872-73; see
also infra notes 296-317 and accompanying text (describing factors that may make outside
directors less than truly independent).
137. Even before the recent changes arising from Sarbanes-Oxley and the revisions to the
NYSE/NASDAQ listing requirements, see infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text, studies
indicated that among large firms with a market capitalization often billion dollars or greater,
approximately 66% of the board members were independent in that they had no employment
or direct service relationship with the corporation. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law
and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1279 n.70 (1999); see also Langevoort, supra note
135, at 798.
138. See Jonathan Johnson et al., Boards of Directors: A Review and Research Agenda, 22
J. MGmT. 409, 416 (1996).
139. See Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 201-301, 116 Stat. 745 (2002);
see also Elson & Gyves, supra note 12, at 878-79.
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requirements for publicly traded corporations listed on their
exchanges. Principal among the reforms is a common requirement
that the board of each listed company consist of a majority of
independent directors, with the definition of "independent" nar-
rowed to preclude certain outside directors who have significant,
ongoing business relationships with the company and persons who
work for the company's outside audit firm. 140
Even though the proportion of inside directors in the boardroom
has likely dropped over recent decades, this trend has not necessar-
ily diminished the influence of inside interests. Given the realities
of how director elections work, current management has played a
large behind-the-scenes role in determining which outside directors
get nominated by the board's nominating committee and eventually
get elected to the board.14 ' Also, many so-called "independent"
outside directors have had personal relationships with senior
management and the CEO. This social interdependence makes it
more difficult for outside directors to assume an active monitoring
role.14 1 Whether the trend toward adding more outside directors
means that corporate boards have evolved into truly more independ-
ent monitoring bodies remains a highly debatable, thorny question.
It is also simply too early to determine the true impact of the very
recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act and NYSE/NASDAQ reforms elevating
the role of independent directors.
An inside/outside mix in board composition similarly complicates
IRB operations. This confounding factor may hinder IRBs' overall
monitoring effectiveness. As discussed above, the regulations permit
inside institutional and researcher constituencies to dominate
IRBs. Only one nonscientist and only one member who is not
affiliated with the institution must serve on an IRB.'4 Most IRBs
140. See generally Securities and Exchange Commission, Self-Regulatory Organizations;
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Changes, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,156-66 (Nov. 12, 2003). Another
significant reform is the requirement that the independent directors of listed corporations
meet periodically in closed session, without the other directors present. See id. at 64,158,
64,162.
141. See Lin, supra note 38, at 913-14.
142. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 874-85; see also infra notes 296-307 and
accompanying text.
143. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
144. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107(c)-(e) (2003).
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today include only a token number of non-insiders. IRBs of up to
fifteen members have, for example, typically included only one or
two persons not affiliated with the institution.
145
The nonscientist or nonaffiliated IRB members, referred here
collectively for simplicity as the "outside" IRB members, 146 can be
seen as the equivalent of the outside directors on the corporate
board. Just as so many efforts at improving corporate governance
have focused on the outside directors, enhanced IRB monitoring
and oversight may hinge on the outside IRB members. Outside
IRB members, for example, may force the board to consider the
layperson's or research subject's view and help to combat the other
board members' likely biases in favor of experimentation and
research. 47 Outside IRB members may also prove more resilient to
the constant pressures within many institutions for quick and easy
IRB approval. Academic medical center economics and norms can
make it quite daunting for inside IRB members to vote to delay
important research protocols, as everyone within the institution
recognizes the need for a steady flow of research dollars in order for
the institution as a whole to thrive.
48
145. See IRBS: A TIME, supra note 19, at 8. The Office of Inspector General survey indicated
that IRBs seldom maintained better than a one-to-five ratio of outside to inside members. See
IRBS: THEIR ROLE, supra note 30, at 11.
146. Whether an IRB member is non-affiliated or a non-scientist are two distinct inquiries.
Some IRBs draw a portion of their non-scientist members from within the institution, such
as when persons from the medical center's counsel or ethics office serve on the IRB. However,
non-scientists drawn from within the institution are still "outsiders" to the extent that they
have a different perspective than the typical researcher. In any event, the total number of
non-scientists and non-affiliated persons ordinarily serving on the IRB is quite small
compared to the rest of the board.
147. Because of their work as research scientists, clinical investigators on the board have
special insight into the value of conducting clinical trials but do not necessarily have any
special appreciation for risks to subjects' welfare. The inside IRB members may tend to
overstate and overvalue the benefits of a protocol while discounting the risks. See Peter C.
Williams, Success in Spite of Failure: Why IRBs Falter in Reviewing Risks and Benefits, 6 IRB
1, 2 (1984).
148. See Trudo Lemmens & Paul B. Miller, The Human Subjects Trade: Ethical and Legal
Issues Surrounding Recruitment Incentives, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 398, 406 (2003)
("Members of academic IRBs may sometimes themselves feel the financial pressures facing
their institution, as for example where they realize what the rejection of a lucrative study
could mean for funding of research at the institution."). On the other hand, outside IRB
members not dependent on the institution for their careers may be less prone to such
pressures, as they "are uniquely positioned on the IRB to put people first, unhampered by
personal ambition, scientific bias, interdepartmental rivalry, or the profit motive." Patricia
E. Bauer, A Few Simple Truths About Your Community IRB Members, 23 IRB: ETHICS &
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If effective IRB representation of research subject interests
depends so critically on the outside members, then the token
number of outsiders on the typical board poses obvious and
serious problems. Yet the difficulties go deeper than sheer numeri-
cal representation. A number of factors suggest that researcher
interests dominate not only the number of board positions but also
how the boards actually function. 4 9 Nonaffiliated IRB members are
most often recruited by their friends and acquaintances already
serving on the IRB or working within the institution, and the
nonaffiliated members rarely compete for the slots or go through a
formal interview process for the position.5 ° Institutional officials
can be expected to select outside members who share values and
goals that closely match those of the research institution. As Robert
Veatch has noted:
If one of the goals of IRB review is to apply the values and
principles of the broader society and/or the subject groups in
deciding whether the rights and welfare of subjects are being
adequately protected, it would be surprising if that goal could be
achieved by a group selected by local institutional officials who
have very special and sometimes idiosyncratic sets of values. 5 '
Even accounting for the outside members, therefore, IRBs might
more accurately be characterized as agents of the institution rather
than as agents of the research subjects." 2
Moreover, outside IRB members often have very little in common
with the average research subject. Their socioeconomic backgrounds
and educational levels vary considerably from the average patient,
making them questionable proxies.' Non-scientist members of
HuM. RES. 7, 7 (2001).
149. See Goldner, supra note 51, at 106.
150. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 57, at 6 (stating that a large number of unaffiliated IRB
members report that they were recruited by the IRB chair or a friend/acquaintance also on
the board and that the appointment process was rather ad hoc and informal).
151. Veatch, supra note 76, at 27.
152. See LEVINE, supra note 46, at 342-43.
153. See Porter, supra note 57, at 2 (noting that a survey of non-scientist, non-affiliated
IRB members revealed that many held doctoral and masters degrees and they could hardly
be viewed as "average citizens"); NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM., supra note 19, at 63
("Professionals who are nonscientists might be no more able to represent the view of low-
income or seriously ill participants, for example, than scientists.").
[Vol. 46:619
MEDICAL RESEARCH OVERSIGHT
IRBs also face legitimate questions about their capacity to be
vigilant monitors. Often lacking clinical and scientific expertise,
they may not be in a position to recognize and understand fully the
technical risk and benefit issues embedded within the protocol
description, and they will have to follow the lead of the inside
members. They also may find their questions and concerns dis-
missed or talked over by persons with clinical training on the
board."M Outside IRB members also lack knowledge of the inner
workings, policies, and procedures of the institution. This can put
them at a clear disadvantage in their attempts to gather informa-
tion and keep track of clinical investigators' activities.
3. Time Constraints
Corporate directors and IRB members typically serve on the
board as only a part-time activity. Their limited time commitment
seems increasingly disproportionate to the expanding tasks and
responsibilities confronting corporate boards and IRBs. Corporate
boards and IRBs are episodic bodies; most deliberations and major
decisions require a scheduled formal meeting with a quorum of the
board present. Boards of publicly held corporations meet an average
of only eight times a year and estimates indicate that directors
spend the equivalent of only fifteen working days a year on board
matters.'55 Directors can realistically keep up with only so much
given the limited time devoted to board affairs. 5
Outside directors in particular may face severe time constraints,
as they have competing time demands from their positions external
to the corporation. As outside directors may be new to the corpora-
tion, there is also a learning curve to overcome about firm history
and operations. Efforts to gather information and to monitor
effectively will require significant up-front investment of time and
other resources, yet there are few incentives for outside directors to
154. See Bauer, supra note 148, at 7 ("In the alphabet-soup world of the highly credentialed
[inside IRB members], the input of these singleton community members is easily
overlooked--or worse, discounted.").
155. See EISENBERG, supra note 104, at 203-04.
156. Further, critics charge that boards squander their limited deliberative time, devoting
far too much time to routine matters not as critical for board attention. See JAY W. LORSCH
& ELIZABETH MACINVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE
BOARDS 178-79 (1989).
65720041
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
make such an investment.'57 Plus, outside directors may serve on
more than one board, adding additional competing time demands.158
Service on an IRB also involves considerable time pressures.
Affiliated IRB members must juggle the time demands of their
regular positions within the institution with their IRB service. It is
highly questionable whether IRB members receive sufficient
administrative credit and freedom from other responsibilities to
allow time for their IRB activities. Instead, IRB work may be added
on as an "extra" to their regular duties. Meanwhile, outside IRB
members have their own regular, external activities to pursue,
competing with IRB service. Indeed, outside members report that
reviewing protocols in advance and otherwise preparing for IRB
meetings makes significant demands on their time.'59
The part-time nature of IRB service has not kept up with IRBs'
dramatically increasing workloads. Even at busy academic medical
centers, many IRBs meet only one or two times per month. But the
rise in industry sponsored research, and financial pressures on
medical centers to generate revenue through a greater volume of
clinical trials (and the accompanying commercialization opportuni-
ties) means that more clinical trials are ending up before the IRB.
This leads to added pressure on IRBs to perform a much larger
number of reviews and with quicker turn-around.6 0 Indeed, the
number of protocols IRBs review today far outpaces what must have
been contemplated when IRBs were first created. In the mid-1970s,
when IRBs formally became part of the regulatory scheme, each IRB
averaged a review of forty-three proposals per year, with IRBs at
major research institutions reviewing in the hundreds.'' Given this
volume, IRBs could devote at least modest amounts of time to each
protocol for review. Estimates indicate that in the mid-1970s, IRBs
spent an average of almost one hour per proposal for initial
reviews."'
157. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 875-76, 884.
158. See Rock, supra note 130, at 1013 n.7 (citing estimates that, for example, 28% of
directors serve on the boards of two other corporations in addition to their own company).
Several corporate governance reform proposals seek to limit the number of boards upon which
an outside director may serve.
159. See Porter, supra note 57, at 5.
160. See IRBS: THEIR ROLE, supra note 30, at 5-6.
161. See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174, 56,186 (Nov. 30, 1978).
162. See id. at 56,186-87.
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The days of having one hour available per protocol for initial
reviews are long gone.'63 One study suggests that IRBs spend an
average of no more than one to two minutes deliberating on each
protocol." Other estimates suggest that busy IRBs can devote only
about eight minutes per new protocol review. 5 Continuing reviews
of already approved protocols can particularly get rushed, and IRBs
have been found to cram several continuing reviews in the last
fifteen minutes of a two and a half hour board meeting. 6 The
expanding number of protocols has simply strained IRB capacity.
Today, IRBs at major research institutions can face more than 2,000
protocol reviews per year. 67 Consider the workload increase at
specific institutions. Duke University reviewed approximately four
hundred protocols per year in 1974, compared to approximately
2,200 protocols per year recently. The University of California at
San Francisco went from reviewing one hundred protocols per year
in 1966 to nearly 4,000 protocols annually in 1999.168
This increasing workload means that IRBs end up relying on
individual board members to do the heavy lifting of protocol review.
A common procedure adopted by many IRBs is for the chair to pre-
assign proposed research projects to individual board members. At
the board meeting, the reviewer summarizes the protocol for the
rest of the board. Unless this reviewer raises a specific question or
163. The Office of Inspector General found that IRBs at major institutions surveyed
typically had meetings that lasted about two and a half hours. During this time, an average
of eighteen initial reviews and nine expedited reviews were conducted, in addition to
consideration of forty-three protocol amendments and twenty-one adverse event reports. See
IRBS: THEIR ROLE, supra note 30, at 9.
164. A General Accounting Office report indicated that IRBs spent only one to two minutes
of review per study, relying chiefly on reviews conducted by a sole initial reviewer in advance
of the board meeting. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: CONTINUED
VIGILANCE CRITICAL TO PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS 17 (1996).
165. Assuming the typical three-hour meeting and an average of twenty-two meeting times
per year, an IRB has but eight minutes to devote per new protocol review and four minutes
per continuing review. See William J. Burman et al., Breaking the Camel's Back: Multicenter
Clinical Trials and Local Institutional Review Boards, 134 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 152,
153 (2001). This estimate is based on an estimated workload, consistent with industry trends,
of five hundred new and one thousand continuing reviews per year for an academic medical
center with two separately functioning IRBs. See id.
166. See IRBs: THEIR ROLE, supra note 30, at 7.
167. See id. at 7, 9. From the period of 1993-1998, the number of initial reviews IRBs were
asked to perform increased 42%. See IRBs: A TIME, supra note 19, at 5.
168. Mary R. Anderlik & Nanette Elster, Lawsuits Against IRBs: Accountability or
Incongruity?, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 220, 223 (2001).
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concern or invites the rest of the board to consider some aspect of
the research project, the rest of the board will not even see and
review the entire protocol documentation, and they typically will not
question approval of a protocol unless the initial reviewer does
first.169 This makes for a particularly fragile, problem-prone system
of monitoring as so much hinges on the efforts of a lone, initial
reviewer. This single-reviewer-led deliberation also is clearly not the
type of group-effort review process that the National Commission
contemplated for IRBs. 7 °
Time constraints, more than any other factor, probably best
explain why the IRB has often disappointed as an effective monitor-
ing body, even at the most prestigious research institutions.' A
review system burdened by such workload strain is bound to have
errors and failures. The heightened workload pressures means that
"[miany IRBs, especially in large institutions, are on the verge of
imploding."172
169. Observers of IRB deliberations report that unless the initial reviewer flags a problem,
the rest of the board typically will approve a research protocol with little or no discussion. See
IRBS: A TIME, supra note 19, at 6.
170. The National Commission emphasized that IRBs were deliberative, group decision-
making bodies and that the boards functioned best when all committee members used their
expertise to consider a protocol. The Commission stated that "Islince discussion among IRB
members is an important element in the successful functioning of an IRB, all members of the
IRB should receive a copy of each research protocol and IRB determinations should be made
in convened meetings of a representative quorum of the members." Protection of Human
Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174,56,182 (Nov. 30, 1978) (emphasis added). This recommendation
simply flies in the face of how most IRBs function today. Because of increasing workloads and
the number of protocols to review, very few IRBs are even able to copy and circulate the entire
contents of the protocol file to all members before it is scheduled for discussion.
171. For example, IRB work overload figured prominently in the oversight problems
surrounding the death of Ellen Roche in a Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center study. See
supra note 16. An external review committee found that the IRB protocol review process was
grossly inadequate. The committee was particularly troubled that until the research subject
death, there had been only one meeting every two weeks of an IRB responsible for the review
of 800 new protocols per year, plus numerous more continuing reviews for already approved
protocols. See Robert Steinbrook, Protecting Research Subjects-The Crisis at Johns Hopkins,
346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 716, 719 (2002).
172. IRBS: THEIR ROLE, supra note 30, at 9 (quoting an unnamed, senior IRB official).
Others have referred to the time constraint problem as creating a "pressure cooker
atmosphere" for IRBs. See Burman et al., supra note 165, at 153.
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4. Information Constraints
Similar to time constraints, informational deficits hamper
corporate boards and IRBs' effectiveness as monitoring bodies. The
corporate board frequently performs as a reactive institution, and
directors' understanding of what is happening with the corporation
day to day is largely dependent on what senior officers tell them.
The directors rarely venture out into the field themselves to
interview corporate personnel or to conduct hands-on inquiries.
Without direct access to information about managerial opportunism,
incompetence, or other problematic conduct, the board may be ill-
prepared to take sufficient action.
The corporate board particularly lacks access to credible,
independent sources of information.'73 Management typically
controls board meeting dates, influences the board's agenda, and
identifies matters for board deliberation. Management can stymie
board requests for information outside of the traditional, tightly
controlled meeting process in the form of direct resistance or, more
often, half-hearted cooperation and lack of full disclosure. 74
Management's large degree of influence over the information
presented to directors at board meetings means directors can be
cued to favor management's position.'75
IRBs also suffer from significant informational deficits. At the
typical IRB meeting, members evaluate new protocols based on
written paperwork submitted by the clinical investigator, which, at
a minimum, typically includes a description of the experimental
design and procedures and a sample consent form. The IRB
boilerplate submission form will query the investigator for certain
information, but the IRB is largely dependent on the clinical
investigator to alert the board in the first place as to possible risks
and benefits associated with the experimental technology. For
industry sponsored research, the clinical investigators, in turn,
must often look to the drug company or device manufacturer
173. See Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three Theories of Corporate Boards of
Directors, 22 J. CORP. L. 1, 4-5 (1996).
174. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 888-90.
175. See Lin, supra note 38, at 914-16. In fact, CEOs have a strong temptation and the
opportunity to manipulate information presented to the board so that the CEO's reputation
before the board is preserved. See Langevoort, supra note 135, at 812.
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sponsoring the trial for much of the needed background information,
including preliminary data results from other clinical trials and
animal studies. As with management presenting to the corporate
board, investigators and sponsors can be expected to cue the
information in such a way as is necessary to obtain favorable IRB
review.
Moreover, IRBs often reach their decisions on new protocols
unaware of previous decisions of other IRBs. For example, research-
ers seeking IRB approval for a protocol are generally not required
to disclose that their proposed research may have been previously
rejected by another IRB at another institution,'76 information that
surely would be relevant to the second reviewing IRB. To address
the potential forum shopping problem, the FDA is considering new
regulations that would require sponsors and investigators partici-
pating in FDA-regulated trials to inform IRBs about any previous
IRB review decisions on the same or similar protocols. 7 v No such
requirement currently exists in the regulations, and, at present, one
lenient IRB can allow problematic studies to move forward unaware
of, and in any event not obligated to follow, the previous decisions
of other IRBs.
IRBs can also operate unaware of credible information from other
sources. For certain large-scale investigations, trial sponsors create
Data Safety Monitoring Boards (DSMBs) to act as a central
repository and to collect preliminary trial data arising from the
same or similar clinical investigations conducted at multiple
research sites. DSMBs attempt to track and synthesize such multi-
site information in order to identify emerging safety problems
associated with an experimental technology. 7 ' Accordingly, DSMBs
176. See IRB'S: A TIME, supra note 19, at 7.
177. See Institutional Review Boards: Requiring Sponsors and Investigators to Inform IRBs
of any Prior IRB Reviews, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,115-16 (Mar. 6,2002) (providing advance notice of
proposed rulemaking) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 56).
178. DSMBs are reviewing bodies that, like IRBs, have a membership of mostly clinical
scientists, as well as statisticians and other professionals. The basic function of the DSMB is
to review study data as it is being collected and to analyze any adverse event reports arising
from a study, all with an eye for monitoring any potential safety problems to ensure patient
safety. DSMBs are required for certain multi-site research projects in trials funded by the
National Cancer Institute. Many commercial trial sponsors conducting research projects at
multiple sites also establish DSMBs. See IRBS: THEIR ROLE, supra note 30, at 10; NAT'L INSTS.
OF HEALTH, NIH POLICY FOR DATA AND SAFETY MONITORING (June 10, 1998), available at
httpJ/grants.nih.gov/grants/guidenotice-files/not98-084.html.
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may become aware of safety concerns for certain investigations
before a local IRB. Unfortunately, this information may not always
be reported back effectively to the local IRBs. A DSMB report can
lack sufficient context to put a local IRB on notice of potential
problems in a research protocol it already approved, because the
local IRB still lacks important data elements that only the DSMB
possesses.' Similarly, the FDA will occasionally issue warning
letters to clinical investigators regarding possible regulatory
violations or trial data concerns, yet IRBs are not always made
aware of such events. 80
More generally, critics charge that the IRB oversight system
regularly misses valuable information by focusing too much on
paper review without paying needed attention to what really
happens in the clinic.'8 ' For example, IRB inquiries into informed
consent tend to examine heavily the wording of the proposed
consent forms rather than how subjects get identified and recruited
into a trial and how investigators actually discuss the research with
potential subjects.'82 Meanwhile, for the critically important
continuing review process, IRBs seldom interview research subjects,
physically observe informed consent procedures, or visit the
research site to evaluate how a research project is proceeding before
deciding whether to grant continuing approval. IRBs also seldom
engage auditors to perform these tasks. IRBs largely depend on
investigators to self-report any problems through accurate, timely
adverse event reports to the IRB, which makes for a fragile and
incomplete continuing review system.8 3
179. See Burman et al., supra note 165, at 154.
180. See IRBs: A TIME, supra note 19, at 6-7.
181. See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 8-9.
182. See Michelle M. Mello et al., The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research, 139
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 40, 40-41 (2003).
183. Indeed, continuing review is one area where IRBs are routinely faulted for not seeking
out more information. The process seems perfunctory and unlikely to catch developing
problems, because so many IRB members treat continuing review as very minimal review.
One IRB member told the Office of Inspector General that he reviews the continuing review
summaries during the board meeting to see if a patient has died. If no patient has died, then
he generally does not raise questions. See IRBS: A TIME, supra note 19, at 6; see also Sharona
Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, The Institutional Review Board, and
Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725, 733 (2001).
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5. Compensation
Rewarding good performance through .bonuses, contingency
payments, or other variable compensation can align the incentives
of agent and principal and help minimize the problems inherent in
agency relationships."8 However, such fine-tuned compensation
schemes are rarely applied to IRB members and corporate directors.
With regard to IRBs, the applicable regulations do not even require
that members receive any form of compensation. As the IRB
structure was initially taking shape, the Commission suggested that
at least nonaffiliated members receive some form of direct payment
for their services. It also recommended that the internal members
of an IRB at least receive recognition and "credit" from their
institutions as a way of rewarding their good service, hoping, for
example, that institutions would relieve IRB members of other
administrative tasks.'85 In the final rulemaking process, however,
HHS concluded that it did not have legislative authority to require
compensation for IRB members and so left it to each institution's
discretion.186
Few institutions have opted to pay IRB members. Inside members
of an institution may be expected to serve as part of their overall
administrative duties for the institution, without any additional
money earned for IRB work. Their general compensation from the
institution rarely is pegged to performing on the IRB or in any way
based on the results of their IRB service. Nor is it clear, despite the
Commission's recommendations, that enough institutions appropri-
ately credit IRB members with relief from other administrative
duties given the increasing workloads IRBs must now carry.
Meanwhile, most outside, nonaffiliated IRB members act as true
volunteers, serving on the committees without any compensation.
For the few who receive some form of payment, they usually receive
only a very modest gratuity or stipend. 7
184. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based
Compensation For Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427, 1429 (2001).
185. See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174, 56,178 (Nov. 30, 1978).
186. See Final Regulations Amending Basic HHS Policy for the Protection of Human
Research Subjects, 46 Fed. Reg. 8,366, 8,385 (Jan. 26, 1981) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
187. See Sengupta & Lo, supra note 115, at 214 (reporting that among outside IRB
members surveyed, only nineteen percent reported monetary compensation to serve on an
IRB).
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Apart from the failure to utilize economic incentives effectively to
align the interests of IRB members and research subjects, the lack
of compensation schemes may have an additional negative spillover
effect.' Monetary rewards can exert psychological influence by
signaling and reinforcing certain behaviors or by attaching value
and esteem to ajob well done.'89 Because IRB members are not paid,
it may conversely signal to IRB members, and to the researchers
that they must monitor, that what IRBs do is not very important or
does not require any particular expertise. This no doubt contributes
to and reinforces IRB members' feelings of frustration and lack of
support. This can contribute to further inattentiveness by IRB
members and less than vigilant performance. As the maxim goes,
you get what you pay for.
Unlike IRB members, corporate directors receive direct payment
for their services. Yet the compensation does not necessarily
establish clear incentives for effective monitoring on behalf of
shareholders. A director's compensation traditionally has been
unrelated to the director's performance. Most directors receive the
same compensation package for service on the same board. Directors
who work extra hard at monitoring are not rewarded with extra
compensation, nor are inattentive directors who do a poor job
penalized financially. Each will receive the same predetermined
director payment.190
188. Compensating IRB members is not without controversy, however. A small subset of
independent review boards do compensate their members. Independent review boards
typically complete their reviews in a more timely manner than ordinary IRBs, which may be
evidence that the economic incentives encourage diligent work by board members. However,
concerns have been raised that independent review board members may face conflicts of
interest and feel pressures to grant favorable reviews because of the money involved. Trial
sponsor and clinical investigator payments to independent review boards fund board
operations, includingboard payments to individual board members. Thus, independent review
boards are financially dependent on the same parties that seek their review. See IRBS: THE
EMERGENCE, supra note 85, at 6-7.
189. See Richard A. Guzzo & Raymond A. Katzell, Effects of Economic Incentives on
Productivity: A Psychological View, in INCENTIVES, COOPERATION, AND RISK SHARING 108-11
(Haig R. Nalbantian ed., 1987); Edward E. Lawler III, Pay for Performance: A Motivational
Analysis, in INCENTIVES, COOPERATION, AND RISK SHARING, supra, at 69-70, 79-84.
190. See Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1268.
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In addition, though director compensation is on the rise,' 9' the
pay traditionally has been modest, at least modest in terms of the
money that these directors, often well-paid CEOs or other senior
executives, could earn elsewhere for their services.'92 Thus, the
overall effect of director payments may be blunted. CEOs join the
boards of other companies as outside directors usually not because
of direct financial compensation for director service but rather for
the prestige associated with a board seat, the chance to learn about
another company, and the perceived quality and talent of other
board members.' 9 ' Recognizing the limitations of the traditional
director compensation schemes, corporations have started experi-
menting with more sizable payment packages contingent on good
corporate performance. For example, the firm may offer directors
stock options in the corporation in the hopes that this will align
director interests with maximizing the wealth of the firm. Such
compensation schemes, however, are only a recent development.'94
6. Vague Performance Standards and Difficulty in Evaluating
Effort
Identifying whether and when a corporate board or IRB does its
job well is no easy task, thus compounding the difficulties of
aligning agent-principal incentives and ensuring good performance
by directors and IRB members. Part of the difficulty in gauging
corporate board and IRB effort stems from the fact that IRB and
corporate board functions defy clear, rule-like specification. Instead,
more flexible and ultimately vague standards must suffice.
191. Average director payments at 200 large public companies in 2001 were over $150,000.
See Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on the
Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, supra note 12, at
510.
192. See Blair & Stout, supra note 105, at 443; Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19
CARDozo L. REV. 265, 275 (1997) (noting that "most outside directors are CEOs of other major
corporations and receive sufficient compensation to render trivial their compensation for
serving as outside directors").
193. Dallas, supra note 173, at 14.
194. See Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1268; see also Fisch, supra note 192, at 275
(suggesting that even directors paid by stock options in a corporation, as a way to align
director performance with the corporation's, may end up thwarting the intended effects by
shifting some of their personal financial risk based on the corporation's performance through
the use of derivative instruments).
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For corporate boards, conventional analysis holds that directors
should direct their efforts to the primary purpose of the corpora-
tion-shareholder wealth maximization. Legally, however, not much
is said about what specific steps directors should take to achieve
that end. Consider how the the Michigan Supreme Court, in the
classic corporate law case, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., addressed what
directors do: "A business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors
is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end." 95
Wealth maximization is such a broad goal and the steps required
towards that end are subject to such reasonable disagreement that
corporate law seems to keep things purposely fuzzy with regard to
gauging director conduct. The law often steers clear of specifying
prescribed courses of action for the corporate board, leaving many
details of oversight and monitoring to director discretion through
the business judgment rule.'96 The fiduciary duty case law of
Delaware, the leading corporate law jurisdiction, has been described
as essentially "mushy" in its reluctance to specify when the fiduciary
duties of directors become actionable and in its failure to offer
clearer rules for determining appropriate director conduct.' 97 These
vague legal standards mean that, at bottom, "[w] e do not know what
the directors are supposed to do; we know only that they are
195. 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). The case involved a challenge to Henry Ford's stated
plans to have Ford Motor Company earn lower profits and avoid paying certain dividends. He
had hoped to return some of the foregone profits to the public in the form of lower prices for
the company's cars. See id. at 671.
196. Because business affairs are "extraordinarily complex, opaque, and uncertain," courts
have tended to focus on the process corporate boards use to reach their decisions as a way of
gauging board negligence, rather than focusing on the substance of the decisions. See Lynn
A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van
Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 675, 681 (2002). The inability
of the law to prescribe particular director conduct is evident in the business judgment rule.
The doctrine generally protects from legal challenge a business decision made by directors
that they believe is in the best interests of the corporation, in which the directors act in good
faith, free from conflict of interest, and after having reasonably gathered information. See,
e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Courts applying the business judgment
rule express reluctance in questioning and second-guessing the substantive merits of a
business decision by the board, thus creating a wide zone of discretion for director
performance.
197. See Rock, supra note 130, at 1101-02.
6672004]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
supposed to do it 'with care.'""' The inability of courts to produce
more circumscribed measures of board conduct reflects the larger
problem of shareholders' reliance on director oversight. Apart from
cases of sheer board incompetence, director self-dealing, or board
neglect in the face of flagrant managerial opportunism, it actually
becomes quite complicated to evaluate which boards do their
monitoring tasks well and which do not.
Publicly traded corporations might appear to have an easy
marker by which to judge the board's performance-the corpora-
tion's current share trading price. However, stock price can rise and
fall for many reasons unrelated to the board's monitoring perfor-
mance. A firm with inattentive, lazy, and unimaginative directors
may still produce good financial results because of talented,
trustworthy managers, favorable market positions the corporation
has historically enjoyed, or other factors independent of the board
itself. Active, vigilant, and talented directors may still end up in a
corporation producing poor financial results because of general
economic downturns in the applicable industry or other factors
extrinsic to the board.199
Moreover, using overall corporate financial performance as a
proxy for the board's performance may inappropriately ignore the
contributions of other corporate actors. The public corporation has
been analogized to a "team production" process where the activities
and output of the team are dependent on the contributions of
multiple parties, such as investors, employees, bondholders, and
managers, operating in a complex network of interactions. °0 It often
becomes hard to attribute components of the corporation's eventual,
non-segmentable output to the specific contributions of individual
team members. "[Blecause the inputs and outputs of team produc-
tion are to some extent unverifiable-meaning they cannot be
readily identified and measured by an outside party such as a
court-there is no way to set a substantive judicial standard for
198. Bayless A. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 615,
620-21 (1984).
199. The firm's stock price and other conventional market indicators, such as return on
investment, are subject to continual debate as to whether they accurately measure good
corporate performance, suggesting additional problems with using such measures indirectly
to gauge board performance. See Johnson et al., supra note 138, at 430.
200. See Blair & Stout, supra note 105, at 418-19.
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gauging how good a job the board is doing."201 Similarly, the board
of directors itself can be viewed as a production team comprised of
individual directors working together to produce collective output.
This approach makes it arduous to evaluate and monitor the effort
of individual corporate directors.20 2
IRBs share similar performance verification problems. The
elusively broad goal for corporate directors-shareholder welfare
maximization-is instead for IRBs the equally intangible, obscure
goal of protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects. The
practical means to this lofty end are not spelled out in rule-like
specificity. The regulatory IRB review criteria for evaluating a new
protocol 2 3 leave considerable room for variation in decisions
between IRB members and between IRBs. The regulations merely
call for a "rough utilitarian weighing of the risks and benefits" of a
study.2 The Commission cautioned that in reviewing risks and
benefits for trial protocols, quantitative measures of acceptable
levels of risk compared to benefit simply were not available to IRBs.
The Commission further warned that it would be difficult to make
precise, line-drawing judgments about which protocols IRBs should
approve or reject.20 5 Similarly, the continuing review regulations fail
to tell IRBs when, if ever, it is necessary to conduct on-site visits for
direct observation of research procedures or even what documents
IRBs should examine in performing continuing review.20 6 In short,
"ftlhere are very few provisions in the regulations that protect
against bodies that might be sloppy, venal, or subservient to the
201. Id. at 437.
202. See Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 10.
203. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
204. Mello et al., supra note 182, at 40.
205. See Goldner, supra note 51, at 98 (summarizing and quoting the National
Commission's Belmont Report discussion of this issue). As Peter Williams has further
observed, the vague regulatory criteria leave a lot of room for each IRB to proceed in many
possible different directions:
Moreover, [IRBsI are asked to compare the impact of research on individuals and
on society as a whole; yet boards are given no guidance in how to balance the
interests of a particular subject against the interests of the collective. These
lacunae in the regulations must be filled on a case-by-case basis by IRB
members relying on their judgment both about what counts as a benefit or
danger and how each is to be weighed.
Williams, supra note 147, at 1.
206. Hoffman, supra note 183, at 733.
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institution. Put another way, the quality of an IRB's work depends
to an inordinate degree on the conscience and commitment of its
volunteer members."2 °7 Not surpisingly, given these open-ended
review standards, assessments can vary widely between IRBs.
Indeed, inconsistencies in decisions between different IRBs for the
same or similar protocols occur with relatively significant
frequency.20 8 Even a seemingly simple question, such as whether
allergy skin testing on children, without the prospect of direct
benefit for the participants, is too risky for IRB approval, leads to
very different risk assessments by IRBs given the vague regulatory
criteria.2 °9
In contrast to corporate boards, IRBs do not even have apparently
objective measures such as the corporation's stock trading price, by
which to evaluate their effort. One could look to the number of
adverse complications or patient deaths in clinical trials at an
institution as a measure of IRB effectiveness. Given that many
clinical trials involve critically ill research subjects who have failed
conventional therapy, however, it is enormously difficult to attribute
causation of death and injury to inappropriate research conduct
rather than to the background risks the ill subjects were likely going
to face anyway. Further, the reality of allowing clinical experimen-
tation to occur means exposing subjects to unknown yet potentially
very serious risks. Accordingly, prevention of research subject
deaths and serious injury may be a skewed and inappropriate
measure of IRB performance, as with such criteria, "it is inherently
207. Edgar & Rothman, supra note 36, at 493.
208. See, e.g., Jon Mark Hirson et al., Variability in Institutional Review Board Assessment
of Minimal-Risk Research, 9 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1417 (2002); Henry Silverman et al.,
Variability Among Institutional Review Boards'Decisions Within the Context of a Multicenter
Trial, 29 CRITICAL CARE MED. 235 (2001).
209. The research regulations provide that IRBs should not approve pediatric research that
poses more than a "minor" increase over "minimal risk" when it does not offer a prospect of
direct benefit to the children. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.406 (2003). The regulations do not provide
very helpful guidance for how to interpret these terms. Not surprisingly, a recent survey
found significant disagreement among IRB chairpersons as to whether, in light of the
regulations, allergy skin testing without the prospect of direct benefit for children is therefore
too risky for IRB approval. See Seema Shah et al., How Do Institutional Review Boards Apply
the Federal Risk and Benefit Standards for Pediatric Research?, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 476,
479 (2004) (noting 27% of IRB chairpersons thought the allergy skin testing research was too
risky to approve, while 66% deemed it safe enough).
670 [Vol. 46:619
MEDICAL RESEARCH OVERSIGHT
easy to fail and almost impossible to succeed fully."21° Similarly, an
institution with a track record of few physical adverse events in its
clinical trials may simply have an overly cautious and ultimately
ineffective IRB that is preventing research subjects from important
clinical trial opportunities that, although risky, the subjects very
much want to pursue.
Finally, exacerbating the problems of gauging IRB and corpo-
rate board performance is that the interests of the principals
-shareholders and research subjects-as a group are not uniform.
Measuring whether corporate boards or IRBs act in the best
interests of shareholders and research subjects in the aggregate
may gloss over the fact that sometimes the interests of shareholders
and research subjects within a class may conflict or need to be
traded-off against one another. For example, short-term investors
can be expected to have very different risk preferences than long-
term shareholders. Short-term investors should only be concerned
with how a corporation's stock price moves during the very short
interval during which they invest in the firm.21' Corporate boards
that constantly play to short-term investor interests, with a view
toward generating immediate, favorable financial news to boost
share price, may end up pushing the firm in directions that are not
optimal for the firm's financial health and strategic survival in the
future, thus disfavoring long-term shareholders.
Similarly, the views of potential research subjects can vary widely
as to risk preferences and ultimate goals. Some subjects may
volunteer for clinical trials out of a sense of altruism in order to help
future patients who may benefit from the knowledge gained. Other
subjects will enter a trial because they believe they will experience
therapeutic benefit. Another class of subjects, urged on by powerful
research advocacy groups, may be more concerned with access to
new technology and more willing to tolerate and volunteer for
riskier experiments.212 An IRB that consistently rejects protocols as
210. Steinbrook, supra note 19, at 1429.
211. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 863.
212. As Rebecca Dresser has detailed, research advocacy groups such as breast cancer and
HIV/AIDS activists have developed as a powerful constituency in influencing how research
trials get funded and conducted. Many research advocacy groups portray study participation
as the way to obtain cutting-edge therapy. They have pressed for clinical trials with
increasing levels of risk and possibly unrealistic expectations of benefit. In addition, many so-
called research advocates vary in their ability to be representative of potential research
20041
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presenting unacceptable levels of risk may in fact be favoring more
risk-averse subjects at the expense of subjects more concerned about
access to new technology. Determining whether an IRB functions
effectively first requires resolving the complex and highly debatable
issue of which research subject constituency the IRB should be
favoring, making it quite difficult to gauge overall IRB performance.
7. Limited Liability
In theory, the threat of legal sanctions incentivizes individual IRB
members and corporate directors to exert monitoring effort. IRBs
and corporate boards share a great degree of insulation from legal
liability, however, making it questionable whether liability exposure
impacts board monitoring performance significantly. For corporate
directors, the threat of legal liability for insufficient monitoring
principally arises from potential fiduciary claims brought against
the directors, either by shareholders directly or pursued as a
derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. The director's major
fiduciary duties include the duty of care, duty of loyalty, duty of
good faith, and duty to act lawfully. Questionable monitoring by a
director, apart from instances of self-dealing or illegal activity,
ordinarily would give rise to alleged duty of care violations. The
duty of care holds that a director should, in discharging his
oversight function, act with the care that a person in a like position
would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circum-
stances.213 Board decisions challenged for breaching the duty of care,
however, ordinarily receive the protection of the business judgment
rule.214 In addition, significant procedural hurdles, such as the
demand requirement for bringing a derivative suit, can impede
shareholder claims alleging a director's breach of fiduciary duty.215
Accordingly, the legal standards remain very deferential to and
protective of directors' discretion.
subjects, as they may receive funding from drug companies or other sponsors, or have
personal experiences with the diseases that skew their views of what the typical research
subject would want. See generally REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS SALVATION:
PATIENT ADVOCACY AND RESEARCH ETHICS (2001).
213. See, e.g., REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2002).
214. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 464-66 (2004).
215. See Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1084 (2004).
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In addition to business judgment rule protections, leading
corporate law jurisdictions such as Delaware permit the corporation,
through its certificate of incorporation, to nearly eliminate director
liability for duty of care violations.21 Also, many large corporations,
to entice persons to serve on the board, offer comprehensive liability
insurance or will indemnify the directors for a large range of board
activity. The combined effect of the various legal protections and
potential indemnification and insurance arrangements means that
the actual risk exposure for any particular director for a violation of
the duty of care is actually quite low. Indeed, liability for directors
for duty of care violations remains so "extremely rare" 17 that, in
terms of real likelihood of a successful suit, the threat of such
liability should not play more than a modest role in shaping board
conduct.21
Like corporate directors, the actual risk of liability exposure for
IRB members remains quite low. Indeed, when HHS codified the
revised IRB regulations in 1981, it addressed concerns of commenta-
tors that qualified IRB members would not serve on the boards
because of liability fears. HHS noted that it was not aware of any
action where an IRB member had been successfully sued for
negligence and felt that directly addressing liability protection for
IRB members was, therefore, not necessary.21 9
In theory, IRB members could be sued under general common law
tort theories for negligently approving a research protocol or for
negligent failure to monitor ongoing trials adequately. Such an
action assumes that IRBs, as indirect third parties in the research
process, have a legal duty of care that extends to individual human
research subjects, an issue that the courts have not adequately
resolved due to the dearth of litigated cases. In any event, such
negligence suits may face limited success for a variety of reasons.
First, it often proves difficult, when dealing with a class of research
subjects who may be seriously ill and failing on conventional
216. See DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 102(b)(7) (permitting elimination of duty of care liability
except in limited circumstances such as when the act is not in good faith, involves intentional
misconduct, or the director derives an improper benefit).
217. See Rock, supra note 130, at 1012; see also Langevoort, supra note 135, at 820
(concluding that the objective risk of liability exposure for directors "remains small").
218. See Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1268.
219. See Final Regulations Amending Basic HHS Policy for the Protection of Human
Research Subjects, 46 Fed. Reg. 8,366,8,385 (Jan. 26, 1981) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
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therapy, to show that any alleged injury a research subject suffers
was in fact research-related and not due to the subject's natural
disease progression. Similarly, proving damages can present
problems, as it may be difficult to demonstrate that an ill research
subject would have fared any differently under conventional
therapy." ° These causation and damage problems are compounded
by trying to link IRB actions or inactions to the alleged research
subject harm. In certain instances of alleged misconduct, the IRB
may credibly contend that the researchers deviated from its
approval requirements or that information was not reasonably
available to IRB members about problems with a protocol, so that
the IRB should not be viewed as a responsible party.
The low level of liability for IRBs initially contemplated by the
federal agencies has proven to be fairly accurate. There are very few
instances of research subjects suing IRB members and alleging
inadequate oversight of a clinical trial. Noteworthy recent examples
include the litigation arising from a clinical trial of an experimental
melanoma vaccine conducted at the University of Oklahoma Health
Science Center. Research subjects filed a lawsuit in 2001 against the
university's IRB and several board members, alleging numerous
violations of federal research regulations.221 Also, in recent litigation
220. For example, in the recent litigation arising from research subject deaths in
experimental leukemia therapy trials at the University of Washington's Fred Hutchinson
Cancer Research Center in the 1980s, the jury was prepared to award damages of over $5
million to one subject's family. The medical center was found negligent in damaging bone
marrow donated for that particular subject's transplant. Nonetheless, the jury significantly
reduced the award because the subject's chance of surviving his leukemia with or without the
experimental intervention was not very high. See Tracy Johnson, Jury Sides with Hutch,
Doctors in Deaths of 5 Patients Knew Risks of Leukemia Treatment Study, Panel Decides,
SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 9, 2004, at Al.
221. See Complaint, Robertson v. McGee, No. 01CVOOGOH(M) (N.D. Okla. filed Jan. 29,
2001), available at http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene/robertson/complaint/.html. The plaintiffs
alleged, among other claims, that the IRB members failed to examine the protocol design and
the investigator's qualifications, to review proposed amendments to the trial protocol, to
approve advertisements for the study, and to make sure that the study comported with ethical
standards. See id. Some of the defendants settled the case in 2002. See University of
Oklahoma Settles State Lawsuit over Melanoma Study, Other Claims Proceed, 11 HEALTH L.
REP. 1269, 1269-70 (2002). The plaintiffs' law firm in the University of Oklahoma
case-Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose, and Podolsky-has taken a particularly aggressive
stance and named IRBs and IRB members in other recent medical research litigation. See,
e.g., Complaint, Wade v. Or. Health and Sci. Univ., No. 02CV877KI (D. Or. filed August 2002),
available at http'//www.sskrplaw.com/gene/cordy.html; Complaint, Scheer v. Burke, No.
000375 (Philadelphia County Ct. Com. P1. filed July 2003), available at httpJ/www.
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concerning a Johns Hopkins University affiliated study, which
involved the ongoing exposure of children to hazardous levels of lead
paint, the Maryland Court of Appeals openly chastised the perfor-
mance of the IRB.222
Such cases, although generating much attention in academic
medical research circles, remain the clear exception to the general
pattern of limited legal exposure for IRBs. Though some predict an
increase in the frequency of IRB-related litigation, as plaintiffs'
counsel develop more sophisticated litigation strategies and as they
recognize that some IRB cases may present good litigation pros-
pects,223 any such upswing is still in its beginning stages. The fact
remains that, considering the number of IRBs and clinical trials
currently up and running, IRBs and individual IRB members rarely
ever get named as defendants in litigation.224 Plaintiffs' counsel may
not want to complicate the lawsuit by focusing on the IRB per se
compared to more visible targets, such as the trial sponsor, the
researcher, and the medical center generally,225 who already have
sskrplaw.com/ gene/scheer.pdf.
222. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807,813 (Md. 2001) (finding that
the university IRB had "abdicated" its responsibility to protect research subjects and that the
IRB seemed more concerned with helping the investigators complete their study than the
ethics of the research). See generally Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, Whose Duty
Is It Anyway?: The Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications for Public Health Research,
6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 109 (2002).
223. Litigation against IRBs is the fact predicted to rise because, among other reasons,
plaintiffs' counsel recognize that there has been poor compliance with the research
regulations, investigators and institutions may have conflicts of interest, institutions may be
risk-averse and willing to settle, and because there is a potential for class-action claims. See
Mello et al., supra note 182, at 43.
224. Complicating matters is that IRBs are not necessarily independent legal parties. At
most institutions IRBs are mere committees organized by and within the medical center or
university. Under litigation procedure, plaintiffs naming the medical center or university as
a defendant may try to hold the larger medical center or university responsible for the conduct
of the IRB, even without naming the IRB as an independent party in the complaint.
Universities or medical centers may also be found vicariously liable for their employees and
agents serving on the IRB. But individual defendants may quickly get dropped from the
litigation as plaintiffs focus on the deeper-pocket institutional defendant. In any event,
individual IRB members have rarely experienced civil litigation because of their IRB activity.
225. See Hoffmann, supra note 183, at 746. For example, in two other recent high-profile
research cases: (1) the death of Jesse Gelsinger in the gene therapy trial at the University of
Pennsylvania; and (2) problems arising in experimental leukemia therapy trials at the
University of Washington's Fred Hutchison Cancer Research Center, the institutions' IRBs
were not named as defendants in the resulting final complaints. See Complaint, Gelsinger v.
Trs. of the Univ. of Pa. (Philadelphia County Ct. Com. Pl. filed Sept. 18, 2000), available at
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ample deep pockets. Plaintiffs' counsel may also strategically
conclude that it is best not to alienate IRB members by naming
them in a lawsuit, in the hopes that information from the IRB may
be forthcoming as plaintiffs pursue actions against the researcher
or institution generally. Even if the IRB is named in the initial
complaint (in addition to plaintiffs already naming the institution
which organized the IRB), it may later get dropped from the case as
the litigation progresses. Moreover, it may otherwise be difficult for
plaintiffs to access information by which to build a case against an
IRB. Peer review statutes generally protect as confidential the
deliberations and records of peer review committees to allow
members to engage in frank and open discussion.22 In some states,
the peer review statutes have been applied to IRBs, allowing the
boards to refuse to disclose requested documents to plaintiffs by
claiming the information as privileged and protected by the peer
review laws.227
http'/www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.html; Complaint, Wright v. The Fred Hutchinson
Cancer Research Ctr., No. 01-2-008376 (Kitsap County Super. Ct., Wash. filed Mar. 29, 2001),
available at http'//www.sskrplaw.com/gene/wright/complaintl.html; Anderlik & Elster, supra
note 168, at 221-22 (discussing the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center litigation).
Although the jury recently returned a verdict awarding approximately $1 million to the family
of one research subject in the Hutchinson Cancer Center case, the outcome was interpreted
as largely favorable to the medical center and the physician-investigators. The defendants
were found negligent for damaging bone marrow donated for one patient but not negligent in
conducting the overall study or in failing to disclose the risks involved. See Johnson, supra
note 220, at Al.
226. Peer review committees-typically comprised of practicing physicians-appear in
many different segments of the health care system. For example, hospitals use peer review
committees to investigate the competence of medical staff applicants and to evaluate the
quality of care rendered within an institution. See generally Gail N. Friend et al., The New
Rules of Show and Tell: Identifying and Protecting the Peer Review and Medical Committee
Privileges, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 607 (1997) (discussing protection of peer review records). The
federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 encourages such peer review activities
by offering potential immunity protection for peer reviewers. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152
(2004). State medical licensing boards also use peer review procedures to investigate and
discipline physicians. See KENNETH R. WING ET AL., THE LAW AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
511-12 (1998). In addition, the Medicare program has long depended upon peer review bodies
to evaluate and monitor quality of care. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 476 (2003); Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, Administrative Law Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and Quality
Control Peer Review Organization (PRO) Program: Analysis and Recommendations, 50 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1 (1989). The FDA and other regulatory agencies also depend on the scientific peer
review process for all sorts of risk assessments. See Lars Noah, Sanctifying Peer Review:
Publication as a Proxy for Regulatory Decisionmaking, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 677 (1998).
227. See Doe v. Ill. Masonic Med. Ctr., 696 N.E.2d 707 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (finding that
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Though their overall negligence liability remains low, IRBs may
nonetheless face liability exposure under more novel theories,
such as under the federal False Claims Act.228 Such theories are
new and evolving, however, and currently add very little in the
form of additional liability pressure on what IRBs do. Finally, as
with corporate boards, IRBs can make insurance and indemnifica-
tion protection available for members, thus further limiting any
individual member's liability exposure.229
Apart from litigation exposure, non-performing IRB members
enjoy considerable insulation from administrative sanctions as well.
Direct regulatory oversight of IRBs traditionally has been lax.230
Within the last five to seven years, regulatory activity has in-
creased, with OHRP (and its predecessor-the Office for Protection
from Research Risks (OPRR)) doing more on-site field inspections
and actually shutting down clinical trials at influential research
institutions such as Duke and Johns Hopkins.231 Indeed, the number
of significant regulatory actions by the FDA and OPRR/OHRP
against academic medical centers for IRB-related issues rose from
Illinois' peer review statute precluded granting plaintiff access to IRB records). Public record
sunshine laws may apply to IRBs at state-run institutions, such as a state university medical
school, and potentially allow research subjects some limited access rights to IRB records.
State laws permitting research subjects and the general public wide access to all IRB
deliberation records are the exception, however. Maryland has enacted one of the first laws
that attempts to provide broader public access to IRB records. Under the Maryland law, an
IRB must make minutes of meetings available for inspection upon request, although the IRB
may redact confidential and privileged information from public view. See MD. CODE ANN.
HEALTH-GEN. I § 13-2003 (2003).
228. For an interesting exploration of how the False Claims Act could be applied to IRB
activities, see Daniel J. Powell, Using the False Claims Act as a Basis for Institutional Review
Board Liability, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1399 (2002).
229. See Sandra P. Kaltman & John M. Isidor, IRB Member Liability, in INSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 43, at 343.
230. HHS's Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), the predecessor to today's
OHRP, ordinarily did most of its oversight through negotiating up-front assurances with
institutions regarding their IRBs. These assessments rarely involved on-site audits and
evaluations of how the IRBs functioned. While the FDA has tended to conduct more on-site
investigations of IRBs, the sanctions have usually been for procedural irregularities and
technical record-keeping matters. The FDA inspections have rarely looked at overall
monitoring by IRBs. See generally IRBS: THEIR ROLE, supra note 30, at 12-14.
231. See Jonathan Bor & Tom Pelton, U.S. Halts Hopkins Research, BALTIMORE SUN, July
20, 2001, at 1A; Susan Kauffinan & Joel B. Obermayer, Ban on Duke Trials Lifted, NEWS &
OBSERVER, May 15, 1999, at Al. See generally PROTECTING SUBJECTS, supra note 19, at 9-10
(detailing substantial increase in regulatory activity with regard to IRBs since 1998).
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one in 1997 to fourteen in 1999.232 Considering the number of
research protocols that get reviewed each year, however, this still
means that only a modest amount of IRB activity is ever subject to
on-site agency evaluations or possible administrative sanction.
Moreover, in nearly all recent OPRR/OHRP investigations, the
agency refrained from sanctioning the individual IRB members.
While an institution's research funding and participation in
federally funded trials might have been suspended or jeopardized
because of the deficiencies found, the individual IRB members fared
much better. At worst, the agencies required IRB members to
undergo enhanced training and education, rather than imposing
fines, disbarment from federal programs, or other serious adminis-
trative penalties on the individual members.233
8. Group-Think Problems, Social Bonds, and Conformity
Pressures
The insight that IRBs and corporate boards are, at bottom, social
institutions driven by a complex web of personal associations and
bonds provides an additional reason for doubting their monitoring
effectiveness. IRB members and corporate directors confront similar
group-based pressures and can become entangled in and compro-
mised by ongoing relationships with each other and the very actors
that they are supposed to be monitoring. Psychological studies of
highly cohesive groups with strong preferences for cooperation show
that they can develop a "groupthink" bias. This bias urges consen-
sus among members, even if suboptimal and inaccurate decisions
232. See Burman et al., supra note 165, at 153.
233. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 54-56 (listing and
summarizing all major OPRR Compliance Oversight Investigations of research institutions
for the period January 1990-June 2000). In most cases where IRB performance was partly at
issue, such as at University of Illinois at Chicago (1999), University of Maryland-Baltimore
(1998), and Cornell University Medical Center (1996), the institution was required to have
IRB members undergo more education and training. Only in very rare situations, such as at
Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) (2000), was the IRB required actually to change
its membership or discipline a member by asking him or her to step down from the board.
VCU, for example, was required to designate new IRB chairpersons in order to lift its
regulatory suspension from participation in federally funded research trials. See id. at 56.
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result. 23 4 Groupthink discourages a critical examination of alterna-
tives and may lead the group to gather incomplete information.235
Directors may be at risk for groupthink problems, because
cohesiveness has been a fundamental, distinct characteristic of the
typical corporate board. The traditional corporate board culture
favors consensus and collegiality over conflict.236 Directors on
corporate boards face psychological conditions which generate
tremendous pressures to conform to the group.237 Directors who
directly challenge the CEO or ask critical questions of management
or of each other run up against firmly entrenched board traditions
that emphasize politeness and civility and avoidance of conflict.238
One particular problem associated with groupthink is a tendency to
stay committed to a decision once made and not to want to reexam-
ine or change it because of the level of discomfort in admitting a
234. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 31 (discussing the groupthink phenomenon);
Langevoort, supra note 135, at 810 (describing the groupthink bias as the implicit tendency
of cohesive groups to censor non-preferred points of view and to discount information
inconsistent with what is preferred).
235. See Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 31. See generally O'Connor, supra note 12, at 1233
(highlighting the negative effects of groupthink in the Enron disaster).
236. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83,
91-92 (1985) (describing how boards tend to select directors who are seen as agreeable and
like-minded, and how boards disfavor individuals who are quarrelsome and who will not
cooperate in reaching decisions by group consensus); Langevoort, supra note 135, at 797
(describing the dominant view of the board as one that places a "heavy emphasis on teamwork
and conflict-avoidance"); Lin, supra note 38, at 916 (describing the board culture as one that
"rewards consent and discourages conflicts").
237. Conditions favoring conformityinclude: (1) board decisions often raisejudgment issues
involving a degree of uncertainty and ambiguity, the exact type of decisions in which
individuals will tend to be more influenced by what others in the group think; (2) conformity
increases when members value or admire each other, a condition evident in the "elite" club
atmosphere of corporate boards; and (3) opponents to the group must voice their opposition
at face-to-face meetings, making dissent more psychologically uncomfortable. See Dallas,
supra note 173, at 6; see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 899 (describing how most
outside directors take their responsibilities seriously but how they rarely get to exercise
independent judgment because "board meetings are dominated by a management ethos of
forced collegiality and agreement").
238. See Forbes & Milliken, supra note 130, at 494-95. Directors who create conflict by
departing from the norms of cohesion and collegiality will tend to experience less satisfaction
with board service and will likely respond to such conflict by spending less time on board
service rather than more. See id.
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mistake. This phenomenon may, for example, partly explain the
reluctance of corporate boards to dismiss nonperforming CEOs. 239
A director's principal benefit from board service often is gaining
entry to and being perceived as part of the elite, talented social
group that comprises the board. Accordingly, the average director
may prefer not to challenge this very same group and will try to
avoid rocking the boat. Similarly, directors' social ties to senior
management can inhibit vigorous oversight. Directors also clearly
recognize that their interactions with senior management are not
isolated but will extend over the course of their board tenure and
also potentially to other business dealings, and, accordingly, they
may be hesitant to jeopardize such relationships. Finally, many
outside directors hold CEO positions in their own companies and
socially identify with the executives of the firm that they are
overseeing. They may resist vigorous board questioning of manage-
ment, because they would not want to be challenged by their own
corporate boards to such a degree.24 °
IRBs are also considerably at risk for groupthink bias and for
experiencing related social pressures that discourage effective
monitoring. Indeed, IRB members face several of the same psycho-
logical conditions identified as creating the high levels of conformity
in corporate boardrooms. First, IRB decisions involve uncertainty
and ambiguity, such as in applying the very open-ended, vague
regulatory review criteria 241 to evaluate new protocols. Second,
members of the group tend to identify closely with each other, as
most IRB members are fellow clinical investigators who place a high
value on the research process and who have been chosen by the
same board selection procedures. Even outside IRB members tend
to be recruited by their friends or acquaintances on the IRB" 2 and
thus can be expected to have considerable social loyalties to certain
members of the group. Third, IRB meetings are face-to-face, and
239. See Langevoort, supra note 135, at 811. But see Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 27-29
(suggesting that the group decision-making process of the board can counter the individual
overconfidence biases of managers-biases that can lead managers to become wedded to their
initial plans and not see the flaws and need for change).
240. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 875 (stating that outside directors who hold
management positions with other companies 'are unlikely to monitor more energetically than
they believe they should be monitored by their own boards").
241. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
242. See Porter, supra note 57, at 6.
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persons who want to dissent from the group or request that the IRB
spend more time on a protocol must do so openly, making it more
uncomfortable for those who do not conform.243
Indeed, the overall IRB culture tends to favor cohesion and
conflict-avoidance. Outside IRB members can find it daunting to
show up at periodic meetings and directly challenge and disagree
with the sizable majority of inside members who already know each
other through the institution. Surveys reveal that outside IRB
members perceive that their presence is not always welcome.2"
Accordingly, they may be reluctant to strain the situation further
with nonconforming conduct. Even inside IRB members who wish
to challenge the status quo recognize that they can be punished for
being obstructionist through social disapproval from other IRB
members and through other sanctions.2 45 Additionally, inside IRB
members may hesitate to confront certain clinical investigators,
preferring to avoid such disagreements with their institutional and
social colleagues.2 46 Finally, inside IRB members can be expected to
socially identify with the clinical investigators as fellow researchers.
Inside IRB members thus may be inclined to favor a more hands-off
approach. In conducting their own clinical research as principal
investigators, they would no doubt prefer less IRB oversight and
accompanying hassle.
Because of such groupthink bias and social pressures, IRBs likely
face the same risk of over-commitment error as corporate boards.
This risk suggests that IRBs may be particularly weak at doing
what is arguably their most important function--continuing review
of already approved protocols. The IRB members as a social group
may implicitly stay committed to an initial approval decision for a
243. See Dallas, supra note 173, at 6 (discussing such psychological conditions as tending
to create conformity in groups).
244. For example, non-affiliated IRB members often report negative experiences in
interactions with the inside scientist members, including feelings that the scientists tolerate
their presence on the IRB only because diverse membership is required by the federal
regulations. See Sengupta & Lo, supra note 115, at 214-15; see also Porter, supra note 57, at
6 (noting that many outside IRB members reported feeling intimidated and/or inadequately
prepared for their roles when they went to meetings and were surrounded by scientific experts
who were more familiar with institutional operations and used technical jargon).
245. Obstructionist IRB members may find that their own research grants do not get
approval or they may be denied promotion within the institution. See Edgar & Rothman,
supra note 36, at 492.
246. See Williams, supra note 147, at 3.
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protocol and resist or discount mounting evidence of problems once
the research is underway. IRB members can also engage in "risk-
shifting," a pattern of behavior related to groupthink. That is, it
may be easier for the group to approve of a new protocol with a
certain level of risk that individual members, if making the decision
alone, would not favor. Any problems and sense of regret and
responsibility an individual IRB member might experience from a
bad decision can be diffused among the group.247
III. MULTIPLE BOARD ROLES AND THE MONITORING TRADE-OFF
If the IRB, like its corporate counterpart, suffers from such deep,
systematic flaws in performing its classic monitoring function, then
why continue to use the IRB as an oversight institution? Why not
abandon the IRB structure entirely? However, the corporate
governance perspective cautions against rashly dismissing IRBs as
useless oversight bodies because of their monitoring limitations.
This Part summarizes the corporate governance literature to
illustrate how corporate directors perform significant, non-monitor-
ing functions, such as acting as mediating hierarchs among the
corporation's stakeholders and performing a service role in provid-
ing strategic planning advice to senior executives. Corporate
governance theory suggests that attempts to augment the classic
monitoring function may make corporate boards less able to fulfill
these significant non-monitoring roles. This Part also considers how
IRBs perform similar non-monitoring roles and may likewise
confront a monitoring trade-off dilemma.
Corporate governance scholarship is rich with debate over the
multiple roles performed by corporate boards and what should serve
as the board's overall objective.24 The various theories of corporate
boards are not necessarily consistent with each other. It is beyond
the intended scope of this Article to capture, summarize, and
reconcile fully all prevailing views of corporate board dynamics.
Instead, this Article more modestly aims to highlight several
247. See id. at 3-4.
248. For representative recent scholarship, see Symposium, Enron and the Future of U.S.
Corporate Law and Policy, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004); Symposium, Agency Law Inside
the Corporation, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1167 (2003); Symposium, Van Gorkom and the Corporate
Board: Problem, Solution, or Placebo?, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 447 (2002).
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leading theories of what corporate boards actually do beyond the
classic monitoring function. Exploring the non-monitoring dimen-
sions of the corporate board helps one recognize that the IRB has
perhaps unappreciated strengths and offers certain advantages as
an oversight institution. As a result, the IRB remains positioned to
perform important, non-monitoring functions.
A. The Mediating Hierarch Role
Recent, provocative corporate governance scholarship argues that
the corporate board performs its most important role not as a
monitoring agent of the shareholders. Instead, because of the
board's unique position in the governance scheme, it functions as a
"mediating hierarch" capable of balancing the often conflicting
claims of shareholders, bondholders, managers, employees, the local
community, and other stakeholders to the corporation's assets and
resources.249 Under this view, directors may often act to advance
shareholder interests; however, as mediating hierarchs, directors
need not account to any particular constituency of the firm."' Such
theories, therefore, reject the classic principal-agent description of
the shareholder-director relationship as an inaccurate and incom-
plete explanation of what directors actually do and should do. The
classic principal-agent model fails, for example, to explain why
shareholders have so little control over the board, their purported
agents, and why directors enjoy such broad discretion in their
regular activities. The classic principal-agent view also fails to
explain why bondholders, creditors, and other third parties would
regularly make investments in corporations if directors rigidly
249. See Blair & Stout, supra note 105, at 408.
250. See id.; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 276-87 (1999). The mediating hierarch view of corporate directors
has generated much debate and is not without its critics. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 101. A
more recent model proposed for understanding the corporate board is that of "director
primacy." See generally Bainbridge, supra note 26. This view is similar to the mediating
hierach model, in holding that directors are not the mere agents of the shareholders. Id. at
550. The director primacy model, however, differs from the mediating hierarch theory in
positing that directors, rather than acting as mediating hierarchs for various constituencies
of the corporation, instead serve as the nexus for the various contractual relationships making
up the corporation. Id. at 551. This model envisions the director more as a "Platonic guardian"
and the board as a sui generis body, rather than principally seeing the board as a mediator
among different constituents in a team production process. Id. at 550-51.
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pursued only shareholder interests, a strategy which can disfavor
non-shareholder constituents.251
The alternative understanding of the corporate board as mediat-
ing hierarch stems from initially viewing the corporation as a
production team. That is, the corporation's activities and output
depend upon a group of shareholders, creditors, employees,
managers, and other stakeholders combining assets, investments,
and other efforts in some degree of coordination together as a
team.252 Recognizing that the corporation has team production
aspects, however, presents a fundamental governance problem: how
to allocate surpluses among the team members. The different
constituents of the corporation can make different investments-
capital, sweat equity, etc.-that combine to produce a corporate
output that is non-separable. 3 In other words, there is no easy way
to allocate the overall corporate surplus to each team member
according to his or her individual efforts. The individual contribu-
tions combine in synergistic and not easily visible ways to benefit
the corporation as a whole. Plus, it may be very difficult in advance
for all the parties to identify one another, come together, and agree
on how to divide the wealth resulting from their joint efforts."
The participants in the corporate production team thus may
prefer to relinquish control of the enterprise to a neutral third party
who will try to best represent the entire corporation and fairly
allocate surplus among the team members.255 This is where the
directors come into play. Directors can function as mediating
hierarchs and balance and broker between different stakeholders'
claims to the collective residual produced by the corporation. There
can be efficiency advantages to this model of corporate governance.
Team production members who understand that the directors, as
mediating hierarchs, will oversee the corporation's affairs so as not
to favor any one constituency, will more likely invest in the
corporation and develop ongoing business relationships with the
other production team members. The board as mediating hierarch,
251. Blair & Stout, supra note 250, at 251-52, 276-81.
252. Id. at 278.
253. Blair & Stout, supra note 105, at 419.
254. Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 672-73 (2002).
255. Id.
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therefore, helps to lower transaction costs and facilitate team-
specific investments in the firm from the various corporate constitu-
216
encies.
Considering directors as mediating hierarchs helps explain why
the corporate board seems at times to be so inadequately designed
as an effective monitoring body for the shareholders. Shareholders
are not the only stakeholder constituency with which the board
must principally concern itself. Certainly, the directors cannot
pursue self-interest or abandon shareholders. As mediating
hierarchs, however, directors owe a more general duty to do what is
best for the corporation as a whole, rather than solely pursuing
shareholders' interests. The director's role may be more accurately
described as resembling a fiduciary or trustee for the firm itself,
with some obligation to maximize corporate surplus so that it can be
divided among the many stakeholders. 257 Thus, not all boards can
be expected to, above all other activities, engage in or even need to
engage in aggressive monitoring for shareholders. Team members
may be able to resolve disputes or curb opportunism between
different constituencies by their own effort. These self-help actions
are bolstered nonetheless by all stakeholders knowing that, as a
backdrop safeguard, they can take a serious dispute to the board for
resolution by the directors as mediating hierarchs, even if this
option is not invoked frequently.25
Do IRBs play a similar role as mediating hierarch? IRBs may not
oversee a team production process to the same degree as do
corporate boards, but there are certain parallels. Just as the
256. Various team members may be reluctant to make capital and sweat equity
investments in the corporation if they run the risk of exploitation or opportunism by any one
constituency, including opportunism by shareholders. If no one constituency can make an
exclusive claim to the corporation's residual assets, however, team members are more likely
to refrain from opportunistic conduct and more likely to invest in the team. They will all take
some comfort that the board of directors will resolve any conflicts among team members
regarding the division of any corporate surplus. In other words, it may be an efficient way for
all the team members to agree to resolve any such conflicts over how to divide the corporate
surplus by agreeing to subject themselves to the will of the board, which will monitor their
efforts and decide how to divide the surplus most appropriately. The mediating hierarch
model thus may be an important, efficient means for coordinating the investments and
maintaining favorable relations among the different team members in the firm. See Blair &
Stout, supra note 105, at 419-26.
257. See Blair & Stout, supra note 250, at 290-92, 316.
258. See Blair & Stout, supra note 105, at 425-26.
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corporate board must confront different stakeholders with claims to
the corporation's residual surplus, the IRB must deal among various
stakeholders who have distinct agendas regarding the institution's
research activities. These stakeholders include the faculty investiga-
tors, clinical trial sponsors, research subjects, senior institutional
officials, government funding agencies, and even future patients
who might benefit from the knowledge gained by research.
Such actors may find that their research objectives conflict and
that they remain vulnerable to opportunistic attempts by other
stakeholders to direct the institution's overall research enterprise.
Clinical investigators, for example, might pressure research subjects
to enroll in trials that offer high risk and little immediate direct
therapeutic benefit, because the knowledge gained will significantly
advance the researchers' experimental goals and help their
academic pursuits. Similarly, external research sponsors, such as
pharmaceutical companies, may press to start and conclude a
clinical trial with great speed, even before the technical research
issues get adequately resolved to the satisfaction of many academic
investigators, because of the pressures to get new drugs through the
FDA approval process in order to reap commercial benefits. Even
research subjects may try to game the system for their own
advantage. In their desire to gain access to new technology, research
subjects can compromise the scientific integrity of the trial results
at the expense of the clinical investigators and trial sponsors.259
A certain level of stakeholder tension and disagreement, there-
fore, is inherent in an institution's research enterprise, and it can
jeopardize and make more costly the pursuit of clinical trials. The
IRB, however, has the capacity to perform a very helpful role in
mediating such potential conflicts among the different research
259. For example, nearly one-third of research subjects in a recent study of inhaler
medication discarded the contents of their inhalers in an attempt to conceal their failure to
take the medication at intervals and in dosages as required by study protocol. Presumably,
the deception was motivated in part by the research subjects' desire not to be excluded from
the trial for noncompliance, so as to maintain access to the experimental therapy. See Michael
S. Simmons et al., Unpredictability of Deception in Compliance with Physician-Prescribed
Bronchodilator Inhaler Use in a Clinical Trial, 118 CHEST 290, 290 (2000); see also Hamilton
Moses III et al., Collaborating with Industry-Choices for the Academic Medical Center, 347
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1371, 1372 (2002) (describing how patients' expectations for access to new
treatments may compete with the objectives of commercial sponsors regarding conduct of
clinical trials).
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stakeholders. The requirement for IRB review of each protocol
positions the IRB as a potential reconciling force. The IRB wields
enough effective power to command necessary attention from the
stakeholders. Even the corporate board of a medical institution has
no final veto power over an IRB's decision to approve or reject a
protocol. The buck stops with the IRB." ° Apart from outright
approval or rejection of a protocol, an IRB has many direct and
indirect means at its disposal to impact which studies actually get
performed, in what timeframe, and at what cost to the different
stakeholders involved.26' This power can be used to broker potential
stakeholder conflict and curb certain opportunism. As with corpo-
rate boards, mediating hierarch theory suggests that the IRB need
not intervene frequently in stakeholder disputes to adequately
perform as a mediator. The backdrop of regular IRB review, and the
thought that the IRB will not favor any one constituency, may spur
the stakeholders to work through certain disagreements by
themselves or to refrain from opportunistic conduct initially, thus
facilitating regular, recurring participation in the institution's
research activities by the various stakeholders.
As an example of the IRB's mediating role, consider what
happens when potentially competing clinical trials get conducted at
the same institution. Natural coordination problems arise as the
different investigations must compete for the same eligible popula-
260. Indeed, the Commission considered but rejected the idea of requiring a mechanism for
appeal of IRB decisions, adopting the view that "an IRB should have the final word at its
institution regarding the ethical acceptability of proposed research involving human subj ects."
Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 56,174, 56,183 (Nov. 30, 1978). Lars Noah
suggests that:
Although academic and other institutions that house IRBs may choose to review
board decisions (perhaps at the behest of a patient advocate even though no
formal mechanism exists for challenging board decisions to approve a protocol),
the regulations expressly prevent these institutions from overriding an IRB
decision to reject a protocol.
Noah, supra note 34.
261. For example, an IRB may choose to make approval of a protocol contingent upon
numerous conditions, such as limiting the number of subjects or narrowing the clinical criteria
for subjects to be eligible. Alternatively, an IRB can insist on rigid enrollment/informed
consent procedures, such as requiring the presence of a patient advocate during all
discussions with research subjects or precluding investigators from enrolling subjects directly
and mandating that another, independent physician do the enrollment to counter any
investigator bias. See LEVINE, supra note 46, at 111-12, 122-23. All conditions imposed will
be favorable to certain stakeholders but not others.
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tion in recruiting research subjects.2 62 For example, the IRB at
Loyola University's Stritch School of Medicine recently faced this
dilemma. A research protocol before the IRB proposed to recruit
renal cell cancer patients; meanwhile, another renal cell cancer
study was preliminarily underway at the same facility. Both
investigations tested attempts to reduce the cancer recurrence rate
and improve the survival rate after surgery for these patients. One
protocol intended to give the subjects the drug interleukin post-
surgery, while the other would use a vaccine.263 When the investiga-
tors found out about the potential conflict in recruiting the same
renal cell cancer subjects for the different trials, they attempted,
through a crude political compromise, to work out an enrollment
coordination plan that favored the interleukin trial.
In essence, the investigator for the disfavored vaccine protocol
agreed to narrow its eligibility criteria and recruit fewer subjects
overall. Also, when patients technically would be eligible for both
protocols, they would not be told about the second, disfavored
vaccine protocol.2 The IRB, however, overruled this initial
coordination plan. The IRB concluded that it was unethical not to
let subjects eligible for both trials know about the existence of both
research opportunities. The IRB thus proposed that investigators
alert potential subjects about both trials during the enrollment
process.265
Here, one sees the IRB acting akin to a mediating hierarch. The
IRB intervened in a preliminary agreement already brokered among
the lead investigators to steer a course of action more attentive to
research subject interests. Although it might appear that the IRB
simply imposed an obvious solution-let subjects know about both
trials-and acted primarily as an agent of research subjects, the
issues and interests at stake are in fact more complex. In thwarting
initial attempts to favor the progress of the interleukin trial, the
IRB instead attempted a middle-of-the-road, consensus-building
262. See Elisa J. Gordon & Kenneth C. Micetich, Competing Clinical Trials in the Same
Institution: Ethical Issues in Subject Selection and Informed Consent, 24 IRB: ETHICS & HUM.
RES. 1, 1 (2002).
263. See id.
264. See id. at 1-2.
265. See id. at 5.
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approach. This compromise was not necessarily the optimal one for
potential research subjects or for the clinical investigators. Perhaps
a more acceptable solution would have been to favor the trial that
posed less risk to subjects or to favor the trial capable of quicker
data resolution, so that the knowledge gained could be diffused more
broadly and quickly to help similarly situated patients. Perhaps the
institution should have refused to allow both trials to run concur-
rently in the first place and award exclusive priority to the first-in-
time protocol, as some research subjects had already made signifi-
cant commitments to that investigation.
Viewing the IRB as a mediating hierarch, the more important
point is that the IRB reached a decision sufficiently attuned to
different stakeholder interests. In competing trial scenarios such as
this example, research stakeholder conflicts may become intractable
or pose severe problems for the institution as a whole unless capable
of regular resolution by an interceding body trying to represent all
stakeholder interests fairly. Clinical investigators may face their
own career demands, or pressures from their funding sponsors, to
complete enrollment as quickly as possible and, consequently, may
be unwilling to yield potential subjects to any other trial at the
institution. If the trials run concurrently, competition for the same
subjects may limit each investigation's potential enrollment,
significantly delaying progression and data collection.
In fact, with concurrently run trials, the danger exists that both
trials will end up with "underpowered" data based on too few
research subjects enrolling to produce meaningful results. Moreover,
an inability to control coordination problems has negative spillover
effects that can jeopardize the institution's future research enter-
prise generally. An institution that regularly forces coordinated
enrollment between two competing clinical trials in such a way as
to make the conduct of either one of the trials infeasible may simply
force investigators and trial sponsors to look to other institutional
settings for their work. Similarly, if an institution gains the
reputation of withholding clinical trial opportunities from eligible
subjects, future research subjects may vote with their feet and look
to other institutions for research opportunities.
An effective mediating body, however, can minimize such
problems arising from trial coordination conflict over the long run.
Although the Loyola University IRB's decision may not have been
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the right one or the best one in all situations that involve competing
trials, the decision is defensible as not significantly favoring one
constituency over the other. Also, because of the institutional power
that the IRB wields, the stakeholders had to live with the IRB's
decision as final. If the IRB review mechanism was not available to
work out such disputes on a regular basis, it would become more
costly for the stakeholders to settle such issues themselves, certain
issues might never get considered, and the recurring general conflict
could disrupt the institution's research mission. In this example, by
using its position to reach a solution viewed as fair enough to the
various stakeholders, the Loyola University IRB helped facilitate
their continued participation in the institution's research activities.
Another example of the IRB's mediating potential concerns
controversies over whether to provide preliminary clinical trial data
to research subjects. The federal research regulations provide that,
"[wihen appropriate," the informed consent document should include
a statement that "significant new findings" developed during the
course of the research, which may relate to the subject's willingness
to continue with the experiment, will be disclosed to the subject on
an on-going basis.266 The regulations, however, provide no further
express guidance. What a "significant new finding" is and when it
is appropriate for investigators to disclose preliminary trial data to
research subjects, even before it becomes statistically significant,
remains open to vigorous debate and subject to many differing
interpretations.267 Because of the lack of clear regulatory guidance,
this is one decision that an IRB basically can make on a case-by-
case basis as it sees fit.
Different stakeholders to the research enterprise can be expected
to have vastly contrasting views about preliminary data disclosure.
On the one hand, it would seem that the reasonable research subject
would want to know if the preliminary trial data suggests the
experimental intervention is no better than or possibly worse than
conventional therapy, or if material, unanticipated side effects to
the experimental therapy have been observed. Trial sponsors,
266. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(5).
267. See Goldner, supra note 51, at 126; Thomas Keens, Informing Subjects About Research
Results, in INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: MANAGEMENT AND FUNCTION, supra note 43, at 269
("[Riegulations on protecting human research subjects do not guide the IRB in deciding which
research information [about study results], if any, should be communicated to subjects.").
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however, might be reluctant to share this information, even though
subjects would regard it as material, because of fears it could deter
ongoing subject recruitment, convince current subjects to withdraw
prematurely, or otherwise lead to bad publicity for the still un-
proven therapy.
2 68
Indeed, very valid, countervailing reasons exist for not disclosing
all preliminary data to research subjects. Until such data is
accumulated from a large enough sample to be statistically signifi-
cant, it may merely confuse research subjects, alarm them unneces-
sarily, or be of such limited value that to require its disclosure in all
instances would merely add burdensome administrative costs to the
research protocol. Moreover, investigators and trial sponsors might
legitimately fear that trial data could become tainted if later
subjects were given even slightly different risk information than
earlier ones, because this may introduce certain research-subject
biases or premature withdrawals that could affect the trial
results.269
Whether and when to require preliminary trial data disclosure
thus is one area where the IRB must balance differing stakeholder
views. It also is one area where the various stakeholders, if left to
negotiate the issues themselves, might not be able to come to any
easy solution or better result in terms of satisfying all stakeholder
interests. They likely could not even anticipate all the different
scenarios involving emerging trial data as to be able to reach
definitive agreement in advance. Moreover, negotiating such issues
268. See Goldner, supra note 51, at 126. As an example of such a dispute, consider the
recent controversies in clinical trials of an iron chelation drug at the University of Toronto
and the Hospital for Sick Children. The experimental drug was given to transfusion-
dependent thalassemia patients. When clinical researchers identified unexpected risks with
the drug, the trial sponsor and drug manufacturer, Apotex Inc., terminated the trials before
full subject enrollment. Apotex then sought to prevent the lead researcher from disclosing the
risks to patients or publishing the findings, relying upon a confidentiality clause in its
research agreement with the investigator. As a result of the eventual public outcry
surrounding this incident, the University of Toronto and its affiliated teaching hospitals
eventually implemented a new policy intended to prohibit contract clauses that could be used
to prohibit disclosure of such risks to research subjects. See Patricia Baird et al., Clinical
Trials and Industry, 297 SCIENCE 2211, 2211 (2002); see also Bruce M. Psaty & Drummond
Rennie, Stopping Medical Research to Save Money: A Broken Pact With Researchers and
Patients, 289 JAMA 2128 (2003) (discussing the related problem of what to do when a trial
sponsor decides to terminate an investigation before completion and before full subject
enrollment because of commercial or financing reasons).
269. Goldner, supra note 51, at 126.
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for each and every protocol would be costly and time-intensive. But
the IRB can play an important mediating role. By remaining
relatively neutral and above the potential stakeholder conflict on
this issue, the IRB remains uniquely situated to intervene on a
protocol-by-protocol basis and to reach a decision it believes is at
least fair to all the stakeholders involved and best for the overall
research enterprise. Furthermore, because of the power the IRB
wields and the essential nonreviewability of its actions, the
stakeholders will have to abide by the IRB's decision. If the IRB
performs its role effectively, it can satisfy a sufficient number of the
stakeholders enough of the time so as to minimize conflict and
facilitate continued participation in the institution's research
enterprise.
B. Monitoring Trade-off Problems
If IRBs can and do perform such a helpful mediating role, the
corporate governance perspective warns that an IRB's mediating
abilities can become compromised by attempts to bolster its
monitoring function. The experience of corporate boards indicates
that the very insularity and autonomy that may make them weak
monitoring bodies nonetheless remains critically essential to their
mediating effectiveness. Team production theories explain that
stakeholders may be willing to look to the corporate board to resolve
critical issues such as the division of corporate surpluses, because
the corporate board functions as an autonomous body and enjoys, as
a practical matter, such few curbs on its discretion that it is
beholden to no single group. A board beholden to no one interest
group may be viewed as more trustworthy than a board that
consistently favors one constituency's interests. An effective
corporate board makes use of such above-the-fray perceptions to
work through potential governance disagreements regarding the
firm's activities.27 °
Like corporate boards, IRBs depend upon and make use of
implicit assumptions about their trustworthiness. Trust is essential
to so many aspects of the healthcare system,27' with the area of
270. See Blair & Stout, supra note 105, at 435-40.
271. See generally Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002).
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human subjects research no exception. 2 As the Office of Inspector
General has observed, the IRB review process "is rooted in trust."
27 3
This includes more than the significant trust that research subjects
put in the clinical investigators by volunteering for a clinical trial in
the first place. Researchers themselves must trust and assume that
members of an IRB will act in good faith.
For example, the very process of submitting a potential research
protocol for IRB review may involve disclosure of sensitive or
proprietary information, and the clinical investigator must have
some level of comfort that IRB members will not try to use this
information for personal advantage. Clinical investigators also
recognize that IRB review is largely evaluation by one's peers. As a
general matter, therefore, researchers may expect a certain level of
deference and respect from their professional colleagues, rather
than harsh, inflexible scrutiny from a suspicious, enforcement-
oriented tribunal. The limited nature of IRB review helps to
preserve investigator goodwill and control costs so that clinical
trials can be conducted with relatively greater speed and
efficiency."4 Although many researchers may presently perceive the
IRB review system as bureaucratic, burdensome, and inefficient,
they have yet to view the IRB as a watchdog to be feared and
altogether avoided. Indeed, IRBs have traditionally approached
their reviews in a collegial, non-threatening, non-skeptical
manner.
275
If IRBs aggressively adopt the monitoring function, however, the
fragile level of trust that researchers presently place in IRB review
may disappear. As medical ethicist Robert Levine has warned, an
IRB that interacts with researchers as a "police force,"276 with
extensive, formal monitoring, can create more problems than it
solves. The enormous ill will created between the IRB and its
researcher-constituents can discourage honest investigators from
pursuing research at the institution. It can inject norms of doubt
272. See Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subjects Research: The
Challenge of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L.J. 327, 355-61 (2003).
273. IRBs: THEIR ROLE, supra note 30, at 12.
274. See Nicholas A. Chistakis, Should IRBs Monitor Research More Strictly?, 10 IRB 8,
8-9 (1988).
275. IRBS: THEIR RoLE, supra note 30, at 12.
276. LEVINE, supra note 46, at 348.
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and suspicion, norms at odds with an academic medical culture in
which colleagues ordinarily must trust one another to interact
productively and successfully. It also can make stakeholders less
inclined to look to the IRB for mediating help.277
Loss of trust can also weaken informal monitoring channels
normally available to the IRB. When an IRB is trusted and re-
spected by researchers within an institution, they may actively seek
its advice and assistance in working through thorny problems of
clinical trial conduct and design. If, however, the researchers
generally view the IRB as not credible, nor sufficiently neutral, they
will disclose only the bare minimum of required information and
otherwise seek to evade IRB review. Researchers may also be less
likely to notify an IRB perceived as untrustworthy about question-
able research practices of colleagues at the institution, for fear that
the IRB will overreact and impose burdensome constraints on all
clinical investigations at the facility.7
C. Service Role and Further Exploration of the Monitoring
Trade-off
Corporate boards perform additional, vitally important functions
other than monitoring and mediating. Consideration of these
additional board functions further illustrates the monitoring trade-
off problem. The "service" role describes the actions of a corporate
board in advising the CEO and senior executives on long-term
planning and strategy for the corporation, as well as in reviewing
the structure of significant transactions.279 The service role recog-
nizes that the CEO and senior executives can benefit by seeking and
receiving regular advice from the board. Communication of this sort
allows management to tap the broader views and experience of the
directors and, in particular, to benefit from particular pockets of
277. See id. at 348-50.
278. See id. at 341-42.
279. See Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 8; Fisch, supra note 192, at 272; Forbes & Milliken,
supra note 130, at 492; Johnson et al., supra note 138, at 411, 424. The corporate governance
literature sometimes describes such service conduct as, alternatively, the "managerial"
function of the board. See Fisch, supra note 192, at 272. Another role corporate boards
perform is the "resource" function. Directors can use their contacts to facilitate the
corporation's access to critical talent, supplies, and resources. See Johnson et al., supra note
138, at 427.
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expertise in the boardroom that may not exist within the firm's
internal management ranks.
The service role markedly differs from the classic monitoring
activity, in that directors function as expert background advisors,
working with the CEO and offering guidance, rather than seeking
to replace or otherwise sanction the CEO for transgressions and
subpar performance. 2" The service role, rather than monitoring,
may more accurately describe what most directors see as their
responsibility-working with current management to formulate
successful strategies for the corporation's best interests.2"' In their
service mode, directors offer management an opportunity to
strategize and brainstorm. Management biases, including a
potential overconfidence in currently adopted plans for the firm, can
be corrected by having senior executives hear the views of other
business experts serving as directors.28 2
Attempts to increase the monitoring role of the corporate board
can undercut this service function. If the board monitors too often
and directly intervenes in the day-to-day decisions of management,
it can make managers overly concerned about avoiding risks,
consequently jeopardizing implementation of strategic initiatives,
including those favored by the board.283 More importantly, overzeal-
ous monitoring can chill the communication flow essential to the
board's service role. A board that signals it will sanction manage-
ment for bad news, or that regularly displays skepticism about
management reports, will fuel feelings of distrust and even animos-
ity between the board and senior executives.
280. See Johnson et al., supra note 138, at 424. The service role of the board, however,
sometimes can lead directors into even more of an active role, making day-to-day management
decisions. For certain key transactions, such as mergers, boards of directors have become so
actively involved in formulating strategy as to effectively take control of the transaction and
displace management to the background. See Langevoort, supra note 135, at 803. For such
transactions, courts have often required active participation by the board. See Fisch, supra
note 192, at 273.
281. In fact, monitoring is probably reserved for rare, crisis-mode situations within the
corporation, whereas the service role of the board comes up more frequently in regular
corporate decision making. See Fisch, supra note 192, at 282.
282. See Langevoort, supra note 135, at 803.
283. See Ira M. Millstein, The Professional Board, 50 Bus. LAw. 1427, 1433 (1995). Also,
management may be less interested in implementing a board-imposed plan, making the plan
less likely to succeed. See id.
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This can become a self-perpetuating phenomenon. The more
suspicious the board becomes of management disclosures, and the
increasing pressure the board places on management to disclose
more, the less likely management will want to seek out the board's
advice in the first place. A high level of distrust between the board
and senior management is bad for the firm overall, as it can
seriously inhibit desirable brainstorming between the two groups.2"4
In other words, "overloading the board with true monitors may
create too stark a dilemma for the senior managers, forcing them to
engage in impression management tactics at the expense of seeking
needed advice and assistance in strategy formulation."'85 It seems,
therefore, that a board's effectiveness in monitoring must, to a large
degree, be traded off against its effectiveness in performing the
service role.
Do IRBs perform a service role akin to corporate boards?
Although this role may not be expressly stated as such in the federal
research regulations, IRBs certainly can help with strategic
brainstorming. As seen with the mediating function, the require-
ment for regular IRB review of new and continuing protocols is key
to its service role. This positions the IRB to serve as a sounding
board and conduit for discussions among research colleagues
regarding complicated questions of research design, statistical
power, trial feasibility, recruitment procedures, and the like.
Clinical investigators can tap the collective expertise of IRB
members on such matters and may even seek IRB guidance and
input on a particular technical issue when submitting a protocol for
review."' Similarly, the IRB can give informal suggestions and
recommendations about the protocol beyond the express conditions
it imposes to meet regulatory requirements.
Indeed, IRB review, by allowing for and augmenting regular
communication between active participants in the research
enterprise, can be particularly helpful for junior investigators.
Often, a learning curve needs to be overcome for successful trial
284. See Paredes, supra note 191, at 521.
285. Langevoort, supra note 135, at 816.
286. Cf Noah, supra note 34 (noting that the IRB review process is "open and interactive"
and provides an opportunity for constructive dialogue between the IRB and the investigator,
similar to how referees for peer review publications provide useful feedback to authors to
improve the quality of the published work and the underlying research).
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management, and new investigators may not recognize pragmatic
problems in protocol design that more experienced researchers on
the IRB can identify. For example, an IRB with trained statisticians
may alert a clinical investigator that the proposed study will have
insufficient statistical power and may suggest expanding the
number of subjects studied. In a similar vein, IRB members may
warn an investigator new to the institution that the proposed
recruitment procedures will, in their experience in conducting
research at the same facility, not likely yield the number of
potential research subjects needed, and they may advise exploring
additional recruitment possibilities.
Increased monitoring by an IRB can negatively impact its service
role ability. For one, the demands of increased monitoring compete
with service activities for the already limited time IRB members
have to devote to IRB work overall. If IRBs are required to spend
increasing amounts of time on continuing review protocols, auditing
consent procedures in the field, and other monitoring activities, it
will leave little time for the IRB to brainstorm with clinical
investigators over improving research design or institutional
research policies. Also, as previously noted, a vigilant, active
monitoring IRB can undermine the fragile trust researchers place
in the oversight body. Such a climate of trust promotes and makes
possible informal appeals to the IRB for guidance and assistance.2"7
Allowing IRBs a degree of flexibility in how they function can offer
certain advantages and efficiencies in providing quick, open lines of
communication between the investigators and the IRB within an
institution.218 But a high level of required IRB monitoring activity
runs the risk of foreclosing such spontaneous, informal discussions
and brainstorming. Increased monitoring may simply inhibit
individual researchers' willingness to seek advice and input from
IRB members, or to heed their recommendations, in the first place.
D. Problems with One-Size-Fits-All IRB Reform
Demonstrating that IRBs, like corporate boards, perform a
variety of non-monitoring roles helps to remind us that IRBs possess
287. See Levine, supra note 21, at 162.
288. See Edgar & Rothman, supra note 36, at 497.
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certain unappreciated strengths. In other words, IRBs as currently
structured may be particularly effective at performing mediating,
service, and other non-monitoring functions. This suggests that
radical reform proposals to abandon or completely overhaul IRBs
require careful thought. The monitoring trade-off dilemma cautions
that what may be gained through increased IRB monitoring may not
always be worth what is sacrificed as a result.
This analysis at the very least suggests that IRB reformers need
to be more attentive to context and to the particular needs of each
research institution before dismissing an institution's IRB as
nonproductive and ineffective. Corporate governance theorists have
warned about the dangers of trying to reform corporate boardrooms
under a one-size-fits-all monitoring model. Companies can have very
different needs for certain pockets of expertise on the board
depending on the firm's activities. Plus, in some corporate environ-
ments, intense market pressures, institutional culture, and other
factors serve as a sufficient check on managerial opportunism as to
lessen the need for a vigorous monitoring board. A universal model
of the corporate board that emphasizes the monitoring role,
therefore, will not always serve a specific corporation's interests.289
These insights likely apply to IRBs as well. A universal model of
the IRB rigidly focused on the monitoring role will not be the
optimal board structure at each research institution. More attention
needs to be paid to the particular challenges and stress points
confronting the institution's overall research enterprise. For
example, an institution weakened by faculty power struggles, by an
organizational culture that encourages clinical departments and
individual investigators to compete against each other for limited
research funding, and by fragile relationships with wary, fickle
clinical trial sponsors may be prone to potential conflict and
opportunistic conduct among the research enterprise stakeholders.
In such an environment, the IRB's ability to act as mediating
289. See Fisch, supra note 192, at 284-86. Professor Fisch notes, for example, how
corporations in highly regulated industries may benefit less from a monitoring board, because
the increased regulatory environment already imposes clear constraints on the corporation's
activities. Id. at 285. Also, some high-profile corporations, such as Warren Buffett's Berkshire
Hathaway company, have performed extremely well for shareholders while using a board
structure that emphasizes the service and relations function much more than the monitoring
function. See id. at 287-88; see also Lin, supra note 38, at 931 (emphasizing that a board's
expertise in monitoring may detract from other board responsibilities and talents).
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hierarch takes on increased importance. At another institution,
junior researchers may take on increased trial management
responsibilities without guidance from senior colleagues within
their own clinical department. Here, the IRB's service role becomes
more critical. Attempts to force all IRBs into a unitary monitoring
model thus may be counterproductive and hamper their ability to
engage in non-monitoring functions for which they possess certain
institutional strengths and advantages. None of this means that we
should remain unconcerned about IRB's monitoring limitations or
that IRBs should neglect their fundamental responsibility for
protection of research subjects. But there are reasons to be wary and
somewhat cautious about IRB reform attempts to impose a one-size-
fits-all monitoring model as the solution for all research institutions.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE
FOR IRB REFORM
The IRB-corporate board comparison does much more than simply
highlight a monitoring trade-off dilemma. The experience of
corporate boards can help in predicting how particular changes in
structure, mandate, and procedures will likely affect an IRB's
overall performance. This Part preliminarily explores such implica-
tions of the corporate governance perspective by considering two
significant IRB reform proposals currently attracting much support:
(1) attempts to increase the number of outside, community members
serving on IRBs; and (2) calls for IRBs to take on a more direct role
in reviewing financial conflicts of interest.
A. Increasing the Number of Outsiders on IRBs
Increasing outsider presence stands out as the central, recurring
theme in many current IRB reform proposals. The Institute of
Medicine (IOM) recently called for IRBs to expand the ranks of
unaffiliated members, including non-scientists, local community
residents, and patient representatives, so that they hold at least
twenty-five percent of the membership slots on each IRB.29° This
290. See COMM. ON ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS, INST. OF MED., supra note 21, at 96.
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recommendation follows a very similar minimum twenty-five
percent suggestion made by the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC) in 2001.291 NBAC has further advised bolster-
ing the outside presence by revising IRB procedural rules to require
the presence of representatives from the patient, nonscientific, and
noninstitutional membership categories at an IRB meeting in order
for a sufficient quorum to exist.292 Additionally, academic commen-
tators frequently urge increasing the number of community and
nonscientific IRB members.293 Recall, too, that the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, in supporting an IRB review system, had
initially suggested that nonscientists should comprise at least one-
third of an IRB's membership, a recommendation that the final IRB
regulations failed to follow.294
In theory, increasing the outside presence on IRBs offers several
important advantages for improving IRB oversight. A greater
number of outside members could have more practical success,
through the force of sheer numbers, in getting the IRB to consider
layperson and noninstitutional viewpoints. Additional outside
members could help establish stronger links between the IRB and
the greater community, enhancing perceptions of the IRB's legiti-
macy. They also could serve as a sounding board for researcher and
inside IRB members seeking insight about layperson and other
professionals' perspectives.295 Moreover, the very prospect of having
their protocols reviewed and discussed by a sizable number of
outside members can encourage researchers to take more care in
designing protocols. Presumably, they would be concerned about
wider exposure of potentially questionable research activities, as
well as anticipate receiving a qualitatively different level of scrutiny
from outside members, as compared to insiders.
But the corporate governance perspective cautions that merely
adding more outside members offers no simple, quick-fix remedy.
Indeed, there are limits to how much numerical changes in the
291. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 64.
292. See id.
293. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 148, at 7-8; Goldner, supra note 51, at 107-09.
294. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
295. See Porter, supra note 57, at 2 (describing multiple expectations that have been held
for outside IRB members).
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insider/outsider mix, without more, can realistically affect board
operations. The corporate board experience teaches that pursuit of
shareholder interests and active monitoring do not go hand in hand
with outside status. With regard to corporate boards, the traditional
label of outside director may not entirely reflect that director's
capacity for independence.296 True independence turns on the
director's state of mind and willingness to act, including readiness
to buck management.297 An outside director, although not employed
by the firm, may still have significant business and financial
relationships with the company that affect his willingness to
challenge management. Indeed, for this reason the new NYSE and
NASDAQ listing requirements have tried to define "independent"
directors for public corporations more narrowly, accounting for such
financial ties.29
Even if an outside director avoids significant business relation-
ships with the firm, however, the outside status still does not mean
that director will vigorously represent shareholders as a truly
independent director. In other words, "[g] ood character and financial
independence from management may be necessary conditions for
effective monitoring, but they are hardly sufficient."299 A number of
additional factors can affect an outside director's monitoring ability.
First, and critically important, many outside directors have on-going
personal relationships or socially identify with the firm's senior
executives. °° Such outside directors can face considerable social
pressures. Indeed, in the recent In re Oracle Corp. Derivative
Litigation3°1 proceeding, the Delaware Court of Chancery recognized
the degree to which social ties and other affiliations between
directors and management can compromise an outside director's
capacity for independence. The court questioned whether two
296. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 874-75.
297. Paredes, supra note 191, at 522.
298. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
299. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 874-75.
300. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 138, at 418-19. For example, the typical outside
director may depend on management for his board seat and may find it socially uncomfortable
to monitor friends and peers in management positions. The typical outside director in a large
public company also holds a senior executive position at another corporation. He may be
inclined, therefore, to grant management wide discretion, because that is how he would prefer
to be treated by his own company's board. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 874-75.
301. 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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outside directors, both Stanford University professors, could
maintain sufficient independence in evaluating insider trading
allegations against a fellow colleague at their university in light of
other personal relationships between the outside directors and the
interested parties.32
For example, psychological studies indicate that directors elected
to the board during the tenure of a CEO may feel a personal sense
of obligation and loyalty to that individual."3 This no doubt reflects
the practical reality that although shareholders nominally elect the
directors, the CEO is often able, through indirect means, to
determine who actually gets elected as a director.3" Outside
directors thus may feel they owe their board seats in large part to
current management.3"5 They may also be concerned about renomi-
nation to the board and may not want to risk jeopardizing their
lucrative, prestigious board seats by being critical of senior manage-
ment.0 6 They may also be less willing to challenge persons they
identify as like-minded social peers. As a result, "[aill too often ...
outside directors who are selected in the usual way from the usual
pool turn out to be more independent of shareholders than they are
of management."3 7
Plus, as previously discussed, any director, whether inside or
outside, has few clear incentives to consider shareholder views when
making board decisions. A nominally independent director may
have joined the board primarily to increase his social reputation and
302. See id. at 942-48. The two outside directors were members of Oracle's special litigation
committee (SLC). The SLC had to evaluate a shareholder derivative action alleging insider
trading against the CEO and other members of the Oracle board of directors. See id. at 920-
23. The court concluded that there was reason to doubt the SLC's impartiality in evaluating
the litigation in part because of the numerous social ties and affiliations between the outside
directors, Stanford, and the accused defendants. See id. at 942-48. The court emphasized that
director independence can be threatened not just by financial considerations but also by
personal or other relationships to the interested parties. See id. at 938-39.
303. Johnson et al., supra note 138, at 419.
304. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
305. See Paredes, supra note 191, at 511.
306. See id. at 508.
307. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 873; see also Cox & Munsinger, supra note 236,
at 91-97 (describing how the typical board appointment process, in which nominees are sought
who are like-minded and who will be compatible with the present directors, can generate
powerful biases that compromise a director's ability for making independent judgment);
Matheson & Olson, supra note 125, at 1461 ("[Elven the most independent of directors shun
shareholder input.").
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because of perceived perks of director service, and thus care very
little about the monitoring role and seeking shareholder input. °8 In
fact, outside directors often have less at stake financially in how the
corporation fares than inside directors, meaning that they actually
have less incentive to perform as vigilant monitors and to help with
strategic decision making.3 9 Also, the addition of more outside
directors to a board does nothing to address the problem that time
constraints severely limit even the most dedicated outside director's
effectiveness.310 Further, inside directors can be expected to have
superior information compared to outsiders regarding company
operations, an advantage that still may allow the insiders to control
or hinder much of what gets done by the board, notwithstanding the
insiders' diminished numbers.31'
Length of board service can also impact a director's monitoring
capacity. Simply serving on a board over time may wear down
outsiders' capacity for detachment and objectivity. A long-serving
director can become assimilated into and coopted by the corpora-
tion's governing culture. 1 2 Corporate law has taken only tentative
steps to account for this particular factor influencing board dynam-
ics, reflected, for example, in Michigan's unusual corporation
statute. Under the Michigan law, lengthy board service, regardless
of non-employment and lack of significant financial ties with the
firm, can disqualify a director from obtaining independent status
important for approval of conflict of interest transactions and for
certain other corporate actions.1 3 Similarly, some institutional
308. See Langevoort, supra note 135, at 798-99.
309. See id. at 806-07.
310. For this very reason, several current corporate governance reform proposals have
focused on limiting the number of boards on which outside directors may sit, at least to ensure
that they have more time to devote to each corporation's affairs. The Council of Institutional
Investors, for example, has suggested that outside directors with full-time jobs should not
serve on more than two other company's boards. The Council further recommends that CEOs
limit their outside director service to only one other corporation and that, in any event, no
person should serve on more than five corporate boards. Council of Institutional Investors,
Corporate Governance Policies (2003), available at httpJ/www.cii.org/dcwascii/web.nsfdoc/
policies index.cm (last modified Oct. 13, 2004).
311. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 874-75.
312. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921, 953 (1999) (noting the potential that
"directors who have been on the board for a long time, though nominally independent, may
simply be less energetic than newer directors").
313. Michigan excludes from the definition of "independent directors" persons who have
7032004]
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investors have urged that term limits apply to director service, in
order to bring new ideas and talent to the board.314 On the other
hand, in certain corporate environments, increased board tenure
might help, rather than hurt, a director's monitoring role. The
longer an outside director serves, the more company-specific
information he gathers, reducing his dependency on management
for information.315
The intricacies involved in accounting for how length of board
service impacts an outside director's monitoring role point to the
much larger, underlying problem. The experience of corporate
boards demonstrates that trying to change board conduct through
the mere addition of more outside directors is no easy task. The
board is an unwieldy, convoluted institution responsive to many
factors. Numerous, distinct variables interact in a non-linear, often
attenuated manner to drive the actions of individual directors and
the overall board. Empirical studies of corporate board behavior
suggest that whether an outside director will be an effective,
independent monitor depends on a number of conditions wholly
apart from the director's nominal outside status. Such conditions
range from the length of the director's board service, to the size of
the overall board, to the person's professional training and experi-
ence before going on the board.316 Accordingly, the empirical
research indicates that the makeup of the board does not correspond
neatly with particular performance outcomes; instead, the effects of
served on the corporate board for more than three years, whether or not they were considered
independent when first elected. MINCH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 450.1107(3)(f) (West 2002). This
definition implicitly recognizes that a director's capacity for independence becomes
compromised after years of board service and the development of interpersonal ties with
management.
314. The influential California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) and the
Teachers Insurance Annuity Association College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF)
have called for director term limits. See Elson & Gyves, supra note 12, at 882.
315. See Lin, supra note 38, at 950.
316. See id. at 903. Professor Lin, reviewing the empirical literature, identifies a number
of factors that influence an outside director's capacity for independence, including: (1) the
number of other outside directors in the boardroom; (2) the length of the director's service on
the board; (3) the director's professional qualifications; (4) the length of the CEO's tenure in
office; (5) the director's equity interest in the company and other business ties to the firm; (6)
the director's general experience with the firm's industry, and (7) the overall size of the board.
See id. at 957.
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board composition are probably far more complicated, subtle, and
indirect.317
The lesson for IRBs is that simply adding more outside, unaffili-
ated members to an IRB does not guarantee any significant change
in board operations. Given the complex variables that affect overall
board performance, changing board composition will, at best, have
an attenuated impact. Additionally, an IRB member's capacity
for independence and active monitoring does not automatically
track his outside, non-affiliated status. Like outside directors,
nonaffiliated IRB members may become worn down by lengthy
tenure on the board. Unless there is significant turnover in
committee membership, outside IRB members may become easily
co-opted by institutional interests. They also will continue to face
significant time constraints, calling into question their ability to be
effective monitors. Simply increasing the number of outside
members by a modest degree also will not address the underlying
problem that all outside IRB members have to perform an uncom-
fortable social role of onlooker and intruder. As one outside IRB
member describes it, "Oftentimes, we feel like the skunk at the
picnic. Institutions and researchers alike view us with skepticism,
or with resignation at best."
18
Perhaps more important, the corporate governance perspective
cautions that unless the appointment process for outside IRB
members also radically changes, simply adding more non-affiliated
IRB members may not change board dynamics a great deal. Outside
IRB members usually join the board upon invitation of the existing
IRB chair or upon recommendation by someone already on the
IRB.3" 9 Thus, like outside corporate directors, non-affiliated IRB
members typically join a board already encumbered by social
relationships with several current board members. In addition, like
outside corporate directors, IRB members may feel some degree of
loyalty and obligation to the persons and institution who appointed
them to the board. This will make it difficult for the typical outside
member to adopt a more active monitoring stance and shake up
current board operations. Adding a few more outside members to
317. See Forbes & Milliken, supra note 130, at 490; Lin, supra note 38, at 922, 925-26.
318. Bauer, supra note 148, at 7.
319. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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the room does not necessarily change the underlying pressures for
IRB members to conform, act for the institution's benefit, and
continue operations as usual.
If IRB reform really requires more active monitoring by non-
affiliated members, then perhaps the entire IRB appointment
process needs to be overhauled. Imagine, for example, if non-
affiliated members of an IRB had to be nominated and elected by
community groups or other representatives of an institution's
patient base, without any involvement by institutional officials
other than making sure such elections take place. One might then
expect to see outside IRB members with very different expectations
about their responsibilities and with fewer interpersonal and
professional relationships weighing down the inclination to monitor.
Elected IRB members who do not owe their direct appointment to
anyone at the institution might feel more comfortable and even
obligated to take on clearer research subject advocacy roles, even if
this creates clear tensions with other members of the board.320
Similarly, if outside IRB members served limited tenures on the
committees, perhaps they would approach their tasks with more
vigor and capacity for detachment and be able to conclude their
board service before the many social pressures take hold and wear
them down.
The corporate governance perspective further suggests that
changing board procedural rules is equally important as changing
board composition in order to reap the benefits of an increased
outsider presence on the board. Although corporate boards have
been adding more outside directors over the past decade, this
apparently did not help in avoiding the most recent round of
corporate scandals. Accordingly, reform proponents have addition-
ally advocated for treating the outside faction, procedurally, as a
more independent organ. For example, the American Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance instructs that independent
directors, acting as their own group, should be entitled in certain
situations to retain their own legal counsel, accountants, and other
320. Of course, management has largely co-opted the board election process in shareholder
voting contests. It therefore would be important to put sufficient procedural protections in
place to ensure that institutional officials do not have the ability to influence the outcome of
IRB member elections.
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experts for advice in overseeing the corporation's affairs.32'
Similarly, the new NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements
require the independent directors of the board to meet at regularly
scheduled executive sessions, without the inside directors present.322
Finally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that the corporation's
critically important audit committee be comprised entirely of
independent directors,323 while the new NYSE and NASDAQ listing
requirements also require the nominating and compensation
committees to consist solely of independent directors,3 24 ensuring
that the outside faction has regular platforms for taking monitoring
action without the involvement and potentially chilling presence of
the inside directors.
An apparent lesson to be learned from corporate board reform is
that the outsiders require sufficient opportunities and support to
act independently. The underlying board procedural rules may
therefore also need changing to treat the outsider group as a quasi-
distinct body expected to undertake autonomous deliberation and
action without the presence of the insiders. For example, perhaps an
IRB's outside members should be required to meet and convene
regularly in closed sessions, without the inside members present.
In addition, perhaps certain audit and investigation functions of
the IRB should be overseen by a committee of the IRB comprised
solely of the outside members. In fact, it may be necessary to go
even further and split the IRB itself into two distinct groups
with different responsibilities. One group would consist of inside
members, and the second group would consist solely of outside
321. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.04 (1994); see also Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1282 (describing an
emerging norm in the corporate governance world to treat "the body of independent directors
as a de facto corporate organ").
322. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York
Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Changes, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,158, 64,162 (Nov. 12, 2003); see also Elson
& Gyves, supra note 12, at 877-78 (describing such reforms as "a critical step in fostering
board independence and better consequent management monitoring").
323. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77
(2002) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
324. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes,
68 Fed. Reg. at 64,158, 64,162-63.
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members, with certain critical oversight functions assigned to the
outside faction alone.325
Alternatively, to ensure a more vigorous outside presence on
IRBs, it may be necessary to develop a cadre of accredited individu-
als who would serve as "professional" outside IRB members for pay.
This suggestion parallels a related corporate governance reform
proposal that has attracted attention: creation of a class of profes-
sional independent directors to serve on corporate boards. Academic
commentators, for example, have called for the development of a
core of professional directors. These persons would be selected based
on having sufficient skills, backgrounds, and time availability to
bring to the job and would receive competitive compensation for
their board service as independent directors. 6 IRB reform propo-
nents might similarly explore the merits of creating a class of
professional outside members to serve on IRBs for compensation
and other rewards.
Finally, corporate governance scholarship suggests that excessive
outsider presence in the boardroom may be too much of a good thing
and can have counterproductive effects. Adding more non-peers to
a board creates more distant, less trust-based relationships in the
boardroom and between the board and senior management. A board
that is distant, with members not alike, may find that its directors
take their board service less seriously, leading to an ultimately less
productive board.327 Also, reducing the number of inside directors
means putting greater reliance on outsiders who lack knowledge of
the corporation's day-to-day workings and who may have less
applicable expertise to bring to the table. The CEO and senior
325. In this respect, Professor Goldner's recommendation for dual committees within an
IRB has certain appeal. He suggests that IRBs be split into two major committees: one
comprised of scientific and affiliated members and the other comprised of largely outside
community-based members, with each committee having distinct charges. The first committee
would review scientific aspects of a protocol and consider, from a scientific standpoint,
whether risks to subjects are reasonable in light ofanticipated benefits. The second committee
of outsiders would review the community acceptability of proposed research projects, among
other considerations. Goldner, supra note 51, at 107-09. At least in this type of dual
committee structure, the outsider presence on the IRB is given sufficient authority to be able
to take independent action.
326. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 40, at 883-92.
327. See Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 37-38 (discussing how mutual compatibility, trust,
and cooperation between board members is a source of board strength and key to why the
board often makes decisions better than individuals); Langevoort, supra note 135, at 810-11.
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managers have greater incentive to provide distorted information
when there is an increased outsider presence, recognizing that they
are more likely to face sanctions for providing disappointing news.328
This inaccurate information flow compromises the board's ability to
monitor effectively3 29 and undercuts the board's service role. Also,
simply increasing the outsider presence by adding more board seats
increases the overall board size. Large boards can become unwieldy
and procedurally complicated, ending up able to accomplish less
than smaller groups.3 °
All of this suggests that increased outsider presence on IRBs may
have unintended, negative spillover effects. For example, if work
becomes more unpleasant because increased monitoring makes the
board conflict-ridden and less collegial, IRB members may simply
put less effort into their board service to begin with. A divisive IRB,
with less trust-based relationships between board members and
between the board and the researchers at the institution, may
chill the effective communication flow necessary to the IRB's
monitoring and service functions. In addition, a greater number of
non-affiliated IRB members means a greater number of persons on
the board who have no intimate knowledge of the inner workings of
the institution, who view IRB service as a part-time volunteer
activity, and who may lack the scientific background required to
identify potential problems in protocol review. In short, increasing
the outsider presence may deprive the IRB of valuable, needed
expertise and of greater time effort from inside members in their
monitoring, service, and mediating roles. 31 Reform proponents need
328. See Langevoort, supra note 135, at 812-13; Lin, supra note 38, at 914 ("[Slome believe
that the outside directors merely receive selective information that would support
management's desired position on the matter. As a result, ... outside directors may see major
issues confronting the corporation through management's eyes.").
329. See Langevoort, supra note 135, at 800.
330. See Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 9 (describing how trends in recent decades for more
active, monitoring boards in public corporations have tended to result in boards of smaller
overall size than in the past); Fisch, supra note 192, at 278; Lin, supra note 38, at 952-53
(noting that larger boards can reduce directors' effectiveness because there is less time for
everyone to speak at a board meeting, and because it may encourage some directors to shirk
and free-ride on the efforts of the many other persons in the boardroom).
331. Cf Forbes & Milliken, supra note 130, at 498-99 (discussing similar problems with
corporate boards that have more of an outsider presence); Lin, supra note 38, at 966 (warning
about the similar problems with mandating particular board compositions for corporate
boards).
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to better account for such spillover effects before looking to a
numerical change in board composition as the magic bullet of IRB
improvement.
B. Enhanced IRB Role in Reviewing Financial Conflicts of Interest
Financial conflicts of interest "have come center-stage " 332 as one
of the most pressing challenges confronting human subjects
research today. The private sector finances a greater percentage of
medical research today than in the past.333 The general increase in
private sector funding, as well as more commercialization opportu-
nities for researchers and medical centers emanating from publicly
funded studies, have spawned a plethora of funding arrangements
and related financial conflicts of interest.334 The powerful economic
incentives provide rewards for enrolling subjects and completing a
greater volume of clinical trials speedily and with favorable results.
Consequently, the objectivity of the research and the welfare of the
participating subjects can be significantly compromised.335
The push to do something more about financial conflicts of
interest has extended to IRBs. For most of their history, IRBs have
occupied an uncertain, ill-defined, and relatively passive role in
policing financial ties in clinical research. For example, neither the
general IRB regulations, nor the existing financial conflict of
interest requirements imposed by the FDA regulations,336 the Public
332. Barnes & Florencio, supra note 17, at 390.
333. See Patricia C. Kuszler, Curing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Impossible
Dreams and Harsh Realities, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 115, 118-19 (2001); Michael J.
Malinowski, Institutional Conflicts and Responsibilities in an Age of Academic-Industry
Alliances, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 47, 48-49 (2001).
334. The financial arrangements include honoraria, consulting fees, equity stakes in
commercialization ventures, and receipt of educational grants and other funding from the trial
sponsor. See generally Goldner, supra note 17, at 382-86; Kuszler, supra note 333, at 135-37
(summarizing individual investigator and institutional financial conflicts of interest).
335. See, e.g., NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 59; Sameer S. Chopra,
Industry Funding of Clinical Trials: Benefit or Bias?, 290 JAMA 113, 113-14 (2003); Karen
A. Jordan, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research: Proposals for a More
Effective Regulatory Scheme, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 15, 23-29 (2003); Karine Morin et al.,
Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287 JAMA 78, 81-83 (2002).
336. An applicant seeking FDA approval of an investigational product must disclose to the
agency certain investigator financial conflicts of interest with regard to the drug or device
being tested or the company sponsoring the research. The regulations require disclosure for
equity or compensation interests exceeding specified dollar thresholds. Among other things,
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Health Service (PHS) regulations, 37 and the funding policies of the
National Science Foundation (NSF)33 clearly require an IRB to
evaluate financial conflicts in deciding whether to approve or
disapprove a research protocol.3 39 The research regulations and
federal agency funding policies also have not clearly required
disclosure of financial conflicts to potential research subjects.34 °
Accordingly, IRBs traditionally did not investigate financial conflicts
when performing protocol review. Nor have IRBs ordinarily
scrutinized consent forms for full disclosure of any financial ties.
The Office of Inspector General found that seventy-five percent of
IRBs do not review any financial arrangements between sponsors
and investigators. 341 Although such practices may be changing in
light of increased concern regarding financial conflicts, for many
decades IRBs rarely took an active role in such matters. 42
investigators must report to the FDA payments from sponsor companies of over $25,000
(beyond compensation for actual research costs) and equity interests valued at more than
$50,000 in sponsor companies. Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 21 C.F.R. §§
54.2-54.4 (2003).
337. Institutions participating in PHS-funded studies must develop and enforce conflict of
interest policies, including requiring investigators to disclose to the institution "significant
financial interests" that they have in a research study. This includes payments of $10,000 or
more to investigators from sponsor companies and investigators having more than five
percent ownership in a sponsor company. The institution must then "manage, reduce, or
eliminate" the conflict. This could include imposing certain monitoring requirements, moving
the trial to another site, or requiring that someone other than the conflicted investigator do
the actual enrollment of subjects and gathering of data. See Responsibility of Applicants for
Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which PHS Funding Is Sought, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.602-
50.604 (2003); see also Responsible Prospective Contractors, 45 C.F.R. §§ 94.1-94.6 (2003).
338. The NSF policy, which applies to most NSF-funded studies, is very similar to the PHS
rules. Institutions participating in NSF-funded studies must maintain conflict of interest
policies. Investigators are to disclose certain financial conflicts of interest, above a specified
monetary threshold, to the institution. The institution must then follow its policies. to manage,
reduce, or eliminate the conflict. See Investigator Financial Disclosure Policy, 60 Fed. Reg.
35,820 (July 11, 1995); NAT'L SCI. FOUND. GRANT POLICY MANUAL, § 510: Conflict of Interest
Policies (July 2002), available at www.nsf.gov/pubs/2002/nsf)2151/gpm5.htm.
339. See Goldner, supra note 17, at 390.
340. While disclosure to the FDA or to the institution itself is sometimes necessary to
manage a conflict, disclosure to the research subject traditionally has not been required,
although such an obligation might be found under common law. See Kuszler, supra note 333,
at 143; Frances H. Miller, The Hidden Hazards of Clinical Trials, TRIAL, Oct. 2003, at 48, 50.
341. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RECRUITING
HUMAN SUBJECTS: PRESSURES IN INDUSTRY SPONSORED CLINICAL RESEARCH 26 (2000).
342. See Goldner, supra note 17, at 391 (discussing NIH estimate that twenty-five percent
of IRBs routinely considered investigators' financial conflicts of interest, but also noting that
this figure represents a very recent trend and that "[i]t would appear that existing IRB review
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Now, however, many urge IRBs to do much more. The National
Bioethics Advisory Commission has recommended that IRBs
investigate financial arrangements as part of the risk/benefit
analysis done for overall protocol review and determine what
information needs to be disclosed to research subjects.343 Academic
commentators have similarly advocated for more direct involvement
by IRBs in monitoring financial conflicts.3 ' In a significant new
regulatory development, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) has promulgated guidance that envisions consider-
able expansion of IRB activities in this area.345 HHS recommends
that IRBs consider whether methods "used for management of
financial interests of parties involved in the research adequately
protect the rights and welfare of human subjects."346 The HHS
guidance also cautions IRBs to consider, before approving a protocol,
whether additional corrective actions are required to minimize the
risks subjects face in light of any conflicting financial interests.347
The HHS guidance does not necessarily intend IRBs to take the
lead within an institution in addressing financial conflicts of
interest. The guidance also contemplates that institutions, to deal
with the already existing FDA, PHS, and NSF financial conflict of
interest rules,348 might make use of distinct conflict of interest
committees (COICs) to deal with recurring issues of financial
of [financial] conflicts of interest might be of recent vintage").
343. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 59-60.
344. See, e.g., Baruch A. Brody et al., Expanding Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest: The
Views of Stakeholders, 25 IRB: ETHICS & HuM. RES. 1, 6 (2003) (urging IRBs to enforce
investigators' disclosures of potential financial conflicts both to IRBs themselves and to
research subjects); Evan G. DeRenzo, Coercion in the Recruitment and Retention of Human
Research Subjects, Pharmaceutical Industry Payments to Physician-Investigators, and the
Moral Courage of the IRB, 22 IRB 1, 3 (2000) (urging IRBs to ask more questions about
potential conflicts for investigators, including financial incentives for recruiting subjects);
Goldner, supra note 17, at 397-98 (calling for increased IRB oversight, while conceding this
may be a second-best solution compared to direct regulatory bans on such financial conflicts
of interest).
345. See Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving Human Subjects:
Guidance for Human Subject Protection, 69 Fed. Reg. 26,393 (May 12, 2004).
346. Id. at 26,397.
347. See id. at 26,397. In addition, with regard to monitoring informed consent, HHS
advises that IRBs consider what information should be disclosed, and at what level of detail,
to subjects about such financial conflicts. See id.
348. See supra notes 336-38 and accompanying text.
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conflicts of interest for institutions and investigators. 349 Nonethe-
less, institutions can choose to respond to the HHS guidance by
placing much more responsibility on their IRBs. Even at institutions
that make use of distinct COICs, IRBs could still play a prominent
role in evaluating financial conflicts. The guidance gives IRBs
considerable discretion to address such matters in their own
protocol reviews, wholly apart from the COIC deliberations.35 °
Unfortunately, the corporate governance perspective cautions
that an increased role for IRBs in reviewing financial conflicts of
interest may be misguided and prove disappointing. Corporate
boards, unlike IRBs, have a well-developed track record in review-
ing financial conflicts of interest.35' Indeed, corporate statutes
encourage the firm to obtain the approval of disinterested, inde-
pendent directors on the board for a transaction raising conflict of
interest problems.35 2 Whether independent directors have performed
well in this assigned role is another story. For example, in the
Enron fiasco, a board comprised overwhelmingly of outside directors
nonetheless performed dismally in monitoring financial conflicts of
interest for key senior executives.353 Similarly, empirical studies of
349. See Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving Human Subjects, 69
Fed. Reg. at 26,396.
350. HHS has urged IRBs to consider the impact of financial ties on each protocol that they
review, both in terms of risk assessment and in ensuring that informed consent requirements
are met. See id. at 26,397 (final guidance); 68 Fed. Reg. 15,459 (Mar. 31, 2003) (draft
guidance). Presumably, under the guidance, IRBs can refuse to approve a protocol if they
believe the institution is taking insufficient steps to protect research subjects from potential
financial conflicts, even if the institution's COIC has already approved the proposed measures
for dealing with the conflict.
351. For example, the corporate board has to consider the impact of potential financial
conflicts of interest on management decisions when setting compensation for senior
executives, when evaluating proposed transactions between the firm and entities affiliated
with a director/officer, and when responding to a corporate takeover threat by an acquirer
that will seek to displace the current management.
352. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2003) (providing that a transaction posing
a conflict for a director or senior executive in the corporation is not voidable because of the
conflict if it is approved by a majority of the disinterested directors on the board). See
generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr.,Approval by Disinterested Directors, 20 J. CORP. L. 215, 216-
19 (1995); Lin, supra note 38, at 899-900 (explaining how corporate law has traditionally
relied upon outside directors to monitor financial conflicts that put management interests
ahead of shareholders' interests).
353. During the troubled months for Enron in 2001, the company had fourteen directors
on the board-only two were classic inside directors. See Paredes, supra note 191, at 504. The
board of mostly outside directors did little to monitor the financial conflicts of the company's
senior executives. For example, the Enron board ratified Enron CFO Andrew Fastow's
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corporate board action in setting CEO compensation do not
necessarily support the view that the participation of nominally
independent, outside directors has a clearly measurable impact in
controlling potential financial conflicts of interest for the firm's top
executive. Boards with greater participation by outside directors in
the compensation process do not determine executive compensation
in a manner markedly different from boards with less participation
by outsiders." 4
Nominally independent directors may not be optimal monitors of
financial conflicts of interest, because, as previously discussed,
being independent does not mean that such a director will be a good
monitor generally.5 ' Indeed, even-handed scrutiny of a conflict of
interest transaction requires challenging the manager or fellow
director facing the financial conflict. Few directors may willingly
take such action due to the significant psychological and social
investment in and management of several partnerships doing related-party transactions with
Enron. Because this was a severe conflict of interest situation the Enron board apparently had
to waive the corporation's conflict of interest policies as applied to CFO Fastow on several
occasions. Fastow was ultimately enriched by his participation in the partnerships at Enron's
expense. The Special Committee investigating the board's role concluded that board approval
of Fastow's participation in the partnerships, given the financial conflicts of interest, was a
"fundamentally flawed" decision. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
ENRON CORP. 9 (2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport. Elson
and Gyves point out that:
A company's chief financial control officer acting on both sides of a corporate
transaction would have been considered a highly unusual occurrence in any
public company and should have caused great concern at the board level. The
Enron directors, however, apparently failed to note the significance of and
respond appropriately to this important red flag.
Elson & Gyves, supra note 12, at 862; see also O'Connor, supra note 12, at 1235-36 ("[A]
significant factor contributing to Enron's demise was the Enron Board's approval of and
failure to monitor the related-party transactions."). Part of the problem was that so many of
the outside directors for Enron had their independence compromised by financial ties to the
company. See S. REP. NO. 107-70 (2002), available at http'J/www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/
070902enronboardreport.pdf.
354. See Johnson et al., supra note 138, at 422-23. But see Lin, supra note 38, at 928-30,
962 (discussing various studies suggesting outside directors may at least indirectly benefit
shareholders in the way they impact executive compensation decisions, yet also noting that
studies are ultimately mixed on whether having more outside directors on the board really
improves overall firm performance). See also Paredes, supra note 191, at 521 (noting the data
is mixed as to whether firms perform better on several measurement scales when their boards
have more independent directors).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 304-17.
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pressures they regularly face in the boardroom. A director who
challenges financial conflicts of interest risks appearing disloyal or
seeming untrusting of his fellow peers and the persons who helped
put him on the board in the first place.356 This is not to suggest that
corporate boards are hopelessly inept at policing financial conflicts
of interest. The empirical data on corporate boards' ability to deal
with conflicts of interest generally remains subject to reasonable
debate.35 7 When corporate boards have acted as effective financial
conflict of interest monitors, however, this usually has corresponded
with the presence of a critical mass of independent directors, in
terms of sheer numbers, in the boardroom.5 '
This evidence does not bode well for IRBs. Currently, IRBs have
very few outside members. Meanwhile, financial ties to industry
already compromise the potential objectivity of many inside IRB
members. A recent study indicates that almost half of all faculty
IRB members have served as consultants to pharmaceutical or
medical device companies,359 calling into question whether such
inside IRB members can sufficiently distance themselves from
industry and neutrally evaluate potential financial conflicts faced
by fellow investigators and their respective institutions. Expecting
that the typical board's one to two outside members will do all
the heavy work of financial conflicts review seems unrealistic.
Moreover, hoping the outside members can stand up to powerful
institutional and investigator constituencies and take the uncom-
fortable position of regularly challenging investigator and institu-
tional financial conflicts-especially when the other faculty IRB
356. See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 1248-49.
357. For a summary of the literature and empirical studies on corporate board performance
in monitoring financial conflicts of interest and, in particular, the role of outside directors, see
Lin, supra note 38.
358. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 173, at 21. Professor Dallas reviews various studies of
corporate board behavior in conflict of interest situations, for example, when boards have
replaced non-performing CEOs, and observes this action is more likely to be taken when the
board is "dominated" by outside directors. Professor Dallas states: "These findings confirm the
importance of more independent directors on boards when corporations deal with serious
conflict of interest issues." Id.
359. See Eric G. Campbell et al., Characteristics of Medical School Faculty Members
Serving on Institutional Review Boards: Results of a National Survey, 78 ACAD. MED. 831, 831
(2003) (presenting a survey of nearly 3,000 faculty at more than 120 medical schools that
found that forty-seven percent of faculty IRB members had served as consultants to industry).
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members already have so many ties to industry-may simply be too
much to ask.
This difficulty points to a related expertise and capacity problem
for IRB review of financial conflicts. IRBs may be even less suited
to do this type of review than corporate boards. The typical outside
director on a corporate board is better trained and equipped to
address financial conflict situations than the typical outside
member on an IRB. Outside directors include a sizable number of
CEOs and senior executives of other companies. They can call upon
their business acumen and financial expertise in evaluating
numerous economic conflict of interest scenarios, such as consider-
ing whether a CEO's proposed compensation package truly aligns
the CEO's interests with the firm's performance. Many IRB
members reviewing financial conflict of interest situations have no
equivalent financial and business background upon which to draw.
The complex economic arrangements involved in funding clinical
trials can include the award of stock contingent on certain occur-
rences, licensing rights, "put" options, seed money for commercial
start-ups, limited partnership and otherjoint venture opportunities,
royalty-based payments, and specialized grant funding to individual
investigators and to institutions. These arrangements raise
complicated, arcane financial issues far beyond what the ordinary
IRB member is used to seeing.
It may be hopelessly naive to expect that ordinary IRB members,
generalists with regard to the business side of research, will know
a real problem when they see it. Recognizing a potential financial
conflict of interest and recognizing a serious financial conflict of
interest that warrants immediate intervention by the IRB are two
very different things. Not all financial incentives are alike. It takes
the right training and background to separate the wheat from the
chaff. Research on financial incentives in other health care arrange-
ments indicates that financial incentives offered to physicians are
highly contextual. For example, financial incentives offered by
managed care organizations to physicians to practice cost-effective
medicine vary significantly in their intensity and impact depending
on the amount of incentive at issue, the time period over which it is
applied, the number of physicians subject to the incentive, the
number of patients involved, and what non-financial incentives are
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also in place.36 0 There is every reason to expect that financial
incentives in the clinical research setting will similarly vary in
intensity and impact depending on the overall context, such as the
number of other investigators sharing the same incentive, how the
incentive is actually calculated, the amount of money to be earned
compared to an investigator's other compensation sources, the time
period over which the incentive is applied, and whether the
institution as a whole shares in the incentive. Serious credible
review of financial conflicts of interest will require the efforts of IRB
reviewers who have a sophisticated understanding of such variable
conditions and how they can make a potential financial conflict
more or less intense in the research setting. Unfortunately, most
IRBs do not have this expertise to draw upon among their typical
members.
Recognizing the inevitable limitations typical corporate boards
face in dealing with serious financial conflicts of interest, some
corporate governance reform proposals have called for dual corpo-
rate boards. One board would consist solely of outside directors.
This first board, more insulated from the traditional management
structure, would take the lead in reviewing serious conflict of
interest issues and would develop expertise in this area. The second
board, comprised of a more traditional mix of insiders and outsiders,
would handle day-to-day general business review functions. 6 ' IRB
reformers might similarly see value in a dual-board approach.
Indeed, in light of the problems IRBs likely will face in performing
serious financial conflicts review, this function might more appropri-
ately be delegated to an institution's separate COIC, a body that
would not necessarily include IRB members.
The dual board approach would call for a far more limited IRB
role in reviewing financial conflicts of interest than envisioned by
HHS, but would not completely eliminate IRBs from involvement in
monitoring financial conflicts. Clearly, evaluating the informed
360. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: INCENTIVE PAYMENTS BY
HOspITALs CouLD LEAD TO ABUSE 22-23 (1986); Celia Coelho-Kamath & Judi McLean Parks,
Perceived Injustice & Framing Incentives in Physician Compensation Contracts, ACAD. MGMT.
PROC. 116, 119-20 (1996); Henry T. Greely, Direct Financial Incentives in Managed Care:
Unanswered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53, 85-87 (1996); Stephen A. Magnus, Physicians'
Financial Incentives in Five Dimensions: A Conceptual Framework for HMO Managers, 24
HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 57 (1999).
361. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 173, at 24.
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consent process, which is and should remain a prime IRB function,
will require some involvement by IRBs in understanding the
financial arrangements behind each research protocol so the IRB
can determine what information about financial conflicts needs to
be disclosed to research subjects. Ideally, the gathering of this
information, and initial evaluation of the severity and intensity of
the financial conflicts, and the imposition of various monitoring
safeguards, would be performed by a separate body rather than by
the IRB. This recommendation for distinct but parallel oversight
bodies finds some support with similar proposals made by the
Institute of Medicine (IOM). The IOM has recommended that
separate, externally comprised conflict of interest committees take
the lead in assessing and managing financial conflicts, recognizing
that IRBs lack the resources, structure, and authority to perform
this function appropriately.362 Importantly, the IOM warns that if
the bulk of financial conflicts review is thrust upon IRBs, it may
place too great a burden on an IRB's outside members. The IOM
cautions that the few token outside members on an IRB will still
face very powerful obstacles and pressures in challenging financial
conflicts that implicate the entire institution.363
The experience of corporate boards suggests that the IOM is
correct to be suspicious about having IRBs take the lead in financial
362. See COMM. ON ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS, INST. OF MED., supra note 21, at 182-85. Other organizations have reached
similar conclusions to the IOM, albeit without express consideration of the corporate board
parallels. The Association of American Medical Colleges and the Association of American
Universities have suggested that disclosure of significant financial interests by an
investigator be made primarily to a separate conflict of interest committee rather than to the
IRB. See ASSN OF AM. MED. COLLS., PROTECTING SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUSTS, PROMOTING
PROGRESS, POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL FINANCIAL INTERESTS
IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 14 (2001); ASS'N OF AM. UNIVS., TASK FORCE ON RESEARCH
ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT ON INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST 6-7 (2001). In addition, other academic commentators have suggested that it is
better to task distinct conflict of interest committees specifically designed with appropriate
resources to review financial conflicts of interest, rather than further straining IRBs with this
obligation. See, e.g., Malinowski, supra note 333, at 69.
363. See COMM. ON ASSESSING THE SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS, INST. OF MED., supra note 21, at 84-86. Under the IOM proposal, the separate
conflict of interest committees would communicate their findings and actions taken to manage
financial conflicts to the IRB. The IRB could then use this information in performing its
risk/benefit assessment and ethical review, as well as in determining what information should
be disclosed to subjects about the financial conflicts and whether ongoing review is required
if the protocol is approved. See id. at 72-75, 85-86.
718 [Vol. 46:619
MEDICAL RESEARCH OVERSIGHT
conflict monitoring. Moreover, the extra effort required of IRB
members for financial conflicts review may simply compete for time
that members would devote to more traditional IRB monitoring. In
the push to get IRBs to concentrate on financial conflicts of interest,
it is important not to detract from IRBs' ability to address nonfinan-
cial conflicts of interest, which may be far more pervasive and
powerful and ultimately more threatening to research subjects.'4 A
significant new role expansion for IRBs regarding financial conflicts
would also likely have spillover effects on the IRB's service and
mediating roles. Forcing IRBs into an enhanced financial conflicts
monitoring role may raise the monitoring trade-off dilemma all over
again. Moreover, this risks repeating the mission creep pattern that
has plagued IRBs in the past,36 expanding IRB responsibilities
without the appropriate institutional structure, capacity, and
sources of support to do all the tasks simultaneously well.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF NORMS FOR UNDERSTANDING IRB
CONDUCT
The corporate governance perspective cautions that any push for
IRB reform may bump up against another significant, confounding
limitation. The experience of corporate boards demonstrates that
these entities are very much social institutions, powerfully guided
by norms and commonly understood expectations within the
business community of director performance. How directors socially
perceive their roles, and the forms of community approval or
disapproval that follow from vigilant director action, critically
influence board function.366 Social norms may ultimately be more
364. Non-financial conflicts of interest include the investigator's desire for academic
advancement, the desire for prestige and recognition from his peers, and the investigator's
zeal to make new discoveries and to develop new therapies for the sake of contributing to
scientific knowledge. In addition, investigative zeal for clinical research can cause
investigators to adopt certain biases and preconceptions in favor of experimentation at the
expense of research subjects' interests. At some point, these non-financial forces may combine
and push investigators to take actions that benefit the scientific integrity of the clinical trial
more than they do individual research subjects. See id. at 83; Kuszler, supra note 333, at 137-
40. Such non-financial conflicts have traditionally been more within the radar screen of IRB
review.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
366. See, e.g., Forbes & Milliken, supra note 130, at 493-94 (discussing how norms exert
a strong influence on an individual's conduct when the individual belongs to a group, such as
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determinative in shaping corporate directors' behavior than the
specific content of underlying corporate laws and regulations. This
insight likely applies to IRBs as well. An enhanced and improved
role for IRBs in research oversight may never be attained unless,
apart from legal tinkering with board structure, composition, and
procedures, a serious transformation occurs in the norms surround-
ing IRB service.
A Norms Theory and Board Dynamics
The recognition that social norms and conventions largely
influence how parties act, regardless of what a particular law or
regulation says, is of course not unique to the world of corporate
boards or IRBs. Social norms theorists have identified how, in a
wide variety of contexts, a community's perceptions of, and social
expressions of, appropriate standards of conduct may end up
guiding individuals' decisions more than the actual content of the
law. Rather than responding to incentives and restraints estab-
lished through direct law and regulation, in many situations an
individual's concerns about violating socially understood standards
of behavior, which can lead to loss of reputation, censure, ostracism,
and disruption of community relationships, may better explain what
the individual chooses to do and why.3"'
the corporate board, with interdependent social ties); Johnson et al., supra note 138, at 432-33
(discussing the view that the corporate board is a social construction and that directors' social
understanding of their roles, and a board's overall performance, may be influenced by the
spread of norms in the boardroom and between and across different boards). The term "social
norm" is often used in a vague manner without much precise definition. This Article refers
to social norm in a rather broad way as meaning a non-legal rule not backed by formal legal
sanction. Social norms also would not include the private yet formal internal rules of conduct,
such as bylaws, that a corporate board or IRB might adopt for its day-to-day operations. See
Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1255 (using a very similar definition of social norm).
367. There has been a vast amount of recent scholarship on how social norms operate to
guide human behavior and the interaction of law and social norms. See, e.g., Robert C.
Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); Jody
S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL STuD. 377
(1997); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms
and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). Social norms theory has had limited
application to date for health law issues and clinical research in particular. For an interesting
application of social norms theory to the issue of fraud in the U.S. health care system, see
David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social Norms, and the Trust
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The reason to suspect that social norms matter particularly for
corporate boards and, correspondingly, for IRBs, is that there exist
so few other external influences on their behavior. As detailed in
Part II, current laws and regulations afford IRB members and
corporate directors considerably wide discretion in how they choose
to perform their roles. They face limited oversight and influence
from research subjects and shareholders, and they face very limited
legal liability on an individual basis for poor performance.36 Indeed,
Professor Edward Rock describes the "central mystery of corporate
law" as why directors can be expected to do a good job for sharehold-
ers when there is an "apparent infirmity" in various legal, institu-
tional, and market checks on corporate directors' discretion.369
Moreover, compared to its effect on corporate boards, market
deterrence plays a much smaller role in shaping IRB conduct.37 °
Social norms should therefore be expected to help explain what IRB
members do simply because of the sheer lack of other significant
controlling influences on their conduct.
In light of the corporate board experience, IRB reformers should
explore more seriously whether and how norms can be channeled
and used to extract significant changes in board performance and
conduct. For example, notwithstanding the recent business
scandals, many corporate governance theorists believe that directors
take their responsibilities, including the obligation to monitor
management, more seriously today than in decades past.37' Only the
most cynical corporate governance analyst would say that there has
been absolutely no change in corporate board performance. To the
extent that there has been some improvement, a shift in the norms
surrounding service on the board has been key. Directors now
"Reposed in the Workmen," 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531 (2001).
368. See supra Part II.
369. Rock, supra note 130, at 1010.
370. The market for corporate control, see supra note 98, does not exist for IRB members
as it does for corporate directors.
371. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1266. As Melvin Eisenberg has noted:
The common experience of informed observers is that the level of directorial care
has risen significantly in the last ten years or so; that directors today are more
attentive to their responsibilities, more ready to displace inefficient CEOs, more
concerned about corporate structure, more active in setting agendas and
determining corporate strategy, and so forth.
Id.; see also Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 562-63 (discussing trends in the 1980s and 1990s
of more active and effective board oversight).
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increasingly perceive and socially understand the role of director as
requiring a greater level of monitoring effort and higher level of
care, rather than relying on social conventions in the past which
largely shielded nonperforming directors from criticism and
community disapproval. 2 Several factors have been identified as
responsible for this norm shift, including (1) increased willingness
of the media to expose poor performing boards and to subject them
publicly to shame and loss of reputation; (2) institutional investors
exerting their financial power and social influence to set different
expectations for what directors should be doing; (3) the business
community's belief that a board that monitors more contributes
economic value to the corporation; and (4) the influence of the law
in changing social belief systems about the role of the director.373
How has the law influenced the social norms surrounding service
as a director? Corporate governance theorists suggest that the
courts, in deciding duty of care, duty of loyalty, and takeover cases,
have, through their written opinions, effectively "sermonized" to the
business manager community about what it means to be a good
director. The decisions themselves and their public nature, apart
from the direct legal liability that may or may not have actually
resulted from the cases, have been an additional "source of gossip,
criticism, and sanction for [directors] ... who are beyond the reach of
the firm's normal systems of social control."374 Under this view, the
courts' detailed attention to the procedures and processes followed
by corporate boards has had an expressive function, helping to
change overall social expectations about director service. The stories
told by the courts of good and not-so-good corporate board perfor-
mance have contributed to, augmented, and reinforced internaliza-
372. See Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1268-69, 1279-81; see also Cox & Munsinger, supra
note 236, at 91-92 (discussing how older, more traditional corporate board norms favored
cooperation, consensus, and giving management the benefit of the doubt, while disagreement
and conflict was frowned upon).
373. See Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1268-70; Millstein, supra note 283, at 1428-29; Rock,
supra note 130, at 1013-16.
374. Rock, supra note 130, at 1013. Professor Rock contends that the sermonizing opinions,
and norms they are intended to foster, primarily reach their targets through media attention
focused on legal rulings and through corporate counsel, acting as intermediaries, who
transmit the norms to their clients. See id. at 1063-64.
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tion by the business community of new beliefs and attitudes about
what a model director does and for whom the director acts. 5
B. Norms and IRB Reform
There are several important implications here for IRBs. First,
more needs to be done through education, economic incentives,
publicity, and other non-legal means to influence the belief systems
of IRB members regarding the effort expected of them if the IRB is
to take on a more active monitoring role successfully. Second, there
may be an opportunity for law and regulation to influence, even
indirectly, the relevant social attitudes regarding IRB service.376 If
the courts have effectively sermonized to the business community
and helped create a norm shift surrounding the director's role, the
logical question is whether something similar could be done with
IRBs. Courts lack the opportunity to exhort the research community
to the same degree, because fewer cases of inappropriate research
ever get fully litigated as compared to shareholder lawsuits alleging
poor corporate board performance. However, OHRP and FDA, the
federal agencies that review and investigate IRB performance, could
similarly use their powers of persuasion.
Like the courts hearing shareholder litigation claims, FDA and
OHRP have been collecting stories about good and not-so-good
instances of board conduct and performance. These agencies
have increased oversight of IRBs in recent years and in a more
375. See Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 1269-70, 1277, 1280; Stout, supra note 196, at 688
("It is perhaps not too great a stretch to suggest that corporate directors view judges as
persons of influence and authority ... and that judicial pronouncements about how directors
ought to behave can thus influence directors' behavior even when not backed up by legal
sanctions."). Professor Rock has further argued that outside directors, more than management
and other insiders, would particularly be expected to be concerned about public shaming and
reputational sanctions that may result from judicial opinions and other conduits for focusing
on board conduct. This is because outside directors usually do not have the same degree of
opportunity to take economic advantage of shareholders as the insiders, but they care very
much about maintaining their reputations in good standing in elite business circles. See Rock,
supra note 130, at 1104 (discussing this point in the context of the role of outside directors
serving on special committees to evaluate management buy-out (MBO) offers for the
corporation).
376. Cf Goldner, supra note 51, at 116-20 (suggesting that revising existing regulations
regarding IRB membership, informed consent requirements, and the like, could generate
internalization of patterns of behavior and significantly change the thinking of clinical
researchers).
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public manner, including posting the corrective actions required of
institutions on the agency web sites. 7 Yet the regulatory agencies
have not sufficiently capitalized on the opportunity to disseminate
these stories widely, compellingly, and consistently with a view
towards influencing and re-orienting social attitudes about IRB
service. Certainly, there have been well-publicized research
scandals in recent years, most notably the death of Jesse Gelsinger
in the gene therapy trial at the University of Pennsylvania." 8
Though the Gelsinger story is commonly used as an example of the
pernicious influence of financial incentives and alleged lax oversight
in clinical research, 9 there still does not appear to be firm consen-
sus within the research community about the specific conduct of the
IRB members involved in the Gelsinger affair. Other than a vague
sense that the IRB should have done something more, there remains
considerable confusion about where specifically the IRB members
allegedly failed in their roles: Should the IRB members not have
allowed the research to proceed at all? Or was their mistake simply
not ensuring disclosure of all the financial ties to the subjects? Or
simply not asking enough questions before approving the protocol?
Or failing to do adequate continuing review? Meanwhile, the new
HHS guidance concerning IRB review of financial conflicts has not
really helped identify the appropriate boundaries of IRB conduct in
such situations."' The Gelsinger episode and other recent research
377. See, e.g., Office for Human Research Protections, 2003 Determination Letters, at
httpJ/www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance/letters/2003.html (last modified Aug. 11, 2004).
378. See supra note 17.
379. See, e.g., Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to
Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423, 437-38 (2001); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Teenager's Death
Is Shaking Up Field of Human Gene-Therapy Experiments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,2000, at A20.
380. Consider the new HHS guidance for IRBs dealing with financial conflicts of interest.
See Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving Human Subjects: Guidance
for Human Subject Protection, 69 Fed. Reg. 26,393 (May 12, 2004). It is capable of such
varying interpretation and application, for example, that it ultimately provides no clear lesson
to IRBs about how to act if a scenario like the Gelsinger incident should occur again. The
point is that, under the HHS guidance, it is still not clear whether the University of
Pennsylvania IRB, if it had considered the financial conflicts more directly, should have
absolutely refused to approve the clinical trial being conducted at the University. The HHS
guidance offers many options to an IRB for deciding how to deal with such financial conflicts,
such as barring the financially conflicted investigator from recruitment of subjects to using
surrogates to observe the informed consent process directly. See id. at 26,396. Even though
allowing IRBs great flexibility, the far-ranging options offer disappointingly vague indications
about what is acceptable IRB conduct in monitoring financial conflicts. Indeed, many within
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scandals simply have not been conveyed and used as effectively as
they could for marshalling social firepower and community views
regarding what the public expects of model IRB members.
To use the law expressively to influence the critical norms
surrounding IRB service, perhaps the IRB and research community
would be better served by a well-pronounced regulatory decision
akin to the Delaware Supreme Court's famous ruling in Smith v.
Van Gorkom.3 81 In the Van Gorkom decision, well known to business
organizations and corporate law students everywhere, the Delaware
Supreme Court found that Trans Union's directors breached their
duty of care by approving a merger in which Trans Union sharehold-
ers stood to receive a significant premium over the current market
price for their shares. Van Gorkom shocked many in the business
community, because the directors included highly regarded business
persons, and because it was questionable whether the board's
decision to sell the company on the terms proposed was actually a
bad decision, especially in light of the premium over market price
that the shareholders stood to gain." 2 Nonetheless, the court found
flaws in the process by which the board made its decision, because
directors reached the decision too hastily, without enough informa-
tion, and without paying enough attention to certain management
conflicts surrounding the deal. 3
Corporate governance theorists who support Van Gorkom suggest
the decision has had a very important expressive function in terms
of encouraging directors to use more effort in fulfilling their duty of
care and to pay more attention to process.3" Van Gorkom sent the
the research community likely continue to hold different views of what the University of
Pennsylvania IRB should have done in the Gelsinger affair. Some would say that the IRB's
problem was insufficient detail as to the informed consent process, as opposed to insufficient
attempts to manage the financial conflicts. Others would say that the IRB should have
required the research to be conducted at a different institution altogether. No consensus has
emerged within the research community as to what the real "lessons" of the Gelsinger case
are, specifically for IRB members trying to conform to model roles, other than the very vague
sense that IRB members should do more.
381. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
382. See, e.g., Fred. S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why Van
Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 631, 635-36, 644-45 (2002).
383. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-78.
384. See Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 53-54; Stout, supra note 196, at 686-92. Van
Gorkom, however, has not been without its critics. See McChesney, supra note 382, at 635-37
(summarizing many of the criticisms).
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stark but simple message that it is not enough for directors to be
well-intentioned and to rely on their business laurels; a director who
fails to follow a reasonable oversight process still disappoints
community expectations and warrants criticism. Under this view,
Van Gorkom has helped develop effort norms, building up a social
role of the model director as one who stays informed and deliber-
ates. In particular, Van Gorkom may have been well-targeted at
directors who genuinely wanted to do the right thing but felt socially
uncomfortable confronting management. Directors who might be
reluctant to probe senior executives and gather more information
can now say they must ask more questions and demand more
information because this is increasingly expected of a model director
within the larger business community.385
A well-disseminated, cautionary tale of deficient IRB perfor-
mance, elaborating upon specific, problematic facts of IRB proce-
dures and operations, akin to the criticisms of the corporate board
in Van Gorkom, could help change IRB norms. For example, it is
simply unsettling to realize that at large institutions IRBs review
new research protocols in less than eight minutes.386 Drawing
greater community attention to such troubling procedural details
about how IRBs conduct their reviews, through the bright glare of
publicity, regulatory criticism, and other means, may be what is
needed to shake up conventional attitudes about IRB service and
how IRB members evaluate their own performance. Outside IRB
members likely would be particularly receptive to such a norm shift
exhorting members to work harder and be more critical in repre-
senting research subject interests.387
A final, related point with regard to norms and IRB conduct is
that institutions need to do much more to reward and support IRB
385. See Stout, supra note 196, at 688-90.
386. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
387. It can be presumed that outside IRB members truly do want to do some good, but they
may feel worn down because of their minority presence among insiders and scientists. A norm
that encourages and rewards them for more vigilant conduct would be very helpful. Indeed,
outside IRB members probably have already partially internalized such beliefs about their
appropriate roles. A survey of non-affiliated IRB members revealed that such members
thought that the ideal characteristics of a non-affiliated IRB member are assertiveness, self-
confidence, self-esteem, and courage-qualities important to the member's willingness and
ability to ask questions and challenge the institutional perspective on a protocol. See Porter,
supra note 57, at 3.
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members for dedicated service, even if not financially. As the
corporate board experience indicates, board work that becomes
conflicted, unpleasant, and overloaded with too many tasks may
simply result in a less productive board overall.38 The risk of
increased regulatory sermonizing about IRB members' conduct
is that heavy-handed shaming and criticism may simply drive
otherwise willing and able IRB members off the board. IRB
members likely would prefer to avoid further social disapproval
for occupying a position that already offers few perks and rewards
but plenty of negatives. Service on the IRB is often "considered
onerous"38 9 and "a thankless task."39 ° Not only must IRB members
face limited compensation and severe time constraints, but re-
searchers within the institution are more likely to grumble about
the IRB as a bureaucratic nuisance or view IRB service disparag-
ingly than to look to the board members with gratitude for the
work that they do.39' IRB members no doubt find it "demoralizing
to be overwhelmed with work ... and to realize that one has little or
no institutional backing when confronting a colleague over a
protocol."392
Of course, recognizing the importance of changing norms
surrounding IRB service does not mean that there is an easy
solution for accomplishing this. Norms operate in powerful yet
subtle and indirect ways. They owe their creation to many disparate
factors, and they can take hold and become entrenched in folkways
and traditions of the community. Indeed, it seems that accomplish-
ing such a norm shift is not possible without deeper changes in the
culture of academic medicine. Many academic medical centers place
a much higher premium on prolific and productive clinical research
by faculty members than on effective IRB service. Many research-
388. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 130, at 37-38 (discussing how mutual compatibility,
trust, and cooperation between board members is a source of board strength and key to why
the board often makes decisions better than individuals); Langevoort, supra note 135, at 810-
11.
389. Eve E. Slater, IRB Reform, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1402, 1404 (2002).
390. Coleman, supra note 33, at 51.
391. See, e.g., Judith Randal, Examining IRBs: Are Review Boards Fulfilling Their Duties?,
93 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1440, 1441 (2001) ("[TIhe lot of IRB chairs and members tends not
to be happy anyway .... [T]here is a long history of some investigators perceiving IRBs as a
potential threat to their careers.").
392. Anderlik & Elster, supra note 168, at 226.
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ers do not get real, bona fide, measurable administrative credit
for working on the IRB, particularly with regard to it being given
sufficient weight for promotion and tenure within academic
institutions.3
Not surprisingly, only a small minority of medical school faculty
actually do IRB work, perhaps due to the lack of recognition for this
activity.394 Much more needs to be done to increase the social
prestige and institutional rewards of IRB service. Until joining and
serving with dedication on an IRB is regarded as sufficiently
important and necessary within the relevant medical research
communities, akin to the prestige associated with a board seat in
the business communities, and until a firmer social consensus
develops regarding what is expected of model IRB members, one
should be dubious that IRB members will persevere in any of their
assigned oversight roles. 395 Introducing long-lasting reform will
require the emergence of a different view of dedicated IRB service
as every researcher's responsibility and privilege, 39 as well as the
larger public's robust social approval and support for the very
important work that IRBs do.
393. Recently, there have been renewed calls that institutions should reward IRB members
for valuable service with release time or tenure credit or that an IRB should effectively
"buyout" a member's administrative time and free the IRB member from other administrative
responsibilities within the institution. See id. These suggestions would not be necessary if
institutions currently backed their IRB members with greater non-financial rewards and
support. The current culture within academic medical centers simply places a much higher
premium on productive clinical researchers than it does on good IRB service.
394. See Campbell et al., supra note 359, at 834 (finding that recent service on an IRB was
limited to only eleven percent of faculty members and speculating the low IRB participation
rate by medical faculty is due to how little value is placed on this activity compared to
publishing articles, obtaining grants, and the like).
395. As Robert Levine aptly notes:
The most important problem for the human subjects protection system is that
the workers-the IRB members-are frustrated and disillusioned. These people
... have received no reward apart from the satisfaction of doing something
important. Now, they are weary of reading repeatedly that public opinion ... sees
them as largely incompetent.
Levine, supra note 21, at 162.
396. See id.; Slater, supra note 389, at 1404 ("Why should service on IRBs be considered
onerous? Perhaps the privilege of conducting clinical research should carry with it the
responsibility to serve on the IRB.... It is the responsibility of our [clinical research] profession
to serve [research subjects] to the best of our ability.").
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CONCLUSION
IRBs function as the "sine qua non"397 in the current regulatory
system of protecting research subjects. Yet, the simple fact remains
that while IRBs have, throughout their history, been tasked with
many responsibilities and charges, insufficient attention has been
paid to the IRB as an institutional and governance body itself.
Questions such as why IRBs perform and operate as they do, what
their capacity, functional characteristics, and structures realistically
allow, and what roles they are well-suited for can be easily over-
looked or given short-shift in the larger debates over the direction
of human subjects research.
Recognizing IRBs' many parallels and shared features with
corporate boards, if nothing else, should make clear that simple
solutions for changing board dynamics and performance are difficult
to prescribe. IRBs, as well as corporate boards, function as very
complex oversight bodies, and a number of factors influence their
performance. The experience of corporate boards suggests that mere
tweaks in board composition or structure can become easily
attenuated or overborne by other factors. The lesson for IRBs is that
substantively and qualitatively changing performance will likely
prove enormously difficult, with certain board behaviors hard to
control given the fundamental autonomy and insularity of these
institutions. Perhaps even more important, the IRB-corporate board
comparison explored in this Article suggests that there may be
many fruitful areas for future empirical research. More comparative
data on IRB and corporate board behavior with regard to shared
governance issues, such as board insider/outsider composition or
effectiveness as financial conflicts monitors, could prove very useful
in further understanding board dynamics and IRB capabilities.
This Article is not intended to sound complacent about the
present performance of the nation's IRBs. Nor is it intended to
suggest that increased monitoring by IRBs is per se unwelcome or
that reform attempts are irrevocably misguided, destined for failure,
and not worth pursuing. Whatever direction IRB reform takes,
however, it is important to have a more realistic understanding of
IRBs' unappreciated non-monitoring capabilities, the implications
397. Slater, supra note 389, at 1403.
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of the monitoring trade-off dilemma, IRBs' overall capacity and
functional constraints, and the social norms that drive IRB member
conduct. In short, greater consideration needs to be paid to the IRB's
strengths and limitations as a governance and oversight institution.
This requires reconsidering IRBs in a fresh, different light, account-
ing for what makes them tick and what they can and cannot do well.
For these reasons, trying to learn more from the comparable
experience of corporate boards could help a great deal.
